GHSA-XWRF-HHX9-VMHV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 15:31 – Updated: 2025-09-23 21:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests

The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution background request cannot be active twice.

   CPU 1                                  CPU 2

rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_IDLE -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1

         process_one_req(): for #1
                      addr_handler():
                        RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND
                        mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
                        [.. handler still running ..]

rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) !! two requests are now on the req_list

rdma_destroy_id(): destroy_id_handler_unlock(): _destroy_id(): cma_cancel_operation(): rdma_addr_cancel()

                      // process_one_req() self removes it
              spin_lock_bh(&lock);
                       cancel_delayed_work(&req->work);
                   if (!list_empty(&req->list)) == true

  ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done

kfree(id_priv)

         process_one_req(): for #2
                      addr_handler():
                    mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
                        !! Use after free on id_priv

rdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only cancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens after the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the req_list can have two reqs for the same "handle" but rdma_addr_cancel() only cancels the first one.

The second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will use-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers.

Fix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and always cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never gets more than one item in it and doesn't cost anything in the normal flow that never uses this strange error path.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-47391"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T15:15:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests\n\nThe FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice\non the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the\nwork, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution\nbackground request cannot be active twice.\n\n       CPU 1                                  CPU 2\n\nrdma_resolve_addr():\n  RDMA_CM_IDLE -\u003e RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY\n  rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)  #1\n\n\t\t\t process_one_req(): for #1\n                          addr_handler():\n                            RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -\u003e RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND\n                            mutex_unlock(\u0026id_priv-\u003ehandler_mutex);\n                            [.. handler still running ..]\n\nrdma_resolve_addr():\n  RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -\u003e RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY\n  rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)\n    !! two requests are now on the req_list\n\nrdma_destroy_id():\n destroy_id_handler_unlock():\n  _destroy_id():\n   cma_cancel_operation():\n    rdma_addr_cancel()\n\n                          // process_one_req() self removes it\n\t\t          spin_lock_bh(\u0026lock);\n                           cancel_delayed_work(\u0026req-\u003ework);\n\t                   if (!list_empty(\u0026req-\u003elist)) == true\n\n      ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done\n\n   kfree(id_priv)\n\n\t\t\t process_one_req(): for #2\n                          addr_handler():\n\t                    mutex_lock(\u0026id_priv-\u003ehandler_mutex);\n                            !! Use after free on id_priv\n\nrdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only\ncancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens\nafter the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the\nreq_list can have two reqs for the same \"handle\" but rdma_addr_cancel()\nonly cancels the first one.\n\nThe second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will\nuse-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers.\n\nFix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and\nalways cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never\ngets more than one item in it and doesn\u0027t cost anything in the normal flow\nthat never uses this strange error path.",
  "id": "GHSA-xwrf-hhx9-vmhv",
  "modified": "2025-09-23T21:30:53Z",
  "published": "2024-05-21T15:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03d884671572af8bcfbc9e63944c1021efce7589"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/305d568b72f17f674155a2a8275f865f207b3808"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a085fa9b7d644a234465091e038c1911e1a4f2a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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