RUSTSEC-2020-0124 (CVE-2020-36444)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2020-12-08 12:00 – Updated: 2023-06-13 13:10 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
ArcGuard's Send and Sync should have bounds on RC
Details

Affected versions of this crate implement Send/Sync for ArcGuard<RC, T> with no trait bounds on RC. This allows users to send RC: !Send to other threads and also allows users to concurrently access Rc: !Sync from multiple threads.

This can result in memory corruption from data race or other undefined behavior caused by sending T: !Send to other threads (e.g. dropping MutexGuard<T> in another thread that didn't lock its mutex).


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption",
          "thread-safety"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "async-coap",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/async-coap"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36444",
    "GHSA-9j8q-m9x5-9g6j"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of this crate implement Send/Sync for `ArcGuard\u003cRC, T\u003e` with no trait bounds on `RC`. This allows users to send `RC: !Send` to other threads and also allows users to concurrently access `Rc: !Sync` from multiple threads.\n\nThis can result in memory corruption from data race or other undefined behavior caused by sending `T: !Send` to other threads (e.g. dropping `MutexGuard\u003cT\u003e` in another thread that didn\u0027t lock its mutex).",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2020-0124",
  "modified": "2023-06-13T13:10:24Z",
  "published": "2020-12-08T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/async-coap"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0124.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/google/rust-async-coap/issues/33"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ArcGuard\u0027s Send and Sync should have bounds on RC"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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