PYSEC-2026-2562
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 14:36 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:04Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in ChatOpenAI Image Token Counting
Summary
The ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages() method fetches arbitrary image_url values without validation when computing token counts for vision-enabled models. This allows attackers to trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by providing malicious image URLs in user input.
Severity
Low - The vulnerability allows SSRF attacks but has limited impact due to: - Responses are not returned to the attacker (blind SSRF) - Default 5-second timeout limits resource exhaustion - Non-image responses fail at PIL image parsing
Impact
An attacker who can control image URLs passed to get_num_tokens_from_messages() can:
- Trigger HTTP requests from the application server to arbitrary internal or external URLs
- Cause the server to access internal network resources (private IPs, cloud metadata endpoints)
- Cause minor resource consumption through image downloads (bounded by timeout)
Note: This vulnerability occurs during token counting, which may happen outside of model invocation (e.g., in logging, metrics, or token budgeting flows).
Details
The vulnerable code path:
1. get_num_tokens_from_messages() processes messages containing image_url content blocks
2. For images without detail: "low", it calls _url_to_size() to fetch the image and compute token counts
3. _url_to_size() performs httpx.get(image_source) on any URL without validation
4. Prior to the patch, there was no SSRF protection, size limits, or explicit timeout
File: libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py
Patches
The vulnerability has been patched in langchain-openai==1.1.9 (requires langchain-core==1.2.11).
The patch adds:
1. SSRF validation using langchain_core._security._ssrf_protection.validate_safe_url() to block:
- Private IP ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local)
- Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc.)
- Invalid URL schemes
2. Explicit size limits (50 MB maximum, matching OpenAI's payload limit)
3. Explicit timeout (5 seconds, same as httpx.get default)
4. Allow disabling image fetching via allow_fetching_images=False parameter
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately:
- Sanitize input: Validate and filter
image_urlvalues before passing messages to token counting or model invocation - Use network controls: Implement egress filtering to prevent outbound requests to private IPs
| Name | purl | langchain-core | pkg:pypi/langchain-core |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "langchain-core",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/langchain-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.0.1",
"0.0.10",
"0.0.11",
"0.0.12",
"0.0.13",
"0.0.13rc1",
"0.0.13rc2",
"0.0.2",
"0.0.3",
"0.0.4",
"0.0.5",
"0.0.6",
"0.0.7",
"0.0.8",
"0.0.9",
"0.1.0",
"0.1.1",
"0.1.10",
"0.1.11",
"0.1.12",
"0.1.12rc1",
"0.1.13",
"0.1.14",
"0.1.15",
"0.1.15rc1",
"0.1.15rc2",
"0.1.16",
"0.1.17",
"0.1.18",
"0.1.19",
"0.1.2",
"0.1.20",
"0.1.21",
"0.1.22",
"0.1.23",
"0.1.24",
"0.1.25",
"0.1.26",
"0.1.27",
"0.1.28",
"0.1.29",
"0.1.3",
"0.1.30",
"0.1.31",
"0.1.32",
"0.1.33",
"0.1.33rc1",
"0.1.34",
"0.1.35",
"0.1.36",
"0.1.37",
"0.1.38",
"0.1.39",
"0.1.4",
"0.1.40",
"0.1.41",
"0.1.42",
"0.1.42rc1",
"0.1.43",
"0.1.44",
"0.1.45",
"0.1.46",
"0.1.47",
"0.1.47rc1",
"0.1.48",
"0.1.49",
"0.1.5",
"0.1.50",
"0.1.51",
"0.1.52",
"0.1.53",
"0.1.6",
"0.1.7",
"0.1.8",
"0.1.9",
"0.2.0",
"0.2.0rc1",
"0.2.1",
"0.2.10",
"0.2.11",
"0.2.12",
"0.2.13",
"0.2.15",
"0.2.16",
"0.2.17",
"0.2.18",
"0.2.19",
"0.2.2",
"0.2.20",
"0.2.21",
"0.2.22",
"0.2.23",
"0.2.24",
"0.2.25",
"0.2.26",
"0.2.27",
"0.2.28",
"0.2.29",
"0.2.29rc1",
"0.2.2rc1",
"0.2.3",
"0.2.30",
"0.2.31",
"0.2.32",
"0.2.33",
"0.2.34",
"0.2.35",
"0.2.36",
"0.2.37",
"0.2.38",
"0.2.39",
"0.2.4",
"0.2.40",
"0.2.41",
"0.2.42",
"0.2.43",
"0.2.5",
"0.2.6",
"0.2.7",
"0.2.8",
"0.2.9",
"0.3.0",
"0.3.0.dev0",
"0.3.0.dev1",
"0.3.0.dev2",
"0.3.0.dev3",
"0.3.0.dev4",
"0.3.0.dev5",
"0.3.1",
"0.3.10",
"0.3.11",
"0.3.12",
"0.3.13",
"0.3.14",
"0.3.15",
"0.3.16",
"0.3.17",
"0.3.18",
"0.3.19",
"0.3.2",
"0.3.20",
"0.3.21",
"0.3.22",
"0.3.23",
"0.3.24",
"0.3.25",
"0.3.26",
"0.3.27",
"0.3.28",
"0.3.29",
"0.3.3",
"0.3.30",
"0.3.31",
"0.3.32",
"0.3.33",
"0.3.34",
"0.3.34rc1",
"0.3.34rc2",
"0.3.35",
