GSD-2019-13143
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:23Details
An HTTP parameter pollution issue was discovered on Shenzhen Dragon Brothers Fingerprint Bluetooth Round Padlock FB50 2.3. With the user ID, user name, and the lock's MAC address, anyone can unbind the existing owner of the lock, and bind themselves instead. This leads to complete takeover of the lock. The user ID, name, and MAC address are trivially obtained from APIs found within the Android or iOS application. With only the MAC address of the lock, any attacker can transfer ownership of the lock from the current user, over to the attacker's account. Thus rendering the lock completely inaccessible to the current user.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2019-13143",
"description": "An HTTP parameter pollution issue was discovered on Shenzhen Dragon Brothers Fingerprint Bluetooth Round Padlock FB50 2.3. With the user ID, user name, and the lock\u0027s MAC address, anyone can unbind the existing owner of the lock, and bind themselves instead. This leads to complete takeover of the lock. The user ID, name, and MAC address are trivially obtained from APIs found within the Android or iOS application. With only the MAC address of the lock, any attacker can transfer ownership of the lock from the current user, over to the attacker\u0027s account. Thus rendering the lock completely inaccessible to the current user.",
"id": "GSD-2019-13143"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
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"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-13143"
],
"details": "An HTTP parameter pollution issue was discovered on Shenzhen Dragon Brothers Fingerprint Bluetooth Round Padlock FB50 2.3. With the user ID, user name, and the lock\u0027s MAC address, anyone can unbind the existing owner of the lock, and bind themselves instead. This leads to complete takeover of the lock. The user ID, name, and MAC address are trivially obtained from APIs found within the Android or iOS application. With only the MAC address of the lock, any attacker can transfer ownership of the lock from the current user, over to the attacker\u0027s account. Thus rendering the lock completely inaccessible to the current user.",
"id": "GSD-2019-13143",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:41.509541Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
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"affects": {
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"version": {
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"description": {
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"value": "An HTTP parameter pollution issue was discovered on Shenzhen Dragon Brothers Fingerprint Bluetooth Round Padlock FB50 2.3. With the user ID, user name, and the lock\u0027s MAC address, anyone can unbind the existing owner of the lock, and bind themselves instead. This leads to complete takeover of the lock. The user ID, name, and MAC address are trivially obtained from APIs found within the Android or iOS application. With only the MAC address of the lock, any attacker can transfer ownership of the lock from the current user, over to the attacker\u0027s account. Thus rendering the lock completely inaccessible to the current user."
}
]
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"reference_data": [
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"name": "http://blog.securelayer7.net/fb50-smart-lock-vulnerability-disclosure/",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "http://blog.securelayer7.net/fb50-smart-lock-vulnerability-disclosure/"
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"description": {
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"value": "An HTTP parameter pollution issue was discovered on Shenzhen Dragon Brothers Fingerprint Bluetooth Round Padlock FB50 2.3. With the user ID, user name, and the lock\u0027s MAC address, anyone can unbind the existing owner of the lock, and bind themselves instead. This leads to complete takeover of the lock. The user ID, name, and MAC address are trivially obtained from APIs found within the Android or iOS application. With only the MAC address of the lock, any attacker can transfer ownership of the lock from the current user, over to the attacker\u0027s account. Thus rendering the lock completely inaccessible to the current user."
}
]
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"tags": [
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"url": "http://blog.securelayer7.net/fb50-smart-lock-vulnerability-disclosure/"
}
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}
},
"impact": {
"baseMetricV2": {
"acInsufInfo": false,
"cvssV2": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE",
"baseScore": 9.0,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
"impactScore": 8.5,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"severity": "HIGH",
"userInteractionRequired": false
},
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2020-08-24T17:37Z",
"publishedDate": "2019-08-06T18:15Z"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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