{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "zebra-state"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.4.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "zebrad"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52738"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:44:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed `MAX_MONEY`, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer.\n\nBecause the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch.\n\n### Details\n\nThe finalized state writer at `zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs` iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the `MAX_MONEY` supply cap even though the final net balance (credits minus debits) is valid.\n\nThe code panics on the intermediate overflow via `.expect()` on the balance addition. Under Zebra\u0027s `panic = \"abort\"` release profile, this terminates the process. On restart, the node re-downloads and re-processes the same consensus-valid block, triggering the same panic.\n\nAn attacker with approximately 1,100\u20132,100 ZEC and mining capability can construct a block that permanently halts all Zebra nodes. The attacker recovers their capital (the self-spends return funds to the same address), so the net cost is the mining effort only.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix processes credits and debits together per transaction rather than all credits then all debits, matching zcashd\u0027s approach.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available. Upgrade to Zebra 4.4.2.\n\n### Impact\n\nA single consensus-valid mined block can permanently halt all Zebra nodes on the network. The halt persists across restarts. Recovery requires deploying a patched version. Downstream consumers (light wallets, exchanges, mining infrastructure) lose service for the duration of the halt.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by `@sangsoo-osec`.",
  "id": "GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T19:44:54Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T19:44:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks"
}