PYSEC-2026-3725
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-10 19:17 - Updated: 2026-08-27 23:45
VLAI
Details
Prowler is a cloud security platform. Prior to 5.30.3, Prowler's SAML authentication flow trusted the email domain asserted in a SAMLResponse when deciding which tenant should receive the final token, and the ACS finish logic in api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py recalculated the tenant from user.email instead of binding token issuance to the validated SAML configuration. An authenticated attacker with a controlled SAML IdP could complete a valid SAML flow for an attacker-controlled domain while asserting an email address from another configured domain, causing a SAMLToken and tenant-scoped JWT to be issued for the wrong tenant and enabling cross-tenant account takeover. This issue is fixed in version 5.30.3.
Severity
9.6 (Critical)
Impacted products
| Name | purl | prowler-cloud | pkg:pypi/prowler-cloud |
|---|
Aliases
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "prowler-cloud",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/prowler-cloud"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.30.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.0rc1",
"0.0.0rc10",
"0.0.0rc11",
"0.0.0rc2",
"0.0.0rc3",
"0.0.0rc4",
"0.0.0rc5",
"0.0.0rc6",
"0.0.0rc7",
"0.0.0rc8",
"0.0.0rc9",
"3.0.0",
"3.0.0rc1",
"3.0.0rc11",
"3.0.0rc12",
"3.0.0rc13",
"3.0.0rc14",
"3.0.0rc15",
"3.0.1",
"3.0.2",
"3.1.0",
"3.1.1",
"3.1.2",
"3.1.3",
"3.1.4",
"3.10.0",
"3.11.0",
"3.11.1",
"3.11.2",
"3.11.3",
"3.12.0",
"3.12.1",
"3.13.0",
"3.13.1",
"3.14.0",
"3.15.0",
"3.15.1",
"3.15.2",
"3.15.3",
"3.16.0",
"3.16.1",
"3.16.10",
"3.16.11",
"3.16.12",
"3.16.13",
"3.16.14",
"3.16.15",
"3.16.17",
"3.16.2",
"3.16.3",
"3.16.4",
"3.16.5",
"3.16.6",
"3.16.7",
"3.16.8",
"3.16.9",
"3.2.0",
"3.2.1",
"3.2.2",
"3.2.3",
"3.2.4",
"3.3.0",
"3.3.1",
"3.3.2",
"3.3.3",
"3.3.4",
"3.4.0",
"3.4.1",
"3.5.0",
"3.5.1",
"3.5.2",
"3.5.3",
"3.6.0",
"3.6.1",
"3.7.0",
"3.7.1",
"3.7.2",
"3.8.0",
"3.8.1",
"3.8.2",
"3.9.0",
"4.0.0",
"4.0.1",
"4.1.0",
"4.2.0",
"4.2.1",
"4.2.2",
"4.2.3",
"4.2.4",
"4.3.0",
"4.3.1",
"4.3.2",
"4.3.3",
"4.3.4",
"4.3.5",
"4.3.6",
"4.3.7",
"4.4.0",
"4.4.1",
"4.5.0",
"4.5.1",
"4.5.2",
"4.5.3",
"4.6.0",
"4.6.1",
"4.6.2",
"5.0.0",
"5.0.1",
"5.0.2",
"5.0.3",
"5.0.4",
"5.0.5",
"5.1.0",
"5.1.1",
"5.1.2",
"5.1.3",
"5.1.4",
"5.1.5",
"5.10.0",
"5.10.1",
"5.10.2",
"5.11.0",
"5.12.0",
"5.12.1",
"5.12.2",
"5.12.3",
"5.13.0",
"5.13.1",
"5.14.0",
"5.14.1",
"5.14.2",
"5.15.0",
"5.15.1",
"5.16.0",
"5.16.1",
"5.17.0",
"5.17.1",
"5.18.0",
"5.18.1",
"5.18.2",
"5.18.3",
"5.19.0",
"5.2.0",
"5.2.1",
"5.2.2",
"5.2.3",
"5.20.0",
"5.21.0",
"5.21.1",
"5.22.0",
"5.23.0",
"5.24.0",
"5.24.1",
"5.24.2",
"5.24.3",
"5.24.4",
"5.25.0",
"5.25.1",
"5.25.2",
"5.25.3",
"5.26.0",
"5.26.1",
"5.27.0",
"5.27.1",
"5.28.0",
"5.28.1",
"5.29.0",
"5.29.1",
"5.29.2",
"5.3.0",
"5.30.0",
"5.30.1",
"5.30.2",
"5.4.0",
"5.4.1",
"5.4.2",
"5.4.3",
"5.4.4",
"5.5.1",
"5.6.0",
"5.7.0",
"5.7.1",
"5.7.2",
"5.7.3",
"5.7.4",
"5.7.5",
"5.8.0",
"5.8.1",
"5.9.0",
"5.9.1",
"5.9.2"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59151",
"GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp"
],
"details": "Prowler is a cloud security platform. Prior to 5.30.3, Prowler\u0027s SAML authentication flow trusted the email domain asserted in a SAMLResponse when deciding which tenant should receive the final token, and the ACS finish logic in api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py recalculated the tenant from user.email instead of binding token issuance to the validated SAML configuration. An authenticated attacker with a controlled SAML IdP could complete a valid SAML flow for an attacker-controlled domain while asserting an email address from another configured domain, causing a SAMLToken and tenant-scoped JWT to be issued for the wrong tenant and enabling cross-tenant account takeover. This issue is fixed in version 5.30.3.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-3725",
"modified": "2026-08-27T23:45:38.224652Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T19:17:26.780Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/releases/tag/5.30.3"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/pull/11650"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/commit/bf3b5c2ba713e533014927141b64948c82c8f32e"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/commit/f5ff30ad175bd2edf02cd28872653c1cda5867b7"
},
{
"type": "EVIDENCE",
"url": "https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler/security/advisories/GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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