mal-2026-14356
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (b7c1d6b7b99791f7bbd5999021f109bef569a6c681eda0bb6196b459b12a3808)
lumen-pages-community@9.9.9 declares a postinstall hook (node dc.js) that runs automatically on npm install. dc.js collects the installer's hostname, username, current working directory, platform, Node version, CI environment variable, and npm user-agent, then issues an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded webhook.site collector URL (https://webhook.site/b00492c6-27ba-4ea0-a9cb-dd50b3770250/dc) with those fields as query parameters. The package name plus a 9.9.9 version and no library functionality matches the dependency-confusion shape: a high-version public namesake that catches internal-name resolution and phones home from any host that resolves it. A self-labeled 'research placeholder' framing in the package description does not change the runtime behavior — installer identifiers leave the host at install time to a third-party collector the installer did not opt into.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "dc.js",
"sha256": "db09ea3714030d84eee4eb3d0f5f9ec1b3fcbcabc952726bac728ef03b5c3dad",
"tlsh": "1021945b2166f42205b370d0375f220c61fae1228e82ea993428e2d4af346781252cfd"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "e5bc7e2ed956a118b24c8b6b0917c7dfccca953ea7e58962bd5427fe0b43fcd6",
"tlsh": "22e07d444920523308d55ee94473514de1b10d5f110da905178351888298ff748b934f"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "lumen-pages-community-9.9.9.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "93abca10f1876e86c6cd933b30f5b8ca9197dc8d",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-kwA81Fg9Mv16OmkW5UT/TzxIfLzyGP5Er2ekuTkqGqPGqBs6WHaoLRlxrGPHsvTfLOAbdsmFwF2SnGLiKEecIg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "lumen-pages-community"
},
"versions": [
"9.9.9"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-018512",
"import_time": "2026-08-21T22:42:49.933927379Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-21T22:11:02Z",
"sha256": "b7c1d6b7b99791f7bbd5999021f109bef569a6c681eda0bb6196b459b12a3808",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"9.9.9"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b7c1d6b7b99791f7bbd5999021f109bef569a6c681eda0bb6196b459b12a3808)\nlumen-pages-community@9.9.9 declares a postinstall hook (`node dc.js`) that runs automatically on `npm install`. dc.js collects the installer\u0027s hostname, username, current working directory, platform, Node version, CI environment variable, and npm user-agent, then issues an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded webhook.site collector URL (https://webhook.site/b00492c6-27ba-4ea0-a9cb-dd50b3770250/dc) with those fields as query parameters. The package name plus a 9.9.9 version and no library functionality matches the dependency-confusion shape: a high-version public namesake that catches internal-name resolution and phones home from any host that resolves it. A self-labeled \u0027research placeholder\u0027 framing in the package description does not change the runtime behavior \u2014 installer identifiers leave the host at install time to a third-party collector the installer did not opt into.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-14356",
"modified": "2026-08-21T22:11:02Z",
"published": "2026-08-21T22:11:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/lumen-pages-community/v/9.9.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in lumen-pages-community (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.