GHSA-WP5X-HRRW-6R4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 18:07Jenkins Git client Plugin 6.6.0 and earlier does not correctly escape the workspace directory name when it is embedded into the SSH wrapper script generated by the "Manually provided keys" Git Host Key Verification strategy on Unix agents.
This allows attackers able to control the name of a build’s working directory (e.g. through a build parameter that determines the workspace directory) to inject shell command substitution and execute arbitrary commands on the agent.
This vulnerability only has an impact when attackers can control working directories (e.g., the argument to the dir(…) Pipeline step) while not being able to control the Pipeline itself or the programs or build scripts it executes.
This vulnerability has been reported through the Jenkins Bug Bounty Program sponsored by the European Commission. Git client Plugin 6.6.1 stores the known_hosts file used by the "Manually provided keys" Git Host Key Verification strategy in the system temporary directory, so the workspace directory name is no longer embedded in the path passed to the generated SSH wrapper script.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:git-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57282"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-25T18:07:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T14:17:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins Git client Plugin 6.6.0 and earlier does not correctly escape the workspace directory name when it is embedded into the SSH wrapper script generated by the \"Manually provided keys\" Git Host Key Verification strategy on Unix agents.\n\nThis allows attackers able to control the name of a build\u2019s working directory (e.g. through a build parameter that determines the workspace directory) to inject shell command substitution and execute arbitrary commands on the agent.\n\nThis vulnerability only has an impact when attackers can control working directories (e.g., the argument to the dir(\u2026) Pipeline step) while not being able to control the Pipeline itself or the programs or build scripts it executes.\n\nThis vulnerability has been reported through the Jenkins Bug Bounty Program sponsored by the European Commission.\nGit client Plugin 6.6.1 stores the known_hosts file used by the \"Manually provided keys\" Git Host Key Verification strategy in the system temporary directory, so the workspace directory name is no longer embedded in the path passed to the generated SSH wrapper script.",
"id": "GHSA-wp5x-hrrw-6r4g",
"modified": "2026-09-25T18:07:21Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T15:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/git-client-plugin/commit/a10f61003e39fd9be6fada0560b13ba718b2716f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/git-client-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/git-client-plugin/releases/tag/git-client-6.6.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2026-06-24/#SECURITY-3723"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins Git client Plugin has an OS command injection vulnerability on agents"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.