{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-05T21:30:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nRecovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker. \n\nIf network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker\u0027s coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either \n\n* they `set` a new manifest and don\u0027t compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of the `contrast` CLI) or\n* they `verify` the coordinator and don\u0027t compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference.\n\nUnder these circumstances, the attacker can:\n\n* Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator\u0027s root CA.\n* Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack.\n\nThis issue does **not** affect the following:\n\n* secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA)\n* integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator\n* certificates chaining back to the mesh CA\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations.\n\n* At the first `set` call, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator.\n* After subsequent `set` or `verify` calls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.",
  "id": "GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8",
  "modified": "2025-02-06T18:05:15Z",
  "published": "2025-02-05T21:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3455"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Contrast\u0027s unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation"
}