GHSA-XHHC-R2PJ-8HH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-30 03:37In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu: Fix WARN_ON in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() due to reset
In __iommu_group_set_domain_internal(), concurrent domain attachments are rejected when any device in the group is recovering. This is necessary to fence concurrent attachments to a multi-device group where devices might share the same RID due to PCI DMA alias quirks, but triggers the WARN_ON in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail().
Other IOMMU_SET_DOMAIN_MUST_SUCCEED callers in detach/teardown paths, such as __iommu_group_set_core_domain and __iommu_release_dma_ownership, should not be rejected, as the domain would be freed anyway in these nofail paths while group->domain is still pointing to it. So pci_dev_reset_iommu_done() could trigger a UAF when re-attaching group->domain.
Honor the IOMMU_SET_DOMAIN_MUST_SUCCEED flag, allowing the callers through the group->recovery_cnt fence, so as to update the group->domain pointer. Instead add a gdev->blocked check in the device iteration loop, to prevent any concurrent per-device detachment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-617",
"CWE-825"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu: Fix WARN_ON in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() due to reset\n\nIn __iommu_group_set_domain_internal(), concurrent domain attachments are\nrejected when any device in the group is recovering. This is necessary to\nfence concurrent attachments to a multi-device group where devices might\nshare the same RID due to PCI DMA alias quirks, but triggers the WARN_ON in\n__iommu_group_set_domain_nofail().\n\nOther IOMMU_SET_DOMAIN_MUST_SUCCEED callers in detach/teardown paths, such\nas __iommu_group_set_core_domain and __iommu_release_dma_ownership, should\nnot be rejected, as the domain would be freed anyway in these nofail paths\nwhile group-\u003edomain is still pointing to it. So pci_dev_reset_iommu_done()\ncould trigger a UAF when re-attaching group-\u003edomain.\n\nHonor the IOMMU_SET_DOMAIN_MUST_SUCCEED flag, allowing the callers through\nthe group-\u003erecovery_cnt fence, so as to update the group-\u003edomain pointer.\nInstead add a gdev-\u003eblocked check in the device iteration loop, to prevent\nany concurrent per-device detachment.",
"id": "GHSA-xhhc-r2pj-8hh5",
"modified": "2026-06-30T03:37:11Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T18:32:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-52952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492422"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5474e6e17a262db45c60575c73f70210f5c7001f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fc289e809f3eb7e36cadc4684ab6fad747a5a93"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-52952.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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