GHSA-WH94-P5M6-MR7J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-20 21:02 – Updated: 2026-02-23 22:29
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw Discord moderation authorization used untrusted sender identity in tool-driven flows
Details

Overview

Discord moderation action handling (timeout, kick, ban) used sender identity from request parameters in tool-driven flows, instead of trusted runtime sender context.

Impact

In setups where Discord moderation actions are enabled and the bot has the necessary guild permissions, a non-admin user could request moderation actions by spoofing sender identity fields.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published affected version (as of 2026-02-19): 2026.2.17
  • Affected range: <=2026.2.17
  • Fixed in planned next release: 2026.2.18

Fix

  • Moderation authorization now uses trusted sender context (requesterSenderId) instead of untrusted action params.
  • Added permission checks for required guild capabilities per action.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 775816035ecc6bb243843f8000c9a58ff609e32d

Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27484"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-20T21:02:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-21T10:16:12Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Overview\n\nDiscord moderation action handling (`timeout`, `kick`, `ban`) used sender identity from request parameters in tool-driven flows, instead of trusted runtime sender context.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn setups where Discord moderation actions are enabled and the bot has the necessary guild permissions, a non-admin user could request moderation actions by spoofing sender identity fields.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published affected version (as of 2026-02-19): `2026.2.17`\n- Affected range: `\u003c=2026.2.17`\n- Fixed in planned next release: `2026.2.18`\n\n## Fix\n\n- Moderation authorization now uses trusted sender context (`requesterSenderId`) instead of untrusted action params.\n- Added permission checks for required guild capabilities per action.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `775816035ecc6bb243843f8000c9a58ff609e32d`\n\nThanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-wh94-p5m6-mr7j",
  "modified": "2026-02-23T22:29:14Z",
  "published": "2026-02-20T21:02:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-wh94-p5m6-mr7j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27484"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/775816035ecc6bb243843f8000c9a58ff609e32d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.19"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw Discord moderation authorization used untrusted sender identity in tool-driven flows"
}


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