CWE-116
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Encoding or Escaping of Output
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved.
705 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9F5V-36FP-5CV6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:11 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:11The PGObject::Util::DBAdmin module before 0.120.0 for Perl, as used in LedgerSMB through 1.5.x, insufficiently sanitizes or escapes variable values used as part of shell command execution, resulting in shell code injection via the create(), run_file(), backup(), or restore() function. The vulnerability allows unauthorized users to execute code with the same privileges as the running application.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-9246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-08T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The PGObject::Util::DBAdmin module before 0.120.0 for Perl, as used in LedgerSMB through 1.5.x, insufficiently sanitizes or escapes variable values used as part of shell command execution, resulting in shell code injection via the create(), run_file(), backup(), or restore() function. The vulnerability allows unauthorized users to execute code with the same privileges as the running application.",
"id": "GHSA-9f5v-36fp-5cv6",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:11:18Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:11:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-9246"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://archive.ledgersmb.org/ledger-smb-announce/msg00280.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9FHH-GQV6-6CP4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:53 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:53The console in Apache jUDDI 3.0.0 does not properly escape line feeds, which allows remote authenticated users to spoof log entries via the numRows parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4267"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-02-19T16:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The console in Apache jUDDI 3.0.0 does not properly escape line feeds, which allows remote authenticated users to spoof log entries via the numRows parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-9fhh-gqv6-6cp4",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:53:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:53:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://juddi.apache.org/security.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/juddi-user/201802.mbox/raw/%3C0F272EE1-E2B4-4016-8C5D-F76ABDD12D18%40gmail.com%3E"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9FWW-8CPR-Q66R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-24 16:03 – Updated: 2026-02-24 16:03Impact
This is a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting the website and author comment fields. The website field was HTML-escaped using quote=False, which left single and double quotes unescaped. Since the frontend inserts the website value directly into a single-quoted href attribute via string concatenation, a single quote in the URL breaks out of the attribute context, allowing injection of arbitrary event handlers (e.g. onmouseover, onclick).
The same escaping was missing entirely from the user-facing comment edit endpoint (PUT /id/) and the moderation edit endpoint (POST /id//edit/).
Any visitor to a page embedding isso comments is impacted. No authentication or interaction beyond mouse movement is required to trigger a payload — an attacker can post a comment anonymously (moderation is off by default) with a crafted website URL, and the payload persists in the database and fires on every page load. With the full-page invisible overlay technique described in the report, the victim only needs to move their mouse.
Patches
The issue is fixed in commit 3cf27c2. Users should upgrade to a version containing that commit once released. The fix applies html.escape(..., quote=True) to the website field across all three write paths (POST /new, PUT /id/, POST /id//edit/), and adds input validation and escaping to the moderation edit endpoint which previously had neither.
Workarounds
Enabling comment moderation (moderation = enabled = true in isso.cfg) prevents unauthenticated users from publishing comments, raising the bar for exploitation. However, it does not fully mitigate the issue since a moderator activating a malicious comment would still expose visitors. There is no configuration-only workaround that fully prevents the vulnerability.
