PYSEC-2026-1580

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-07 14:34 - Updated: 2026-07-07 17:24
VLAI
Details

Summary

Paying invoices in Eclair that do not get settled within the internal timeout (about 30s) lead to a payment being considered failed, even though it may still be in flight.

Details

Using blocking: true on the API call will lead to a timeout error if a payment does not get settled in the 30s timeout with the error: Ask timed out on [Actor[akka://eclair-node/user/$l#134241942]] after [30000 ms]. Message of type [fr.acinq.eclair.payment.send.PaymentInitiator$SendPaymentToNode]. A typical reason for AskTimeoutException is that the recipient actor didn't send a reply. https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L138

This is considered a payment failure by parts of the code, and assumes the payment is not going to be settled after: https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L144 https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L141 https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L146

The best way to fix this is to check the payment status after an error, and when not sure, always consider a payment still in flight.

PoC

A very simple way to exploit this is: - Create a hold invoice - Pay the invoice with the LNbits server backed by an Eclair node, until it times out - Settle the hold invoice

Impact

This vulnerability can lead to a total loss of funds for the node backend.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Impacted products
Name purl
lnbits pkg:pypi/lnbits
Aliases
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lnbits",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/lnbits"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.12.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.10.3.dev1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-34694",
    "GHSA-3j4h-h3fp-vwww"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\n\nPaying invoices in Eclair that do not get settled within the internal timeout (about 30s) lead to a payment being considered failed, even though it may still be in flight.\n\n### Details\n\nUsing `blocking: true` on the API call will lead to a timeout error if a payment does not get settled in the 30s timeout with the error: `Ask timed out on [Actor[akka://eclair-node/user/$l#134241942]] after [30000 ms]. Message of type [fr.acinq.eclair.payment.send.PaymentInitiator$SendPaymentToNode]. A typical reason for AskTimeoutException is that the recipient actor didn\u0027t send a reply.`\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L138\n\nThis is considered a payment failure by parts of the code, and assumes the payment is not going to be settled after:\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L144\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L141\nhttps://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/blob/c04c13b2f8cfbb625571a07dfddeb65ea6df8dac/lnbits/wallets/eclair.py#L146\n\nThe best way to fix this is to check the payment status after an error, and when not sure, always consider a payment still in flight.\n\n### PoC\n\nA very simple way to exploit this is:\n- Create a hold invoice\n- Pay the invoice with the LNbits server backed by an Eclair node, until it times out\n- Settle the hold invoice\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can lead to a total loss of funds for the node backend.\n",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-1580",
  "modified": "2026-07-07T17:24:35.300769Z",
  "published": "2026-07-07T14:34:34.796839Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits/security/advisories/GHSA-3j4h-h3fp-vwww"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34694"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/lnbits"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3j4h-h3fp-vwww"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LNbits improperly handles potential network and payment failures when using Eclair backend"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.