gsd-2022-39293
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2023-12-13 01:19
Details
Azure RTOS USBX is a high-performance USB host, device, and on-the-go (OTG) embedded stack, that is fully integrated with Azure RTOS ThreadX. The case is, in [_ux_host_class_pima_read](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/master/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c), there is data length from device response, returned in the very first packet, and read by [L165 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L165), as header_length. Then in [L178 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L178), there is a “if” branch, which check the expression of “(header_length - UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE) > data_length” where if header_length is smaller than UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE, calculation could overflow and then [L182 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L182) the calculation of data_length is also overflow, this way the later [while loop start from L192](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L192) can move data_pointer to unexpected address and cause write buffer overflow. The fix has been included in USBX release [6.1.12](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel). The following can be used as a workaround: Add check of `header_length`: 1. It must be greater than `UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE`. 1. It should be greater or equal to the current returned data length (`transfer_request -> ux_transfer_request_actual_length`).
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2022-39293",
"description": "Azure RTOS USBX is a high-performance USB host, device, and on-the-go (OTG) embedded stack, that is fully integrated with Azure RTOS ThreadX. The case is, in [_ux_host_class_pima_read](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/master/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c), there is data length from device response, returned in the very first packet, and read by [L165 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L165), as header_length. Then in [L178 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L178), there is a \u201cif\u201d branch, which check the expression of \u201c(header_length - UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE) \u003e data_length\u201d where if header_length is smaller than UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE, calculation could overflow and then [L182 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L182) the calculation of data_length is also overflow, this way the later [while loop start from L192](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L192) can move data_pointer to unexpected address and cause write buffer overflow. The fix has been included in USBX release [6.1.12](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel). The following can be used as a workaround: Add check of `header_length`: 1. It must be greater than `UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE`. 1. It should be greater or equal to the current returned data length (`transfer_request -\u003e ux_transfer_request_actual_length`).",
"id": "GSD-2022-39293"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-39293"
],
"details": "Azure RTOS USBX is a high-performance USB host, device, and on-the-go (OTG) embedded stack, that is fully integrated with Azure RTOS ThreadX. The case is, in [_ux_host_class_pima_read](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/master/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c), there is data length from device response, returned in the very first packet, and read by [L165 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L165), as header_length. Then in [L178 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L178), there is a \u201cif\u201d branch, which check the expression of \u201c(header_length - UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE) \u003e data_length\u201d where if header_length is smaller than UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE, calculation could overflow and then [L182 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L182) the calculation of data_length is also overflow, this way the later [while loop start from L192](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L192) can move data_pointer to unexpected address and cause write buffer overflow. The fix has been included in USBX release [6.1.12](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel). The following can be used as a workaround: Add check of `header_length`: 1. It must be greater than `UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE`. 1. It should be greater or equal to the current returned data length (`transfer_request -\u003e ux_transfer_request_actual_length`).",
"id": "GSD-2022-39293",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:19:21.021511Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com",
"ID": "CVE-2022-39293",
"STATE": "PUBLIC",
"TITLE": "Azure RTOS USBX Host PIMA vulnerable to read integer underflow with buffer overflow"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "usbx",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_value": "\u003c 6.1.12"
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "azure-rtos"
}
]
}
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "Azure RTOS USBX is a high-performance USB host, device, and on-the-go (OTG) embedded stack, that is fully integrated with Azure RTOS ThreadX. The case is, in [_ux_host_class_pima_read](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/master/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c), there is data length from device response, returned in the very first packet, and read by [L165 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L165), as header_length. Then in [L178 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L178), there is a \u201cif\u201d branch, which check the expression of \u201c(header_length - UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE) \u003e data_length\u201d where if header_length is smaller than UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE, calculation could overflow and then [L182 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L182) the calculation of data_length is also overflow, this way the later [while loop start from L192](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L192) can move data_pointer to unexpected address and cause write buffer overflow. The fix has been included in USBX release [6.1.12](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel). The following can be used as a workaround: Add check of `header_length`: 1. It must be greater than `UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE`. 1. It should be greater or equal to the current returned data length (`transfer_request -\u003e ux_transfer_request_actual_length`)."
}
]
},
"impact": {
"cvss": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "CWE-191: Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/security/advisories/GHSA-gg76-h537-xq48",
"refsource": "CONFIRM",
"url": "https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/security/advisories/GHSA-gg76-h537-xq48"
}
]
},
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-gg76-h537-xq48",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"configurations": {
"CVE_data_version": "4.0",
"nodes": [
{
"children": [],
"cpe_match": [
{
"cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:azure_rtos_usbx:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"cpe_name": [],
"versionEndExcluding": "6.1.12",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"operator": "OR"
}
]
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"cve": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com",
"ID": "CVE-2022-39293"
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"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Azure RTOS USBX is a high-performance USB host, device, and on-the-go (OTG) embedded stack, that is fully integrated with Azure RTOS ThreadX. The case is, in [_ux_host_class_pima_read](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/master/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c), there is data length from device response, returned in the very first packet, and read by [L165 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L165), as header_length. Then in [L178 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L178), there is a \u201cif\u201d branch, which check the expression of \u201c(header_length - UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE) \u003e data_length\u201d where if header_length is smaller than UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE, calculation could overflow and then [L182 code](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L182) the calculation of data_length is also overflow, this way the later [while loop start from L192](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/blob/082fd9db09a3669eca3358f10b8837a5c1635c0b/common/usbx_host_classes/src/ux_host_class_pima_read.c#L192) can move data_pointer to unexpected address and cause write buffer overflow. The fix has been included in USBX release [6.1.12](https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel). The following can be used as a workaround: Add check of `header_length`: 1. It must be greater than `UX_HOST_CLASS_PIMA_DATA_HEADER_SIZE`. 1. It should be greater or equal to the current returned data length (`transfer_request -\u003e ux_transfer_request_actual_length`)."
}
]
},
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"description": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-191"
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{
"name": "https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel",
"refsource": "MISC",
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"url": "https://github.com/azure-rtos/usbx/releases/tag/v6.1.12_rel"
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},
"impact": {
"baseMetricV3": {
"cvssV3": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2022-10-18T20:30Z",
"publishedDate": "2022-10-13T19:15Z"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
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- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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