GHSA-VXX9-2994-Q338
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:04 – Updated: 2026-03-16 22:01Summary
The Rust implementation of Yamux can panic when processing a crafted inbound Data frame that sets SYN and uses a body length greater than DEFAULT_CREDIT (e.g. 262145). On the first packet of a new inbound stream, stream state is created and a receiver is queued before oversized-body validation completes. When validation fails, the temporary stream is dropped and cleanup may call remove(...).expect("stream not found"), triggering a panic in the connection state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal Yamux session and does not require authentication. kind of vulnerability is it? Who is
Attack Scenario
An attacker that can establish a Yamux session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single validly encoded Yamux Data|SYN frame with an oversized body: 1. Establish a standard authenticated transport session that negotiates Yamux. 2. Send one Yamux frame with: - Tag = Data - Flags = SYN - StreamId = 1 (or any new inbound stream id) - Length = DEFAULT_CREDIT + 1 (e.g. 262145) - Body of matching size This can trigger a panic (stream not found) and terminate the process, depending on host application panic policy.
Patches
Users should upgrade to yamux v0.13.10
This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "yamux"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32314"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-617"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:04:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-16T14:19:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe Rust implementation of Yamux can panic when processing a crafted inbound Data frame that sets SYN and uses a body length greater than DEFAULT_CREDIT (e.g. 262145).\nOn the first packet of a new inbound stream, stream state is created and a receiver is queued before oversized-body validation completes. When validation fails, the temporary stream is dropped and cleanup may call remove(...).expect(\"stream not found\"), triggering a panic in the connection state machine.\nThis is remotely reachable over a normal Yamux session and does not require authentication. kind of vulnerability is it? Who is \n#### Attack Scenario \nAn attacker that can establish a Yamux session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single validly encoded Yamux Data|SYN frame with an oversized body:\n1. Establish a standard authenticated transport session that negotiates Yamux.\n2. Send one Yamux frame with:\n - Tag = Data\n - Flags = SYN\n - StreamId = 1 (or any new inbound stream id)\n - Length = DEFAULT_CREDIT + 1 (e.g. 262145)\n - Body of matching size\nThis can trigger a panic (stream not found) and terminate the process, depending on host application panic policy.\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to `yamux` `v0.13.10`\n\nThis vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program",
"id": "GHSA-vxx9-2994-q338",
"modified": "2026-03-16T22:01:11Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T20:04:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-yamux/security/advisories/GHSA-vxx9-2994-q338"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32314"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-yamux"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Yamux vulnerable to remote Panic via malformed Data frame with SYN set and len = 262145"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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