OESA-2024-2313 (CVE-2022-4450)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2024-11-01 11:07 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:07 – Source websiteSecurity Fix(es):
The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data" arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data. In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed. If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This will most likely lead to a crash. This could be exploited by an attacker who has the ability to supply malicious PEM files for parsing to achieve a denial of service attack.
The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code. These locations include the PEM_read_bio_TYPE() functions as well as the decoders introduced in OpenSSL 3.0.
The OpenSSL asn1parse command line application is also impacted by this issue.
(CVE-2022-4450)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"openresty-openssl111-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-asan-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-asan-devel-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-debug-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-debug-devel-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-devel-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"openresty-openssl111-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"openresty-openssl111-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-asan-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-asan-devel-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-debug-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-debug-devel-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
"openresty-openssl111-devel-1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1",
"name": "openresty-openssl111",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/openresty-openssl111\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.1h-5.oe2203sp1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "Security Fix(es):\r\n\r\nThe function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and\ndecodes the \u0026quot;name\u0026quot; (e.g. \u0026quot;CERTIFICATE\u0026quot;), any header data and the payload data.\nIf the function succeeds then the \u0026quot;name_out\u0026quot;, \u0026quot;header\u0026quot; and \u0026quot;data\u0026quot; arguments are\npopulated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant decoded data. The\ncaller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is possible to construct a\nPEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data. In this case PEM_read_bio_ex()\nwill return a failure code but will populate the header argument with a pointer\nto a buffer that has already been freed. If the caller also frees this buffer\nthen a double free will occur. This will most likely lead to a crash. This\ncould be exploited by an attacker who has the ability to supply malicious PEM\nfiles for parsing to achieve a denial of service attack.\r\n\r\nThe functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around\nPEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.\r\n\r\nThese functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL\nfunctions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and\nSSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL internal\nuses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does not free the\nheader argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code. These locations\ninclude the PEM_read_bio_TYPE() functions as well as the decoders introduced in\nOpenSSL 3.0.\r\n\r\nThe OpenSSL asn1parse command line application is also impacted by this issue.\r\n\r\n\n(CVE-2022-4450)",
"id": "OESA-2024-2313",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:47Z",
"published": "2024-11-01T11:07:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-2313"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4450"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "openresty-openssl111 security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2022-4450"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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