Resources
- https://docs.python.org/3/library/html.html#html.escape — note the quote parameter
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "isso"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27469"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-24T16:03:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-21T08:16:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nThis is a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting the website and author comment fields. The website field was HTML-escaped using quote=False, which left single and double quotes unescaped. Since the frontend inserts the website value directly into a single-quoted href attribute via string concatenation, a single quote in the URL breaks out of the attribute context, allowing injection of arbitrary event handlers (e.g. onmouseover, onclick).\n\nThe same escaping was missing entirely from the user-facing comment edit endpoint (PUT /id/\u003cid\u003e) and the moderation edit endpoint (POST /id/\u003cid\u003e/edit/\u003ckey\u003e).\n\nAny visitor to a page embedding isso comments is impacted. No authentication or interaction beyond mouse movement is required to trigger a payload \u2014 an attacker can post a comment anonymously (moderation is off by default) with a crafted website URL, and the payload persists in the database and fires on every page load. With the full-page invisible overlay technique described in the report, the victim only needs to move their mouse.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue is fixed in commit 3cf27c2. Users should upgrade to a version containing that commit once released. The fix applies html.escape(..., quote=True) to the website field across all three write paths (POST /new, PUT /id/\u003cid\u003e, POST /id/\u003cid\u003e/edit/\u003ckey\u003e), and adds input validation and escaping to the moderation edit endpoint which previously had neither.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n Enabling comment moderation (moderation = enabled = true in isso.cfg) prevents unauthenticated users from publishing comments, raising the bar for exploitation. However, it\n does not fully mitigate the issue since a moderator activating a malicious comment would still expose visitors. There is no configuration-only workaround that fully prevents\n the vulnerability.\n\n## Resources\n\n - https://docs.python.org/3/library/html.html#html.escape \u2014 note the quote parameter",
"id": "GHSA-9fww-8cpr-q66r",
"modified": "2026-02-24T16:03:04Z",
"published": "2026-02-24T16:03:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isso-comments/isso/security/advisories/GHSA-9fww-8cpr-q66r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27469"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isso-comments/isso/commit/0afbfe0691ee237963e8fb0b2ee01c9e55ca2144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.python.org/3/library/html.html#html.escape"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/isso-comments/isso"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Isso affected by Stored XSS via comment website field"
}
GHSA-9GQ4-2485-Q63Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 15:33 – Updated: 2026-09-02 21:31A flaw was found in CRI-O. The fix for a previous vulnerability (CVE-2022-4318) was incorrect, allowing it to be bypassed. An attacker capable of setting environment variables on a container can inject a newline character into the HOME environment variable. This issue allows the addition of arbitrary lines into /etc/passwd by use of a specially crafted environment variable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15809"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-134"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T13:17:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in CRI-O. The fix for a previous vulnerability (CVE-2022-4318) was incorrect, allowing it to be bypassed. An attacker capable of setting environment variables on a container can inject a newline character into the HOME environment variable. This issue allows the addition of arbitrary lines into /etc/passwd by use of a specially crafted environment variable.",
"id": "GHSA-9gq4-2485-q63q",
"modified": "2026-09-02T21:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T15:33:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/pull/6450"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o/pull/6524"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:57361"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60444"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60449"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60452"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-15809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2022-4318"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2500846"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HCH-G858-CR9J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-02 15:30 – Updated: 2024-02-02 15:30IBM Tivoli Application Dependency Discovery Manager 7.3.0.0 through 7.3.0.10 is vulnerable to HTTP header injection, caused by improper validation of input by the HOST headers. This could allow an attacker to conduct various attacks against the vulnerable system, including cross-site scripting, cache poisoning or session hijacking. IBM X-Force ID: 270270.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-47143"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-644"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-02T13:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "IBM Tivoli Application Dependency Discovery Manager 7.3.0.0 through 7.3.0.10 is vulnerable to HTTP header injection, caused by improper validation of input by the HOST headers. This could allow an attacker to conduct various attacks against the vulnerable system, including cross-site scripting, cache poisoning or session hijacking. IBM X-Force ID: 270270.",
"id": "GHSA-9hch-g858-cr9j",
"modified": "2024-02-02T15:30:28Z",
"published": "2024-02-02T15:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47143"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/270270"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7105139"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HHC-PJ4W-W5RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-01 17:38 – Updated: 2023-09-26 13:59A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was found in the oob OAuth endpoint due to incorrect null-byte handling. This issue allows a malicious link to insert an arbitrary URI into a Keycloak error page.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-parent"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "20.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-4137"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-01T17:38:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-25T20:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was found in the `oob` OAuth endpoint due to incorrect null-byte handling. This issue allows a malicious link to insert an arbitrary URI into a Keycloak error page.",
"id": "GHSA-9hhc-pj4w-w5rv",
"modified": "2023-09-26T13:59:05Z",
"published": "2023-03-01T17:38:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/security/advisories/GHSA-9hhc-pj4w-w5rv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/pull/16774"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/commit/30d0e9d22dae51392e5a3748a1c68c116667359a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:1043"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:1044"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:1045"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:1049"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-4137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2148496"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Keycloak Cross-site Scripting on OpenID connect login service"
}
GHSA-9PG3-25FQ-P6CC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 22:13 – Updated: 2026-06-10 22:13internal/web/operators.go:251 — after handleOperatorCreateAPIKey mints a fresh 32-byte bearer token, the redirect points the operator's browser at:
/ui/operators/<id>?new_key=<raw-token>&key_name=<name>
The raw API key ends up:
- in the browser's URL history
- in the Referer header on every cross-origin asset the detail page loads (any third-party SVG/CSS/JS resource the layout pulls in)
- in any reverse-proxy or load-balancer access log on the path (nginx default combined log captures the query string)
- in any structured log sink the operator's local browser-history backup tool ships out
Authorization: Bearer <token> headers go through the same hops without these problems because access logs typically don't capture request headers and the browser doesn't replay headers cross-origin.
