msrc_cve-2020-25685
Vulnerability from csaf_microsoft
Published
2021-01-02 00:00
Modified
2021-01-29 00:00
Summary
A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query dnsmasq checks in forward.c:reply_query() which is the forwarded query that matches the reply by only using a weak hash of the query name. Due to the weak hash (CRC32 when dnsmasq is compiled without DNSSEC SHA-1 when it is) this flaw allows an off-path attacker to find several different domains all having the same hash substantially reducing the number of attempts they would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This is in contrast with RFC5452 which specifies that the query name is one of the attributes of a query that must be used to match a reply. This flaw could be abused to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25684 the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity.
Notes
Additional Resources
To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle
Disclaimer
The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided \"as is\" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.
{
"document": {
"category": "csaf_vex",
"csaf_version": "2.0",
"distribution": {
"text": "Public",
"tlp": {
"label": "WHITE",
"url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/"
}
},
"lang": "en-US",
"notes": [
{
"category": "general",
"text": "To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle",
"title": "Additional Resources"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "The information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided \\\"as is\\\" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.",
"title": "Disclaimer"
}
],
"publisher": {
"category": "vendor",
"contact_details": "secure@microsoft.com",
"name": "Microsoft Security Response Center",
"namespace": "https://msrc.microsoft.com"
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "CVE-2020-25685 A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query dnsmasq checks in forward.c:reply_query() which is the forwarded query that matches the reply by only using a weak hash of the query name. Due to the weak hash (CRC32 when dnsmasq is compiled without DNSSEC SHA-1 when it is) this flaw allows an off-path attacker to find several different domains all having the same hash substantially reducing the number of attempts they would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This is in contrast with RFC5452 which specifies that the query name is one of the attributes of a query that must be used to match a reply. This flaw could be abused to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25684 the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity. - VEX",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2021/msrc_cve-2020-25685.json"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Microsoft Support Lifecycle",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Common Vulnerability Scoring System",
"url": "https://www.first.org/cvss"
}
],
"title": "A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query dnsmasq checks in forward.c:reply_query() which is the forwarded query that matches the reply by only using a weak hash of the query name. Due to the weak hash (CRC32 when dnsmasq is compiled without DNSSEC SHA-1 when it is) this flaw allows an off-path attacker to find several different domains all having the same hash substantially reducing the number of attempts they would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This is in contrast with RFC5452 which specifies that the query name is one of the attributes of a query that must be used to match a reply. This flaw could be abused to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25684 the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity.",
"tracking": {
"current_release_date": "2021-01-29T00:00:00.000Z",
"generator": {
"date": "2025-10-19T21:39:52.588Z",
"engine": {
"name": "MSRC Generator",
"version": "1.0"
}
},
"id": "msrc_CVE-2020-25685",
"initial_release_date": "2021-01-02T00:00:00.000Z",
"revision_history": [
{
"date": "2021-01-29T00:00:00.000Z",
"legacy_version": "1",
"number": "1",
"summary": "Information published."
}
],
"status": "final",
"version": "1"
}
},
"product_tree": {
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version",
"name": "1.0",
"product": {
"name": "CBL Mariner 1.0",
"product_id": "16820"
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "Azure Linux"
},
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "\u003ccm1 dnsmasq 2.85-1",
"product": {
"name": "\u003ccm1 dnsmasq 2.85-1",
"product_id": "1"
}
},
{
"category": "product_version",
"name": "cm1 dnsmasq 2.85-1",
"product": {
"name": "cm1 dnsmasq 2.85-1",
"product_id": "19065"
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "dnsmasq"
}
],
"category": "vendor",
"name": "Microsoft"
}
],
"relationships": [
{
"category": "default_component_of",
"full_product_name": {
"name": "\u003ccm1 dnsmasq 2.85-1 as a component of CBL Mariner 1.0",
"product_id": "16820-1"
},
"product_reference": "1",
"relates_to_product_reference": "16820"
},
{
"category": "default_component_of",
"full_product_name": {
"name": "cm1 dnsmasq 2.85-1 as a component of CBL Mariner 1.0",
"product_id": "19065-16820"
},
"product_reference": "19065",
"relates_to_product_reference": "16820"
}
]
},
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2020-25685",
"cwe": {
"id": "CWE-326",
"name": "Inadequate Encryption Strength"
},
"notes": [
{
"category": "general",
"text": "redhat",
"title": "Assigning CNA"
}
],
"product_status": {
"fixed": [
"19065-16820"
],
"known_affected": [
"16820-1"
]
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "CVE-2020-25685 A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query dnsmasq checks in forward.c:reply_query() which is the forwarded query that matches the reply by only using a weak hash of the query name. Due to the weak hash (CRC32 when dnsmasq is compiled without DNSSEC SHA-1 when it is) this flaw allows an off-path attacker to find several different domains all having the same hash substantially reducing the number of attempts they would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This is in contrast with RFC5452 which specifies that the query name is one of the attributes of a query that must be used to match a reply. This flaw could be abused to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25684 the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity. - VEX",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/csaf/vex/2021/msrc_cve-2020-25685.json"
}
],
"remediations": [
{
"category": "vendor_fix",
"date": "2021-01-29T00:00:00.000Z",
"details": "2.85-1:Security Update:https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-linux/tutorial-azure-linux-upgrade",
"product_ids": [
"16820-1"
],
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-linux/tutorial-azure-linux-upgrade"
}
],
"scores": [
{
"cvss_v3": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 3.7,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"environmentalsScore": 0.0,
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"temporalScore": 3.7,
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"products": [
"16820-1"
]
}
],
"title": "A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query dnsmasq checks in forward.c:reply_query() which is the forwarded query that matches the reply by only using a weak hash of the query name. Due to the weak hash (CRC32 when dnsmasq is compiled without DNSSEC SHA-1 when it is) this flaw allows an off-path attacker to find several different domains all having the same hash substantially reducing the number of attempts they would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This is in contrast with RFC5452 which specifies that the query name is one of the attributes of a query that must be used to match a reply. This flaw could be abused to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25684 the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity."
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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