oesa-2026-3033
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler
gpsd is a service daemon that mediates access to a GPS sensor connected to the host computer by serial or USB interface, making its data on the location/course/velocity of the sensor available to be queried on TCP port 2947 of the host computer. With gpsd, multiple GPS client applications (such as navigational and war-driving software) can share access to a GPS without contention or loss of data. Also, gpsd responds to queries with a format that is substantially easier to parse than NMEA 0183.
Security Fix(es):
gpsd before commit dc966aa contains a heap-based out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the drivers/driver_nmea2000.c file. The hnd_129540 function, which handles NMEA2000 PGN 129540 (GNSS Satellites in View) packets, fails to validate the user-supplied satellite count against the size of the skyview array (184 elements). This allows an attacker to write beyond the bounds of the array by providing a satellite count up to 255, leading to memory corruption, Denial of Service (DoS), and potentially arbitrary code execution.(CVE-2025-67268)
An integer underflow vulnerability exists in the nextstate() function in gpsd/packet.c of gpsd versions prior to commit ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199da7. When parsing a NAVCOM packet, the payload length is calculated using lexer->length = (size_t)c - 4 without checking if the input byte c is less than 4. This results in an unsigned integer underflow, setting lexer->length to a very large value (near SIZE_MAX). The parser then enters a loop attempting to consume this massive number of bytes, causing 100% CPU utilization and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.(CVE-2025-67269)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"gpsd-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"gpsd-clients-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"gpsd-debuginfo-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"gpsd-debugsource-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"gpsd-devel-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"gpsd-libs-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"gpsd-qt-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"gpsd-qt-devel-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"gpsd-xclients-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"python3-gpsd-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"gpsd-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"gpsd-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"gpsd-clients-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"gpsd-debuginfo-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"gpsd-debugsource-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"gpsd-devel-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"gpsd-libs-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"gpsd-qt-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"gpsd-qt-devel-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"gpsd-xclients-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"python3-gpsd-3.25-3.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1",
"name": "gpsd",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/gpsd\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.25-3.oe2403sp1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "gpsd is a service daemon that mediates access to a GPS sensor connected to the host computer by serial or USB interface, making its data on the location/course/velocity of the sensor available to be queried on TCP port 2947 of the host computer. With gpsd, multiple GPS client applications (such as navigational and war-driving software) can share access to a GPS without contention or loss of data. Also, gpsd responds to queries with a format that is substantially easier to parse than NMEA 0183.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\ngpsd before commit dc966aa contains a heap-based out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the drivers/driver_nmea2000.c file. The hnd_129540 function, which handles NMEA2000 PGN 129540 (GNSS Satellites in View) packets, fails to validate the user-supplied satellite count against the size of the skyview array (184 elements). This allows an attacker to write beyond the bounds of the array by providing a satellite count up to 255, leading to memory corruption, Denial of Service (DoS), and potentially arbitrary code execution.(CVE-2025-67268)\n\nAn integer underflow vulnerability exists in the `nextstate()` function in `gpsd/packet.c` of gpsd versions prior to commit `ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199da7`. When parsing a NAVCOM packet, the payload length is calculated using `lexer-\u0026gt;length = (size_t)c - 4` without checking if the input byte `c` is less than 4. This results in an unsigned integer underflow, setting `lexer-\u0026gt;length` to a very large value (near `SIZE_MAX`). The parser then enters a loop attempting to consume this massive number of bytes, causing 100% CPU utilization and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.(CVE-2025-67269)",
"id": "OESA-2026-3033",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:11:55Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T11:11:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3033"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67268"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67269"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "gpsd security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-67268",
"CVE-2025-67269"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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