Same handler also appends name (r.FormValue("name")) to the query string without url.QueryEscape, so an & in the operator-supplied key name corrupts query parsing and a \r\n in older proxies could split response headers.
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.1.
Reproducer
As admin, create an API key via /ui/operators/<id>/api-keys (form POST). The 303 Location header carries the raw token in the query string. Open browser DevTools → Network → response headers; or check the reverse-proxy access log; or check the operator-detail page's Referer-emitting fetches.
Suggested fix
Stash the raw key in a one-shot server-side flash storage (e.g., a row in operator_sessions keyed by session token, with a one_shot_token column and consumed_at) or in a short-lived signed cookie. Render the key once inline on the detail page after the redirect, and clear the storage on render. Pattern mirrors the recovery-codes display in the TOTP flow.
If the flash-storage refactor is too invasive, the minimal fix is to render the key inline via a POST → 200 OK with HTML (no redirect), losing the post-redirect-get idiom but eliminating the URL exposure.
Also fix name query encoding with url.QueryEscape regardless of which fix shape lands.
CVSS estimate
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N — 5.5 (medium). AV:L because realistic exploit requires log-read access on shared infrastructure (proxy, CDN, browser-history backup) the operator's session touches.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47768"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-532",
"CWE-598"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-10T22:13:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`internal/web/operators.go:251` \u2014 after `handleOperatorCreateAPIKey` mints a fresh 32-byte bearer token, the redirect points the operator\u0027s browser at:\n\n /ui/operators/\u003cid\u003e?new_key=\u003craw-token\u003e\u0026key_name=\u003cname\u003e\n\nThe raw API key ends up:\n- in the browser\u0027s URL history\n- in the `Referer` header on every cross-origin asset the detail page loads (any third-party SVG/CSS/JS resource the layout pulls in)\n- in any reverse-proxy or load-balancer access log on the path (nginx default `combined` log captures the query string)\n- in any structured log sink the operator\u0027s local browser-history backup tool ships out\n\n`Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` headers go through the same hops without these problems because access logs typically don\u0027t capture request headers and the browser doesn\u0027t replay headers cross-origin.\n\nSame handler also appends `name` (`r.FormValue(\"name\")`) to the query string without `url.QueryEscape`, so an `\u0026` in the operator-supplied key name corrupts query parsing and a `\\r\\n` in older proxies could split response headers.\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions up to v0.3.1.\n\n## Reproducer\nAs admin, create an API key via `/ui/operators/\u003cid\u003e/api-keys` (form POST). The 303 Location header carries the raw token in the query string. Open browser DevTools \u2192 Network \u2192 response headers; or check the reverse-proxy access log; or check the operator-detail page\u0027s `Referer`-emitting fetches.\n\n## Suggested fix\nStash the raw key in a one-shot server-side flash storage (e.g., a row in `operator_sessions` keyed by session token, with a `one_shot_token` column and `consumed_at`) or in a short-lived signed cookie. Render the key once inline on the detail page after the redirect, and clear the storage on render. Pattern mirrors the recovery-codes display in the TOTP flow.\n\nIf the flash-storage refactor is too invasive, the minimal fix is to render the key inline via a `POST` \u2192 `200 OK with HTML` (no redirect), losing the post-redirect-get idiom but eliminating the URL exposure.\n\nAlso fix `name` query encoding with `url.QueryEscape` regardless of which fix shape lands.\n\n## CVSS estimate\nAV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N \u2014 5.5 (medium). AV:L because realistic exploit requires log-read access on shared infrastructure (proxy, CDN, browser-history backup) the operator\u0027s session touches.",
"id": "GHSA-9pg3-25fq-p6cc",
"modified": "2026-06-10T22:13:45Z",
"published": "2026-06-10T22:13:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-9pg3-25fq-p6cc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "nebula-mesh: Newly-minted operator API key exposed in redirect URL (Referer, history, proxy logs)"
}
