rustsec-2025-0110
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2025-10-21 12:00
Modified
2025-10-25 11:18
Summary
astral-tokio-tar Vulnerable to PAX Header Desynchronization
Details
Versions of astral-tokio-tar prior to 0.5.6 contain a boundary parsing vulnerability that allows attackers to smuggle additional archive entries by exploiting inconsistent PAX/ustar header handling. When processing archives with PAX-extended headers containing size overrides, the parser incorrectly advances stream position based on ustar header size (often zero) instead of the PAX-specified size, causing it to interpret file content as legitimate tar headers.
This vulnerability was disclosed to multiple Rust tar parsers, all derived from the original async-tar fork of tar-rs.
For additional information see Edera's blog post.
Severity
8.1 (High)
References
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"format-injection"
],
"cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "astral-tokio-tar",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/astral-tokio-tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.6"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62518",
"GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "Versions of astral-tokio-tar prior to 0.5.6 contain a boundary parsing\nvulnerability that allows attackers to smuggle additional archive entries by\nexploiting inconsistent PAX/ustar header handling. When processing archives with\nPAX-extended headers containing size overrides, the parser incorrectly advances\nstream position based on ustar header size (often zero) instead of the\nPAX-specified size, causing it to interpret file content as legitimate tar\nheaders.\n\nThis vulnerability was disclosed to multiple Rust tar parsers, all derived from\nthe original async-tar fork of tar-rs.\n\nFor additional information see\n[Edera\u0027s blog post](https://edera.dev/stories/tarmageddon).",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2025-0110",
"modified": "2025-10-25T11:18:52Z",
"published": "2025-10-21T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/astral-tokio-tar"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0110.html"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "astral-tokio-tar Vulnerable to PAX Header Desynchronization"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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