"0.3.36",
"0.3.37",
"0.3.38",
"0.3.39",
"0.3.4",
"0.3.40",
"0.3.41",
"0.3.42",
"0.3.43",
"0.3.44",
"0.3.45",
"0.3.45rc1",
"0.3.46",
"0.3.47",
"0.3.48",
"0.3.49",
"0.3.5",
"0.3.50",
"0.3.51",
"0.3.52",
"0.3.53",
"0.3.54",
"0.3.55",
"0.3.56",
"0.3.56rc1",
"0.3.57",
"0.3.58",
"0.3.59",
"0.3.6",
"0.3.60",
"0.3.61",
"0.3.62",
"0.3.63",
"0.3.64",
"0.3.65",
"0.3.66",
"0.3.67",
"0.3.68",
"0.3.69",
"0.3.7",
"0.3.70",
"0.3.71",
"0.3.72",
"0.3.73",
"0.3.74",
"0.3.75",
"0.3.76",
"0.3.77",
"0.3.78",
"0.3.79",
"0.3.8",
"0.3.80",
"0.3.81",
"0.3.82",
"0.3.83",
"0.3.84",
"0.3.85",
"0.3.86",
"0.3.9",
"0.4.0.dev0",
"1.0.0",
"1.0.0a1",
"1.0.0a2",
"1.0.0a3",
"1.0.0a4",
"1.0.0a5",
"1.0.0a6",
"1.0.0a7",
"1.0.0a8",
"1.0.0rc1",
"1.0.0rc2",
"1.0.0rc3",
"1.0.1",
"1.0.2",
"1.0.3",
"1.0.4",
"1.0.5",
"1.0.6",
"1.0.7",
"1.1.0",
"1.1.1",
"1.1.2",
"1.1.3",
"1.2.0",
"1.2.1",
"1.2.10",
"1.2.2",
"1.2.3",
"1.2.4",
"1.2.5",
"1.2.6",
"1.2.7",
"1.2.8",
"1.2.9"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26013",
"GHSA-2g6r-c272-w58r"
],
"details": "## Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in ChatOpenAI Image Token Counting\n\n### Summary\nThe `ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages()` method fetches arbitrary `image_url` values without validation when computing token counts for vision-enabled models. This allows attackers to trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by providing malicious image URLs in user input.\n\n### Severity\n**Low** - The vulnerability allows SSRF attacks but has limited impact due to:\n- Responses are not returned to the attacker (blind SSRF)\n- Default 5-second timeout limits resource exhaustion\n- Non-image responses fail at PIL image parsing\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can control image URLs passed to `get_num_tokens_from_messages()` can:\n- Trigger HTTP requests from the application server to arbitrary internal or external URLs\n- Cause the server to access internal network resources (private IPs, cloud metadata endpoints)\n- Cause minor resource consumption through image downloads (bounded by timeout)\n\n**Note:** This vulnerability occurs during token counting, which may happen outside of model invocation (e.g., in logging, metrics, or token budgeting flows).\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable code path:\n1. `get_num_tokens_from_messages()` processes messages containing `image_url` content blocks\n2. For images without `detail: \"low\"`, it calls `_url_to_size()` to fetch the image and compute token counts\n3. `_url_to_size()` performs `httpx.get(image_source)` on any URL without validation\n4. Prior to the patch, there was no SSRF protection, size limits, or explicit timeout\n\n**File:** `libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py`\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been patched in `langchain-openai==1.1.9` (requires `langchain-core==1.2.11`).\n\nThe patch adds:\n1. **SSRF validation** using `langchain_core._security._ssrf_protection.validate_safe_url()` to block:\n - Private IP ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local)\n - Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc.)\n - Invalid URL schemes\n2. **Explicit size limits** (50 MB maximum, matching OpenAI\u0027s payload limit)\n3. **Explicit timeout** (5 seconds, same as `httpx.get` default)\n4. **Allow disabling image fetching** via `allow_fetching_images=False` parameter\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n1. **Sanitize input:** Validate and filter `image_url` values before passing messages to token counting or model invocation\n2. **Use network controls:** Implement egress filtering to prevent outbound requests to private IPs",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-2562",
"modified": "2026-07-13T16:04:29.846346Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T14:36:35.874621Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/security/advisories/GHSA-2g6r-c272-w58r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/commit/2b4b1dc29a833d4053deba4c2b77a3848c834565"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/releases/tag/langchain-core%3D%3D1.2.11"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/langchain-core"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2g6r-c272-w58r"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "LangChain affected by SSRF via image_url token counting in ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.