GHSA-W7WM-2425-7P2H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-04 21:23 – Updated: 2025-02-06 18:04
VLAI
Summary
MarbleRun unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation
Details

Impact

During recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest. This allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state.

If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference.

Under these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment.

This issue does not affect the following:

  • secrets and state of the legitimate Coordinator instances
  • integrity of workloads
  • certificates chaining back to the legitimate Coordinator root certificate

Patches

The issue has been patched in v1.7.0.

Workarounds

Connections that purely authenticate based on a known Coordinator's root certificate, e.g. the one retrieved when using the marblerun manifest set CLI command, are not affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-04T21:23:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nDuring recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest.\nThis allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state.\n\nIf network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker\u0027s Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference.\n\nUnder these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment.\n\nThis issue does **not** affect the following:\n\n* secrets and state of the legitimate Coordinator instances\n* integrity of workloads\n* certificates chaining back to the legitimate Coordinator root certificate\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in [`v1.7.0`](https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/releases/tag/v1.7.0).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nConnections that purely authenticate based on a known Coordinator\u0027s root certificate, e.g. the one retrieved when using the `marblerun manifest set` CLI command, are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h",
  "modified": "2025-02-06T18:04:37Z",
  "published": "2025-02-04T21:23:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/security/advisories/GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/commit/e4864f9f1d0f12a4a7d28514da43bcc75603a5b5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/releases/tag/v1.7.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3450"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MarbleRun unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation"
}



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