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PYSEC-2026-2408

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:15 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:03
VLAI
Details

Summary

The discover_pipeline_files() function in src/ciguard/discovery.py (introduced in v0.8.0 and used by the MCP scan_repo tool shipped in v0.8.1) walks a directory tree following symlinks, with cycle protection via tracking visited resolved paths. An attacker who can plant a symlink in a directory the user (or AI agent) scans can cause discovery to walk into the symlink target and return paths to pipeline-shaped files outside the requested root.

Threat scenario

MCP confused-deputy. A user runs Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor with the ciguard MCP server registered. The agent is fed an adversarial prompt to scan a directory containing planted symlinks (e.g. via a malicious clone or extracted tarball). ciguard.scan_repo walks the symlinks, returning paths and (via subsequent scan calls) file content from ~/.aws/, ~/.config/, /etc/some-pipeline-config/, etc. Pipeline files often contain hardcoded secrets, internal hostnames, deploy keys.

Patch

  • New follow_symlinks: bool = False parameter on discover_pipeline_files. Default refuses to descend into symlinked directories OR symlinked files.
  • Belt-and-braces: results are filtered to those whose .resolve() lies under root.resolve(), applied even when callers opt in to follow_symlinks=True.
  • 3 regression tests in tests/test_discovery.py::TestSymlinkSafety.

Discovery

Found during ciguard's first self-conducted penetration test cycle (PTES + OWASP TG v4.2 + CREST framing), 2026-04-26.

CVSS Scoring

  • CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N — 4.4 (Medium)
  • CVSS v4.0: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N — first.org calc 5.7 (Medium); GitHub's calc returns 2.4 (Low). Vector is correct — calculator profiles differ.

Reproduction

from pathlib import Path
from ciguard.discovery import discover_pipeline_files
# In a victim dir, plant: trojan -> /etc
# (or any other accessible dir containing pipeline-shaped files)
for f in discover_pipeline_files(Path('/tmp/victim')):
    print(f)  # pre-fix: includes paths under /etc; post-fix: only /tmp/victim/

References

  • Fix released in v0.8.2
  • CI regression gate added in v0.8.3
  • https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44220

See also: GHSA-w828-4qhx-vxx3 — same conceptual pattern (path-validation flaw in an AI-agent tool) in Claude SDK for Python, CWE-59 + CWE-367

Impacted products
Name purl
ciguard pkg:pypi/ciguard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "ciguard",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/ciguard"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.8.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44220",
    "GHSA-8cxw-cc62-q28v"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `discover_pipeline_files()` function in `src/ciguard/discovery.py` (introduced in v0.8.0 and used by the MCP `scan_repo` tool shipped in v0.8.1) walks a directory tree following symlinks, with cycle protection via tracking visited resolved paths. An attacker who can plant a symlink in a directory the user (or AI agent) scans can cause discovery to walk into the symlink target and return paths to pipeline-shaped files outside the requested root.\n\n## Threat scenario\n\n**MCP confused-deputy.** A user runs Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor with the ciguard MCP server registered. The agent is fed an adversarial prompt to scan a directory containing planted symlinks (e.g. via a malicious clone or extracted tarball). `ciguard.scan_repo` walks the symlinks, returning paths and (via subsequent `scan` calls) file content from `~/.aws/`, `~/.config/`, `/etc/some-pipeline-config/`, etc. Pipeline files often contain hardcoded secrets, internal hostnames, deploy keys.\n\n## Patch\n\n- New `follow_symlinks: bool = False` parameter on `discover_pipeline_files`. Default refuses to descend into symlinked directories OR symlinked files.\n- Belt-and-braces: results are filtered to those whose `.resolve()` lies under `root.resolve()`, applied even when callers opt in to `follow_symlinks=True`.\n- 3 regression tests in `tests/test_discovery.py::TestSymlinkSafety`.\n\n## Discovery\n\nFound during ciguard\u0027s first self-conducted penetration test cycle (PTES + OWASP TG v4.2 + CREST framing), 2026-04-26.\n\n## CVSS Scoring\n\n- CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N` \u2014 4.4 (Medium)\n- CVSS v4.0: `CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N` \u2014 first.org calc 5.7 (Medium); GitHub\u0027s calc returns 2.4 (Low). Vector is correct \u2014 calculator profiles differ.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom ciguard.discovery import discover_pipeline_files\n# In a victim dir, plant: trojan -\u003e /etc\n# (or any other accessible dir containing pipeline-shaped files)\nfor f in discover_pipeline_files(Path(\u0027/tmp/victim\u0027)):\n    print(f)  # pre-fix: includes paths under /etc; post-fix: only /tmp/victim/\n```\n\n## References\n\n- Fix released in [v0.8.2](https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/releases/tag/v0.8.2)\n- CI regression gate added in [v0.8.3](https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/releases/tag/v0.8.3)\n- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44220\n\nSee also: [GHSA-w828-4qhx-vxx3](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w828-4qhx-vxx3) \u2014 same conceptual pattern (path-validation flaw in an AI-agent tool) in Claude SDK for Python, CWE-59 + CWE-367",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2408",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:03:42.013392Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:15:38.557974Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/security/advisories/GHSA-8cxw-cc62-q28v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44220"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/releases/tag/v0.8.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jo-Jo98/ciguard/releases/tag/v0.8.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/ciguard"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8cxw-cc62-q28v"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ciguard: discover_pipeline_files follows symlinks out of scan root"
}



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