GHSA-9QF4-6P5H-R4F5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-09 18:30SAP BusinessObjects Business Intelligence Platform lets an unauthenticated remote attacker send crafted requests through the URL parameter that controls the login page error message. This can cause the server to fetch attacker-supplied URLs, resulting in low impact to confidentiality and integrity, and no impact to availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-42896"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:17:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SAP BusinessObjects Business Intelligence Platform lets an unauthenticated remote attacker send crafted requests through the URL parameter that controls the login page error message. This can cause the server to fetch attacker-supplied URLs, resulting in low impact to confidentiality and integrity, and no impact to availability.",
"id": "GHSA-9qf4-6p5h-r4f5",
"modified": "2025-12-09T18:30:37Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T18:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-42896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://me.sap.com/notes/3651390"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://url.sap/sapsecuritypatchday"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9VJF-QC39-JPRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 19:32 – Updated: 2026-03-19 20:49Impact
User control of the argument of the addJS method allows an attacker to inject arbitrary PDF objects into the generated document. By crafting a payload that escapes the JavaScript string delimiter, an attacker can execute malicious actions or alter the document structure, impacting any user who opens the generated PDF.
import { jsPDF } from "jspdf";
const doc = new jsPDF();
// Payload:
// 1. ) closes the JS string.
// 2. > closes the current dictionary.
// 3. /AA ... injects an "Additional Action" that executes on focus/open.
const maliciousPayload = "console.log('test');) >> /AA << /O << /S /JavaScript /JS (app.alert('Hacked!')) >> >>";
doc.addJS(maliciousPayload);
doc.save("vulnerable.pdf");
Patches
The vulnerability has been fixed in jspdf@4.2.0.
Workarounds
Escape parentheses in user-provided JavaScript code before passing them to the addJS method.
References
https://github.com/ZeroXJacks/CVEs/blob/main/2026/CVE-2026-25755.md
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "jspdf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25755"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T19:32:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T15:16:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nUser control of the argument of the `addJS` method allows an attacker to inject arbitrary PDF objects into the generated document. By crafting a payload that escapes the JavaScript string delimiter, an attacker can execute malicious actions or alter the document structure, impacting any user who opens the generated PDF.\n\n```js\nimport { jsPDF } from \"jspdf\";\nconst doc = new jsPDF();\n// Payload:\n// 1. ) closes the JS string.\n// 2. \u003e closes the current dictionary.\n// 3. /AA ... injects an \"Additional Action\" that executes on focus/open.\nconst maliciousPayload = \"console.log(\u0027test\u0027);) \u003e\u003e /AA \u003c\u003c /O \u003c\u003c /S /JavaScript /JS (app.alert(\u0027Hacked!\u0027)) \u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\";\n\ndoc.addJS(maliciousPayload);\ndoc.save(\"vulnerable.pdf\");\n```\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been fixed in jspdf@4.2.0.\n\n### Workarounds\nEscape parentheses in user-provided JavaScript code before passing them to the `addJS` method.\n### References\nhttps://github.com/ZeroXJacks/CVEs/blob/main/2026/CVE-2026-25755.md",
"id": "GHSA-9vjf-qc39-jprp",
"modified": "2026-03-19T20:49:36Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T19:32:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF/security/advisories/GHSA-9vjf-qc39-jprp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF/commit/56b46d45b052346f5995b005a34af5dcdddd5437"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZeroXJacks/CVEs/blob/main/2026/CVE-2026-25755.md"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parallax/jsPDF/releases/tag/v4.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "jsPDF has a PDF Object Injection via Unsanitized Input in addJS Method"
}
GHSA-9WXG-VF3R-56HC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 17:45 – Updated: 2026-06-19 17:45Summary
The Contracts Wizard generators printed info.securityContact and info.license verbatim into a single-line comment of the generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source without rejecting line terminators. A newline (\n or \r\n) in either field ends the comment, so the text after it is emitted as source rather than remaining inside the comment — allowing arbitrary declarations to be injected into the generated contract.
