rustsec-2024-0432
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2024-12-18 12:00
Modified
2025-01-03 18:23
Summary
Malicious plugin names, recipients, or identities can cause arbitrary binary execution
Details

A plugin name containing a path separator may allow an attacker to execute an arbitrary binary.

Such a plugin name can be provided to the rage CLI through an attacker-controlled recipient or identity string, or an attacker-controlled plugin name via the -j flag.

On UNIX systems, a directory matching age-plugin-* needs to exist in the working directory for the attack to succeed.

The binary is executed with a single flag, either --age-plugin=recipient-v1 or --age-plugin=identity-v1. The standard input includes the recipient or identity string, and the random file key (if encrypting) or the header of the file (if decrypting). The format is constrained by the age-plugin protocol.

An equivalent issue was fixed in the reference Go implementation of age, see advisory GHSA-32gq-x56h-299c.

Thanks to ⬡-49016 for reporting this issue.

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "code-execution"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rage",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/rage"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.1"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.2"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.2"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.3"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.1"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-4fg7-vxc8-qx5w"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "A plugin name containing a path separator may allow an attacker to execute an arbitrary\nbinary.\n\nSuch a plugin name can be provided to the `rage` CLI through an attacker-controlled\nrecipient or identity string, or an attacker-controlled plugin name via the `-j` flag.\n\nOn UNIX systems, a directory matching `age-plugin-*` needs to exist in the working\ndirectory for the attack to succeed.\n\nThe binary is executed with a single flag, either `--age-plugin=recipient-v1` or\n`--age-plugin=identity-v1`. The standard input includes the recipient or identity string,\nand the random file key (if encrypting) or the header of the file (if decrypting). The\nformat is constrained by the [age-plugin](https://c2sp.org/age-plugin) protocol.\n\nAn equivalent issue was fixed in [the reference Go implementation of age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age),\nsee advisory [GHSA-32gq-x56h-299c](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age/security/advisories/GHSA-32gq-x56h-299c).\n\nThanks to \u2b21-49016 for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2024-0432",
  "modified": "2025-01-03T18:23:54Z",
  "published": "2024-12-18T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/rage"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0432.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/str4d/rage/security/advisories/GHSA-4fg7-vxc8-qx5w"
    }
  ],
  "related": [
    "GHSA-32gq-x56h-299c"
  ],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Malicious plugin names, recipients, or identities can cause arbitrary binary execution"
}


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