mal-2026-14342
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (f47c61fd59fb65dc8c8932e3e913dd83f18fc8af1d5f06b03cae327228821703)
package.json declares a postinstall hook that runs index.js on every install. The script hex-decodes and concatenates a hardcoded destination hostname resolving to gwfqp5cm9r2jfs3d6mjpzt8y5pbkzanz.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator subdomain), then sleeps a randomized 30-120 seconds and issues HTTP POSTs on port 80 carrying: os.hostname, platform, arch, cwd, whoami/id/uname output, the contents of package.json, the full process.env, the contents of ~/.npmrc (which normally holds npm _authToken values), npm root -g, local port scan results, and Windows recon (ver, tasklist, USERPROFILE). The payload exits silently when CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, JENKINS_HOME, npm audit/pack/publish flags, /.dockerenv, or docker/kubepods cgroups are detected, and exports a benign-looking function as a facade. The exfiltrated ~/.npmrc auth tokens and environment variables give the operator credentials to publish malicious versions of the installer's other packages and to access CI cloud secrets.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "723a872c1dbe3eec92d37841ce093baa8f9c946e04c2621b5b37efed162ba8ef",
"tlsh": "85b1949272fb9e70362261e583a3d0277726f0073508eac0ba4c9b46df9f60595d28f9"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "coin-fees-20.1.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "1d7c6c8d9e94e12fd59a4c7010ce6c793e51541a",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-Mi60G1hgndIMcIcClVAu72KQrA/7mVuPPiLgA7kje+FGsrI7k0Gj/zTPL87wvVd+zYX8Myr63aQwKx8eud++Xw=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "coin-fees"
},
"versions": [
"20.1.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-018490",
"import_time": "2026-08-21T03:26:10.350501272Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-21T03:07:50Z",
"sha256": "f47c61fd59fb65dc8c8932e3e913dd83f18fc8af1d5f06b03cae327228821703",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"20.1.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (f47c61fd59fb65dc8c8932e3e913dd83f18fc8af1d5f06b03cae327228821703)\npackage.json declares a postinstall hook that runs index.js on every install. The script hex-decodes and concatenates a hardcoded destination hostname resolving to gwfqp5cm9r2jfs3d6mjpzt8y5pbkzanz.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator subdomain), then sleeps a randomized 30-120 seconds and issues HTTP POSTs on port 80 carrying: os.hostname, platform, arch, cwd, whoami/id/uname output, the contents of package.json, the full process.env, the contents of ~/.npmrc (which normally holds npm _authToken values), `npm root -g`, local port scan results, and Windows recon (ver, tasklist, USERPROFILE). The payload exits silently when CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, JENKINS_HOME, npm audit/pack/publish flags, /.dockerenv, or docker/kubepods cgroups are detected, and exports a benign-looking function as a facade. The exfiltrated ~/.npmrc auth tokens and environment variables give the operator credentials to publish malicious versions of the installer\u0027s other packages and to access CI cloud secrets.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-14342",
"modified": "2026-08-21T03:07:50Z",
"published": "2026-08-21T03:07:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/coin-fees/v/20.1.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in coin-fees (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.