GHSA-VHJ5-X93P-67JW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:29 – Updated: 2026-03-11 00:29Summary
actix-web-lab redirect middleware uses request-derived host information to construct absolute redirect URLs (for example, https://{hostname}{path}). In deployments without strict host allowlisting, an attacker can supply a malicious Host header and poison the Location response header, causing open redirect/phishing behavior.
CVE
Assigned CVE ID: CVE-2025-63762
Details
The issue is in redirect middleware paths that construct absolute URLs from req.connection_info():
actix-web-lab/src/redirect_to_https.rs(around lines 119-132)let host = conn_info.host();format!("https://{hostname}{path}")-
format!("https://{hostname}:{port}{path}") -
actix-web-lab/src/redirect_to_www.rs(around lines 30-35) -
format!("{scheme}://www.{host}{path}") -
actix-web-lab/src/redirect_to_non_www.rs(around lines 30-34) format!("{scheme}://{host_no_www}{path}")
Because host values come from request connection metadata, untrusted Host input can influence redirect targets when deployment-side host validation is missing.
PoC
Environment used for validation:
- Local minimal Actix apps using actix-web-lab middleware
- RedirectHttps: http://127.0.0.1:18080
- redirect_to_www: http://127.0.0.1:18081
- redirect_to_non_www: http://127.0.0.1:18082
Reproduction (RedirectHttps):
curl.exe -i -s "http://127.0.0.1:18080/test" -H "Host: attacker.example"
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
location: https://attacker.example/test
Additional verification:
curl.exe -i -s "http://127.0.0.1:18080/abc/def" -H "Host: evil.example:9999"
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
location: https://evil.example/abc/def
Reproduction (redirect_to_www):
curl.exe -i -s "http://127.0.0.1:18081/hello" -H "Host: attacker.example"
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
location: http://www.attacker.example/hello
Reproduction (redirect_to_non_www):
curl.exe -i -s "http://127.0.0.1:18082/path" -H "Host: www.attacker.example"
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
location: http://attacker.example/path
Impact
This is a Host header poisoning / open redirect issue. Users can be redirected to attacker-controlled domains, enabling phishing and trust-boundary abuse. Any application using these middleware paths without strict host validation (proxy/app allowlisting) is impacted.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.25.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "actix-web-lab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:29:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`actix-web-lab` redirect middleware uses request-derived host information to construct absolute redirect URLs (for example, `https://{hostname}{path}`). In deployments without strict host allowlisting, an attacker can supply a malicious Host header and poison the `Location` response header, causing open redirect/phishing behavior.\n\n### CVE\nAssigned CVE ID: CVE-2025-63762\n\n### Details\nThe issue is in redirect middleware paths that construct absolute URLs from `req.connection_info()`:\n\n1. `actix-web-lab/src/redirect_to_https.rs` (around lines 119-132)\n - `let host = conn_info.host();`\n - `format!(\"https://{hostname}{path}\")`\n - `format!(\"https://{hostname}:{port}{path}\")`\n\n2. `actix-web-lab/src/redirect_to_www.rs` (around lines 30-35)\n - `format!(\"{scheme}://www.{host}{path}\")`\n\n3. `actix-web-lab/src/redirect_to_non_www.rs` (around lines 30-34)\n - `format!(\"{scheme}://{host_no_www}{path}\")`\n\nBecause host values come from request connection metadata, untrusted Host input can influence redirect targets when deployment-side host validation is missing.\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment used for validation:\n- Local minimal Actix apps using `actix-web-lab` middleware\n- RedirectHttps: `http://127.0.0.1:18080`\n- redirect_to_www: `http://127.0.0.1:18081`\n- redirect_to_non_www: `http://127.0.0.1:18082`\n\nReproduction (RedirectHttps):\n```bash\ncurl.exe -i -s \"http://127.0.0.1:18080/test\" -H \"Host: attacker.example\"\n```\n\nObserved response:\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect\nlocation: https://attacker.example/test\n```\n\nAdditional verification:\n```bash\ncurl.exe -i -s \"http://127.0.0.1:18080/abc/def\" -H \"Host: evil.example:9999\"\n```\n\nObserved response:\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect\nlocation: https://evil.example/abc/def\n```\n\nReproduction (redirect_to_www):\n```bash\ncurl.exe -i -s \"http://127.0.0.1:18081/hello\" -H \"Host: attacker.example\"\n```\n\nObserved response:\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect\nlocation: http://www.attacker.example/hello\n```\n\nReproduction (redirect_to_non_www):\n```bash\ncurl.exe -i -s \"http://127.0.0.1:18082/path\" -H \"Host: www.attacker.example\"\n```\n\nObserved response:\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect\nlocation: http://attacker.example/path\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a Host header poisoning / open redirect issue. Users can be redirected to attacker-controlled domains, enabling phishing and trust-boundary abuse. Any application using these middleware paths without strict host validation (proxy/app allowlisting) is impacted.",
"id": "GHSA-vhj5-x93p-67jw",
"modified": "2026-03-11T00:29:17Z",
"published": "2026-03-11T00:29:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/robjtede/actix-web-lab/security/advisories/GHSA-vhj5-x93p-67jw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/robjtede/actix-web-lab/pull/292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/robjtede/actix-web-lab/commit/142c28b82eb59b67445a859a2a9b75e01a9964ee"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/robjtede/actix-web-lab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "actix-web-lab has host header poisoning in redirect middleware can generate attacker-controlled absolute redirects"
}
Sightings
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