GHSA-V2JF-442R-6MJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 21:01 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:01internal/api/pop/nonce.go:25,40,86 + internal/api/server.go:38 — the signed-poll nonce cache is an in-process LRU sized at 65,536 entries. internal/api/updates.go:31 sets pollClockSkew = 5 * time.Minute as the replay window.
Affected
All released versions through v0.3.0 that have shipped the ADR 0004 signed-poll path. (If this is gated behind a feature flag, on a side branch, or not yet on a release tag, please flag — this advisory may not apply to the released artifact yet.)
Threat model
A captured signed-poll request can be replayed:
- After any process restart — the in-memory LRU is wiped, so the original nonce becomes "unseen" again. Replay succeeds if the original timestamp is still within the 5-minute skew.
- After forced eviction — an attacker with control of any single host can flood >65,536 nonces under their own host_id, driving the global LRU to evict the victim's recorded nonce. Replay then succeeds.
Impact is bounded: a replayed poll fetches the /api/v1/agent/updates body. That body can include a freshly-minted enrollment token if a rekey is pending (updates.go:249-260) — at which point the attacker holds a single-use token they can redeem under their own keypair.
Suggested fix
Two options, either acceptable:
- Persist nonces in SQLite keyed by
(host_id, nonce)withON CONFLICT DO NOTHING, retained for the timestamp-skew window. Adds one transactional INSERT per poll; bounded by the skew window (~5 min worth of rows server-wide). - Per-host cap on the LRU instead of a global 65k cap, so one host cannot evict another's records. Combined with shorter skew (≤30s) to bound the post-restart replay window.
Option 1 is more robust; option 2 is lower-implementation-effort.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T21:01:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "`internal/api/pop/nonce.go:25,40,86` + `internal/api/server.go:38` \u2014 the signed-poll nonce cache is an in-process LRU sized at 65,536 entries. `internal/api/updates.go:31` sets `pollClockSkew = 5 * time.Minute` as the replay window.\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions through v0.3.0 that have shipped the ADR 0004 signed-poll path. (If this is gated behind a feature flag, on a side branch, or not yet on a release tag, please flag \u2014 this advisory may not apply to the released artifact yet.)\n\n## Threat model\nA captured signed-poll request can be replayed:\n\n1. **After any process restart** \u2014 the in-memory LRU is wiped, so the original nonce becomes \"unseen\" again. Replay succeeds if the original timestamp is still within the 5-minute skew.\n2. **After forced eviction** \u2014 an attacker with control of any single host can flood \u003e65,536 nonces under their own host_id, driving the global LRU to evict the victim\u0027s recorded nonce. Replay then succeeds.\n\nImpact is bounded: a replayed poll fetches the `/api/v1/agent/updates` body. That body can include a freshly-minted enrollment token if a rekey is pending (`updates.go:249-260`) \u2014 at which point the attacker holds a single-use token they can redeem under their own keypair.\n\n## Suggested fix\nTwo options, either acceptable:\n\n1. Persist nonces in SQLite keyed by `(host_id, nonce)` with `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, retained for the timestamp-skew window. Adds one transactional INSERT per poll; bounded by the skew window (~5 min worth of rows server-wide).\n2. Per-host cap on the LRU instead of a global 65k cap, so one host cannot evict another\u0027s records. Combined with shorter skew (\u226430s) to bound the post-restart replay window.\n\nOption 1 is more robust; option 2 is lower-implementation-effort.",
"id": "GHSA-v2jf-442r-6mjh",
"modified": "2026-06-26T21:01:09Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T21:01:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-v2jf-442r-6mjh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "nebula-mesh: Signed-poll nonce LRU is in-memory and bounded; replay survives restart + eviction"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.