oesa-2025-2395
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler
Scram is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer authentication mechanisms.It is described as part of RFC 5802 and RFC7677. This pachage is a Java implementation.
Security Fix(es):
SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to version 3.2, a timing attack vulnerability exists in the SCRAM Java implementation. The issue arises because Arrays.equals was used to compare secret values such as client proofs and server signatures. Since Arrays.equals performs a short-circuit comparison, the execution time varies depending on how many leading bytes match. This behavior could allow an attacker to perform a timing side-channel attack and potentially infer sensitive authentication material. All users relying on SCRAM authentication are impacted. This vulnerability has been patched in version 3.1 by replacing Arrays.equals with MessageDigest.isEqual, which ensures constant-time comparison.(CVE-2025-59432)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"noarch": [
"ongres-scram-2.1-3.oe2403.noarch.rpm",
"ongres-scram-client-2.1-3.oe2403.noarch.rpm",
"ongres-scram-help-2.1-3.oe2403.noarch.rpm",
"ongres-scram-parent-2.1-3.oe2403.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"ongres-scram-2.1-3.oe2403.src.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS",
"name": "ongres-scram",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/ongres-scram\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1-3.oe2403"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "Scram is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer authentication mechanisms.It is described as part of RFC 5802 and RFC7677. This pachage is a Java implementation.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nSCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to version 3.2, a timing attack vulnerability exists in the SCRAM Java implementation. The issue arises because Arrays.equals was used to compare secret values such as client proofs and server signatures. Since Arrays.equals performs a short-circuit comparison, the execution time varies depending on how many leading bytes match. This behavior could allow an attacker to perform a timing side-channel attack and potentially infer sensitive authentication material. All users relying on SCRAM authentication are impacted. This vulnerability has been patched in version 3.1 by replacing Arrays.equals with MessageDigest.isEqual, which ensures constant-time comparison.(CVE-2025-59432)",
"id": "OESA-2025-2395",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:09:28Z",
"published": "2025-10-11T11:09:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2025-2395"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59432"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ongres-scram security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-59432"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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