Impact
This only matters when these fields are filled from input other than the user who will use the generated contract. Normal self-service use does not meet that condition:
- Web app, AI assistant, and CLI: the user supplies these fields and uses their own output, so a line break only affects their own contract. (These fields are not URL-derived, so shared links cannot set them.)
- Self-hosted API: same — the end user supplies the options and consumes the result.
The case that matters is an integration that fills these fields from untrusted input — for example, an MCP agent whose tool arguments are derived from content it processed. There, a newline in the value can add lines to output that otherwise looks like normal Wizard source. Impact is integrity-only; there is no execution on any Wizard service.
Patches
Fixed by rejecting line terminators in setInfo — the single code path all surfaces use — so the value can no longer break out of the comment. Upgrade to the patched versions. @openzeppelin/wizard-confidential and @openzeppelin/wizard-uniswap-hooks reuse this setInfo through their @openzeppelin/wizard dependency and receive the fix once that dependency is updated to a patched version.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.10.10"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/wizard"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.10.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/wizard-cairo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/wizard-stellar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/wizard-stylus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T17:45:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Contracts Wizard generators printed `info.securityContact` and `info.license` verbatim into a single-line comment of the generated Solidity, Cairo, Stellar/Soroban, and Stylus source without rejecting line terminators. A newline (`\\n` or `\\r\\n`) in either field ends the comment, so the text after it is emitted as source rather than remaining inside the comment \u2014 allowing arbitrary declarations to be injected into the generated contract.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis only matters when these fields are filled from input other than the user who will use the generated contract. Normal self-service use does not meet that condition:\n\n- **Web app, AI assistant, and CLI:** the user supplies these fields and uses their own output, so a line break only affects their own contract. (These fields are not URL-derived, so shared links cannot set them.)\n- **Self-hosted API:** same \u2014 the end user supplies the options and consumes the result.\n\nThe case that matters is an integration that fills these fields from untrusted input \u2014 for example, an MCP agent whose tool arguments are derived from content it processed. There, a newline in the value can add lines to output that otherwise looks like normal Wizard source. Impact is integrity-only; there is no execution on any Wizard service.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed by rejecting line terminators in `setInfo` \u2014 the single code path all surfaces use \u2014 so the value can no longer break out of the comment. Upgrade to the patched versions. `@openzeppelin/wizard-confidential` and `@openzeppelin/wizard-uniswap-hooks` reuse this `setInfo` through their `@openzeppelin/wizard` dependency and receive the fix once that dependency is updated to a patched version.",
"id": "GHSA-9wxg-vf3r-56hc",
"modified": "2026-06-19T17:45:15Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T17:45:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard/security/advisories/GHSA-9wxg-vf3r-56hc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/contracts-wizard"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizard: Line terminators in info.securityContact / info.license can inject lines into generated source"
}
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
- Alternately, use built-in functions, but consider using wrappers in case those functions are discovered to have a vulnerability.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- For example, stored procedures can enforce database query structure and reduce the likelihood of SQL injection.
Mitigation
Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
Mitigation
In some cases, input validation may be an important strategy when output encoding is not a complete solution. For example, you may be providing the same output that will be processed by multiple consumers that use different encodings or representations. In other cases, you may be required to allow user-supplied input to contain control information, such as limited HTML tags that support formatting in a wiki or bulletin board. When this type of requirement must be met, use an extremely strict allowlist to limit which control sequences can be used. Verify that the resulting syntactic structure is what you expect. Use your normal encoding methods for the remainder of the input.
Mitigation
Use input validation as a defense-in-depth measure to reduce the likelihood of output encoding errors (see CWE-20).
Mitigation
Fully specify which encodings are required by components that will be communicating with each other.
Mitigation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename
An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.
CAPEC-81: Web Server Logs Tampering
Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.