rustsec-2025-0139
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
The application loads custom Python rules and configuration files from user-writable locations (e.g., ~/.config/theshit/) without validating ownership or permissions when executed with elevated privileges.
If the tool is invoked with sudo or otherwise runs with an effective UID of root, it continues to trust configuration files originating from the unprivileged user's environment. This allows a local attacker to inject arbitrary Python code via a malicious rule or configuration file, which is then executed with root privileges.
The patch introduces strict ownership and permission checks for all configuration files and custom rules. The application now enforces that rules are only loaded if they are owned by the effective user executing the tool.
When executed with elevated privileges (EUID=0), the application refuses to load any files that are not owned by root or that are writable by non-root users. When executed as a non-root user, it similarly refuses to load rules owned by other users. This prevents both vertical and horizontal privilege escalation via execution of untrusted code.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"privilege-escalation",
"code-execution"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"theshit::fix::python::process_python_rules"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "theshit",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/theshit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.1"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69257",
"GHSA-95qg-89c2-w5hj"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC-BY-4.0"
},
"details": "The application loads custom Python rules and configuration files from user-writable locations (e.g., `~/.config/theshit/`) without validating ownership or permissions when executed with elevated privileges.\n\nIf the tool is invoked with `sudo` or otherwise runs with an effective UID of root, it continues to trust configuration files originating from the unprivileged user\u0027s environment. This allows a local attacker to inject arbitrary Python code via a malicious rule or configuration file, which is then executed with root privileges.\n\nThe patch introduces strict ownership and permission checks for all configuration files and custom rules. The application now enforces that rules are only loaded if they are owned by the effective user executing the tool.\n\nWhen executed with elevated privileges (`EUID=0`), the application refuses to load any files that are not owned by root or that are writable by non-root users. When executed as a non-root user, it similarly refuses to load rules owned by other users. This prevents both vertical and horizontal privilege escalation via execution of untrusted code.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2025-0139",
"modified": "2026-01-04T20:34:25Z",
"published": "2025-12-30T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/theshit"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0139.html"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-95qg-89c2-w5hj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AsfhtgkDavid/theshit/commit/8e0b565e7876a83b0e1cfbacb8af39dadfdcc500"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "theshit vulnerable to unsafe loading of user-owned Python rules when running as root"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.