GHSA-XW85-W2Q2-369X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-04 09:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: don't free the ASCONF's own transport in DEL-IP processing

sctp_process_asconf() caches the transport the ASCONF chunk is processed against in asconf->transport (== chunk->transport, set once in sctp_rcv()). For an ASCONF located through its Address Parameter by __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(), that cached transport corresponds to the Address Parameter, which need not be the packet's source address.

sctp_process_asconf_param() rejects a DEL-IP for the packet source address (ADDIP D8, SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP), but nothing protects asconf->transport. A single ASCONF can therefore carry, in order:

[Address Parameter L] [DEL-IP L] [DEL-IP 0.0.0.0]

where L differs from the source. The DEL-IP for L passes the D8 check and calls sctp_assoc_rm_peer() on the transport that asconf->transport still points at, freeing it (RCU-deferred). The following wildcard DEL-IP then reuses the now-dangling asconf->transport in sctp_assoc_set_primary() and sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(): set_primary() dereferences the freed transport (->ipaddr, ->state) and plants the dangling pointer into asoc->peer.primary_path / active_path, and del_nonprimary_peers(), keeping only the pointer that is no longer on the list, removes every real transport, leaving the association with a transport_count of 0 and primary_path/active_path pointing at freed memory.

Reject a DEL-IP that targets the transport the ASCONF is being processed against, mirroring the existing source-address guard, so the wildcard branch can never reuse a freed transport.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64564"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T07:16:31Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: don\u0027t free the ASCONF\u0027s own transport in DEL-IP processing\n\nsctp_process_asconf() caches the transport the ASCONF chunk is processed\nagainst in asconf-\u003etransport (== chunk-\u003etransport, set once in sctp_rcv()).\nFor an ASCONF located through its Address Parameter by\n__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(), that cached transport corresponds to the\nAddress Parameter, which need not be the packet\u0027s source address.\n\nsctp_process_asconf_param() rejects a DEL-IP for the packet source address\n(ADDIP D8, SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP), but nothing protects asconf-\u003etransport.\nA single ASCONF can therefore carry, in order:\n\n    [Address Parameter L] [DEL-IP L] [DEL-IP 0.0.0.0]\n\nwhere L differs from the source. The DEL-IP for L passes the D8 check and\ncalls sctp_assoc_rm_peer() on the transport that asconf-\u003etransport still\npoints at, freeing it (RCU-deferred). The following wildcard DEL-IP then\nreuses the now-dangling asconf-\u003etransport in sctp_assoc_set_primary() and\nsctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(): set_primary() dereferences the freed\ntransport (-\u003eipaddr, -\u003estate) and plants the dangling pointer into\nasoc-\u003epeer.primary_path / active_path, and del_nonprimary_peers(), keeping\nonly the pointer that is no longer on the list, removes every real\ntransport, leaving the association with a transport_count of 0 and\nprimary_path/active_path pointing at freed memory.\n\nReject a DEL-IP that targets the transport the ASCONF is being processed\nagainst, mirroring the existing source-address guard, so the wildcard\nbranch can never reuse a freed transport.",
  "id": "GHSA-xw85-w2q2-369x",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T09:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T09:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64564"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74e8f3e7114f0e26d1b2c4c048044db9fcc27603"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85aca407c560aba81b5ce9d3d6cf94c74077d19b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b2854f86f0b56e9027d68e7a3fc909d1a9b566f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d136b29bf91dd8e3161281b87de597b7311d9462"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fedeb4468987bcaff85fe3061de5ae052d414740"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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