mal-2026-17310
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (a1083ea1ddf83f29a443e7ba4b24db0d24da35dfd0a9d0ac032ae20501ac57ea)
npm package tailwind-forms-kit@0.5.1 impersonates the @tailwindcss/forms plugin: the package.json name field is ' tailwind-forms-kit' (with a leading space), the README mirrors tailwindlabs/tailwindcss-forms, and the repository field points at the legitimate tailwindlabs/tailwindcss-forms repo. The shipped src/index.js (the package's main entry) is not a Tailwind plugin. It is a single-line obfuscator.io-obfuscated loader (string array _0x18ab with 303 entries, rotate/shift IIFE, decoder _0x35ba, hex-named variables) that at require() time imports node:http, node:https, node:zlib, and spawn from node:child_process. It reassembles at runtime a hardcoded Ethereum sender address (0xa322E5f39aDC2490EfD311D3080e6f0121063e1a) and a list of public Ethereum RPC endpoints and an Etherscan-style indexer URL (publicnode.com, 1rpc.io, drpc.org, blockscout) from string-array indices, queries the indexer for that sender's transaction list ('?module=ac...on=txlist&address=...'), reconstructs a payload from the returned on-chain transaction data, and hands the reconstructed bytes to node:child_process spawn / dynamic execution via global slots (_t_u, _t_s, _H, _H2). This is the EtherHiding blockchain-hosted-C2 pattern: whoever controls the sender address controls arbitrary code executed on any host that installs or requires the package, with no version pin, no hash verification, and blockchain-data transport chosen to evade domain and URL blocklists. The Tailwind branding, copied README, and misleading repository URL are cover for the loader.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "src/index.js",
"sha256": "fd1ef3edfc6c02581abf6bf69f9e73b19ca8d3ddc915fa51beba648e6c0ae62f",
"tlsh": "e103e9957e81121a33434f7fba1bf4e4e12a1899369448c7d21cbc94f8e631ae9f6d34"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "784b58f91fa2f86b78b05ba9b821c9957c7235f6f93c0ae9e4f9ebbfc9b94fd9",
"tlsh": "2821c822cd140e7302e0293596f90583b297a463895cf81d3396c19c8f8d6bfe0f909f"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "tailwind-forms-kit-0.5.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "05ca49af22a2b65a8e6db502de6e79d92416785d",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-bNn+5PEe0Ngs0Xq0kda3levwwCehhf9/nAO65b7PZhtCKjsgh6ecXYV/U00kh53s74AB3lslH+oG0Se8D8axWQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tailwind-forms-kit"
},
"versions": [
"0.5.1",
"0.5.3"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020784",
"import_time": "2026-09-30T01:36:51.330327282Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-30T01:27:06Z",
"sha256": "a1083ea1ddf83f29a443e7ba4b24db0d24da35dfd0a9d0ac032ae20501ac57ea",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.5.1"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021099",
"import_time": "2026-10-06T20:20:38.700621273Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-06T19:51:16Z",
"sha256": "0ddad6b159f2cfa136e4e3f97e86ab0b901a4fb083d1a18987f9daf48f66306e",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.5.3"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (a1083ea1ddf83f29a443e7ba4b24db0d24da35dfd0a9d0ac032ae20501ac57ea)\nnpm package tailwind-forms-kit@0.5.1 impersonates the @tailwindcss/forms plugin: the package.json name field is \u0027 tailwind-forms-kit\u0027 (with a leading space), the README mirrors tailwindlabs/tailwindcss-forms, and the repository field points at the legitimate tailwindlabs/tailwindcss-forms repo. The shipped src/index.js (the package\u0027s main entry) is not a Tailwind plugin. It is a single-line obfuscator.io-obfuscated loader (string array _0x18ab with 303 entries, rotate/shift IIFE, decoder _0x35ba, hex-named variables) that at require() time imports node:http, node:https, node:zlib, and spawn from node:child_process. It reassembles at runtime a hardcoded Ethereum sender address (0xa322E5f39aDC2490EfD311D3080e6f0121063e1a) and a list of public Ethereum RPC endpoints and an Etherscan-style indexer URL (publicnode.com, 1rpc.io, drpc.org, blockscout) from string-array indices, queries the indexer for that sender\u0027s transaction list (\u0027?module=ac...on=txlist\u0026address=...\u0027), reconstructs a payload from the returned on-chain transaction data, and hands the reconstructed bytes to node:child_process spawn / dynamic execution via global slots (_t_u, _t_s, _H, _H2). This is the EtherHiding blockchain-hosted-C2 pattern: whoever controls the sender address controls arbitrary code executed on any host that installs or requires the package, with no version pin, no hash verification, and blockchain-data transport chosen to evade domain and URL blocklists. The Tailwind branding, copied README, and misleading repository URL are cover for the loader.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17310",
"modified": "2026-10-06T20:22:38.767519153Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T01:27:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/tailwind-forms-kit/v/0.5.1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/tailwind-forms-kit/v/0.5.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in tailwind-forms-kit (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.