{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "surrealdb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T20:10:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An authenticated record or scope user could read records on any table reachable through a graph edge or `REFERENCES TO` back-reference, regardless of that table\u0027s `PERMISSIONS FOR select` clause.\n\nTraversing `SELECT * FROM source-\u003eedge-\u003etarget` returned full documents from `target` even when `target` was defined as `PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE`. The same bypass extended through multi-hop chains, so any table reachable by a sequence of edges from a readable starting point was exposed.\n\nThe root cause: `GraphEdgeScan` and `ReferenceScan` fetched records straight from storage without routing them through `Document::pluck_select`, so the target table\u0027s permission expression was never consulted.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated record or scope user can read records on any table reachable through a chain of graph edges or back-references from a table they have `select` on, regardless of the target\u0027s `PERMISSIONS FOR select` clause. Confidentiality-only and bounded to the caller\u0027s current database \u2014 namespace and database isolation are unaffected.\n\n### Patches\n\nA new per-batch permission cache (`exec::permission::CachedTableSelect`) resolves each target table\u0027s `SELECT` permission once and filters yielded values through `check_permission_for_value`, matching the regular `SELECT` code path.\n\n- Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Remove `select` permission on edge tables whose targets should be hidden.\n- Use namespace or database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjjx-rfw4-rmfc",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T20:10:34Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T20:10:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-vjjx-rfw4-rmfc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SurrealDB: Graph traversal bypasses table SELECT permissions"
}