GHSA-RXFF-7RCF-X4WJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty
hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from
list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list)
without first checking that hid->inputs is non-empty. The list member of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry() yields &hid->inputs itself and the following hidinput->input load reads an unrelated member of struct hid_device. dev is then a type-confused pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each set_bit(FF_*, dev->ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers.
Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at least one hid_input. universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a PID usage page, bypassing that gate. A report descriptor whose only application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid->inputs empty while hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches the unguarded list_entry().
The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker software and no logged-in user are required. KASAN reports an 8-byte out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from universal_pidff_probe().
Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the other HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe() propagates the error and unwinds.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee baul.lee@xbow.com
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80780"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T16:18:03Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid-\u003einputs is empty\n\nhid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from\n\n\tlist_entry(hid-\u003einputs.next, struct hid_input, list)\n\nwithout first checking that hid-\u003einputs is non-empty. The list member\nof struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry()\nyields \u0026hid-\u003einputs itself and the following hidinput-\u003einput load reads\nan unrelated member of struct hid_device. dev is then a type-confused\npointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each\nset_bit(FF_*, dev-\u003effbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of\nthe object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further\nwrites of a heap pointer and two function pointers.\n\nUntil hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from\nusbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at\nleast one hid_input. universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with\nHID_CONNECT_DEFAULT \u0026 ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls\nhid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a\nPID usage page, bypassing that gate. A report descriptor whose only\napplication collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid-\u003einputs empty while\nhid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches\nthe unguarded list_entry().\n\nThe write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so\nplugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker\nsoftware and no logged-in user are required. KASAN reports an 8-byte\nout-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from\nuniversal_pidff_probe().\n\nCheck for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the\nother HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe()\npropagates the error and unwinds.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee \u003cbaul.lee@xbow.com\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-rxff-7rcf-x4wj",
"modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T18:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80780"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e0471bf3ab2a6b7eedcc3b8a2a17286b6a9ae1a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4529c03c3da8f91392cd630453452f569973f4cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67bb1074e3d2d12fa059a9cc707e89398a4e4704"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86b63adfa5e132beac4be72668fdf9128fe51d2e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad9330f7e74a97842815a291a0d7389ed2f34504"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d416eeb7d016d82af67c149d884bc6a9323c4ac7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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