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GHSA-WFQ4-36M3-9G42

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 14:47 – Updated: 2026-06-04 14:47
VLAI
Summary
Matrix Rust SDK: Sender-binding gaps in to-device and room-key attribution
Details

Impact

The matrix-sdk-crypto crate before 0.16.1 is missing a check for the sender's user ID when decrypting an Olm-encrypted to-device message containing the sender_device_keys property.

This could be exploited to spoof the sender of an encrypted to-device message, but only if the attacker colludes with (or is) the homeserver operator.

Patches

This issue is fixed in matrix-sdk-crypto 0.16.1.

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds for the issue.

References

This issue was fixed in https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/pull/6553.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at security at matrix.org.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "matrix-sdk-crypto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.16.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45056"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T14:47:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe `matrix-sdk-crypto` crate before 0.16.1 is missing a check for the sender\u0027s user ID when decrypting an Olm-encrypted to-device message containing the `sender_device_keys` property.\n\nThis could be exploited to spoof the sender of an encrypted to-device message, but only if the attacker colludes with (or is) the homeserver operator.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue is fixed in `matrix-sdk-crypto` 0.16.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no known workarounds for the issue.\n\n### References\n\nThis issue was fixed in https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/pull/6553.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [security at matrix.org](mailto:security@matrix.org).",
  "id": "GHSA-wfq4-36m3-9g42",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T14:47:05Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T14:47:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-wfq4-36m3-9g42"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/pull/6553"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/releases/tag/matrix-sdk-0.16.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0159.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Matrix Rust SDK: Sender-binding gaps in to-device and room-key attribution"
}



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