ghsa-w5vr-6qhr-36cc
Vulnerability from github
Versions of ed25519-dalek
prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a Keypair
, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.
Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the S
part of the signature, but not in the R
value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same R
and only differ on the S
part.
Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.
Revised public APIs in v2.0 of ed25519-dalek
do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled "hazmat" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "crates.io", "name": "ed25519-dalek" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "2.0.0" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2022-50237" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-497" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-14T21:10:29Z", "nvd_published_at": null, "severity": "MODERATE" }, "details": "Versions of `ed25519-dalek` prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a `Keypair`, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.\n\nSuch APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the `S` part of the signature, but not in the `R` value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same `R` and only differ on the `S` part.\n\nUnfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.\n\nRevised public APIs in v2.0 of `ed25519-dalek` do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled \"hazmat\" APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.", "id": "GHSA-w5vr-6qhr-36cc", "modified": "2025-07-28T15:53:32Z", "published": "2023-08-14T21:10:29Z", "references": [ { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50237" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/MystenLabs/ed25519-unsafe-libs" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/ed25519-dalek" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0093.html" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "`ed25519-dalek` Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack" }
Sightings
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Nomenclature
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- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.