ghsa-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-10-21 15:42
Modified
2025-10-27 15:13
Summary
astral-tokio-tar Vulnerable to PAX Header Desynchronization
Details

Summary

Versions of astral-tokio-tar prior to 0.5.6 contain a boundary parsing vulnerability that allows attackers to smuggle additional archive entries by exploiting inconsistent PAX/ustar header handling. When processing archives with PAX-extended headers containing size overrides, the parser incorrectly advances stream position based on ustar header size (often zero) instead of the PAX-specified size, causing it to interpret file content as legitimate tar headers.

This vulnerability was disclosed to multiple Rust tar parsers, all derived from the original async-tar fork of tar-rs.

Details

Vulnerability Description

The vulnerability stems from inconsistent handling of PAX extended headers versus ustar headers when determining file data boundaries. Specifically:

  1. PAX header correctly specifies the file size (e.g., size=1048576)
  2. ustar header incorrectly specifies zero size (size=000000000000)
  3. tokio-tar advances the stream position based on the ustar size (0 bytes)
  4. Inner content is then interpreted as legitimate outer archive entries

Attack Mechanism

When a TAR file contains:

  • An outer entry with PAX size=N but ustar size=0
  • File data that begins with valid TAR header structures
  • The parser treats inner content as additional outer entries

This creates a header/data desynchronization where the parser's position becomes misaligned with actual file boundaries.

Root Cause

```rust // Vulnerable: Uses ustar size instead of PAX override let file_size = header.size(); // Returns 0 from ustar field let next_pos = current_pos + 512 + pad_to_512(file_size); // Advances 0 bytes

// Fixed: Apply PAX overrides before position calculation let mut file_size = header.size(); if let Some(pax_size) = pending_pax.get("size") { file_size = pax_size.parse().unwrap(); } let next_pos = current_pos + 512 + pad_to_512(file_size); // Correct advance

```

Impact

The impact of this vulnerability depends on where astral-tokio-tar is used, and whether it is used to extract untrusted tar archives. If used to extract untrusted inputs, it may result in unexpected attacker-controlled access to the filesystem, in turn potential resulting in arbitrary code execution or credential exfiltration.

See GHSA-w476-p2h3-79g9 for how this vulnerability affects uv, astral-tokio-tar's primary downstream user. Observe that unlike this advisory,uv's advisory is considered low severity due to overlap with intentional existing capabilities in source distributions.

Workarounds

Users are advised to upgrade to version 0.5.6 or newer to address this advisory.

There is no workaround other than upgrading.

Timeline

| Date | Event | | --- | --- | | Aug 21, 2025 | Vulnerability discovered by Edera Security Team | | Aug 21, 2025 | Initial analysis and PoC confirmed | | Aug 22, 2025 | Maintainers notified (privately) | | Aug 25, 2025 | Private patch and test suite shared | | Oct 7, 2025 | Text freeze for GHSA | | Oct 21, 2025 | Coordinated public disclosure and patched releases |

Credits

  • Discovered by: Steven Noonan (Edera) and Alex Zenla (Edera)
  • Coordinated disclosure: Ann Wallace (Edera)
Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "astral-tokio-tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62518"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-843"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-21T15:42:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-21T17:15:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nVersions of `astral-tokio-tar` prior to 0.5.6 contain a boundary parsing vulnerability that allows attackers to smuggle additional archive entries by exploiting inconsistent PAX/ustar header handling. When processing archives with PAX-extended headers containing size overrides, the parser incorrectly advances stream position based on ustar header size (often zero) instead of the PAX-specified size, causing it to interpret file content as legitimate tar headers.\n\nThis vulnerability was disclosed to multiple Rust tar parsers, all derived from the original `async-tar` fork of `tar-rs`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerability Description\n\nThe vulnerability stems from inconsistent handling of PAX extended headers versus ustar headers when determining file data boundaries. Specifically:\n\n1. **PAX header** correctly specifies the file size (e.g., `size=1048576`)\n2. **ustar header** incorrectly specifies zero size (`size=000000000000`)\n3. **tokio-tar** advances the stream position based on the ustar size (0 bytes)\n4. **Inner content** is then interpreted as legitimate outer archive entries\n\n### Attack Mechanism\n\nWhen a TAR file contains:\n\n- An outer entry with PAX `size=N` but ustar `size=0`\n- File data that begins with valid TAR header structures\n- The parser treats inner content as additional outer entries\n\nThis creates a **header/data desynchronization** where the parser\u0027s position becomes misaligned with actual file boundaries.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n```rust\n// Vulnerable: Uses ustar size instead of PAX override\nlet file_size = header.size(); // Returns 0 from ustar field\nlet next_pos = current_pos + 512 + pad_to_512(file_size); // Advances 0 bytes\n\n// Fixed: Apply PAX overrides before position calculation\nlet mut file_size = header.size();\nif let Some(pax_size) = pending_pax.get(\"size\") {\n    file_size = pax_size.parse().unwrap();\n}\nlet next_pos = current_pos + 512 + pad_to_512(file_size); // Correct advance\n\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability depends on where `astral-tokio-tar` is used, and whether it is used to extract untrusted tar archives. If used to extract untrusted inputs, it may result in unexpected attacker-controlled access to the filesystem, in turn potential resulting in arbitrary code execution or credential exfiltration.\n\nSee [**GHSA-w476-p2h3-79g9**](https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/security/advisories/GHSA-w476-p2h3-79g9) for how this vulnerability affects `uv`, `astral-tokio-tar`\u0027s primary downstream user. Observe that **unlike** this advisory,` uv`\u0027s advisory is considered **low severity** due to overlap with intentional existing capabilities in source distributions. \n\n## Workarounds\n\nUsers are advised to upgrade to version 0.5.6 or newer to address this advisory.\n\nThere is no workaround other than upgrading.\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n| --- | --- |\n| Aug 21, 2025 | Vulnerability discovered by Edera Security Team |\n| Aug 21, 2025 | Initial analysis and PoC confirmed |\n| Aug 22, 2025 | Maintainers notified (privately) |\n| Aug 25, 2025 | Private patch and test suite shared |\n| Oct 7, 2025 | Text freeze for GHSA |\n| Oct 21, 2025 | Coordinated public disclosure and patched releases |\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Discovered by:** Steven Noonan (Edera) and Alex Zenla (Edera)\n- **Coordinated disclosure:** Ann Wallace (Edera)",
  "id": "GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx",
  "modified": "2025-10-27T15:13:02Z",
  "published": "2025-10-21T15:42:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/security/advisories/GHSA-w476-p2h3-79g9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar/commit/22b3f884adb7a2adf1d3a8d03469533f5cbc8318"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://edera.dev/stories/tarmageddon"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edera-dev/cve-tarmageddon"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0110.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "astral-tokio-tar Vulnerable to PAX Header Desynchronization"
}


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