GHSA-RW89-WM92-GVRJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: validate split-point offset in indx_insert_into_buffer
indx_insert_into_buffer() computes
used = used1 - to_copy - sp_size;
memmove(de_t, Add2Ptr(sp, sp_size), used - le32_to_cpu(hdr1->de_off));
where sp and sp_size come from hdr_find_split(). hdr_find_split() walks entries by le16_to_cpu(e->size) without validating that each step stays within hdr->used or that the size field is at least sizeof(struct NTFS_DE). index_hdr_check(), the on-load gatekeeper, only validates header-level fields (used, total, de_off) and does not walk per-entry sizes.
A crafted NTFS image whose leaf INDEX_HDR reports used == total but contains one interior NTFS_DE with size = 0xFFF0 therefore passes validation, descends to indx_insert_into_buffer() through the ntfs_create() -> indx_insert_entry() path, and makes hdr_find_split() return an sp whose sp_size (0xFFF0) greatly exceeds the remaining bytes in the buffer. The u32 subtraction underflows and the memmove count becomes a near-4-GiB value, producing an out-of-bounds kernel write that corrupts adjacent allocations and panics the kernel.
Reproduced on 7.0.0-rc7 with UML + KASAN via a crafted image and a single 'touch' inside the mounted directory; crash site resolves to fs/ntfs3/index.c at the memmove. Trigger requires only local mount of an attacker-supplied filesystem image (USB, loopback, or removable media auto-mount).
Reject the split whenever the chosen sp plus its declared size already extends past hdr1->used. This is the minimal fix; it preserves the existing hdr_find_split() contract and relies on the same out: cleanup path as the pre-existing error returns.
A prior OOB read in the very same indx_insert_into_buffer() memmove was fixed in commit b8c44949044e ("fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in indx_insert_into_buffer") by tightening hdr_find_e(), but that fix does not cover the split-point size field path addressed here: sp is returned by hdr_find_split(), not hdr_find_e(), and the underflow is driven by sp->size rather than hdr->used exceeding hdr->total.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72191"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:37Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs3: validate split-point offset in indx_insert_into_buffer\n\nindx_insert_into_buffer() computes\n\n used = used1 - to_copy - sp_size;\n memmove(de_t, Add2Ptr(sp, sp_size), used - le32_to_cpu(hdr1-\u003ede_off));\n\nwhere sp and sp_size come from hdr_find_split(). hdr_find_split()\nwalks entries by le16_to_cpu(e-\u003esize) without validating that each\nstep stays within hdr-\u003eused or that the size field is at least\nsizeof(struct NTFS_DE). index_hdr_check(), the on-load gatekeeper,\nonly validates header-level fields (used, total, de_off) and does\nnot walk per-entry sizes.\n\nA crafted NTFS image whose leaf INDEX_HDR reports used == total but\ncontains one interior NTFS_DE with size = 0xFFF0 therefore passes\nvalidation, descends to indx_insert_into_buffer() through the\nntfs_create() -\u003e indx_insert_entry() path, and makes hdr_find_split()\nreturn an sp whose sp_size (0xFFF0) greatly exceeds the remaining\nbytes in the buffer. The u32 subtraction underflows and the memmove\ncount becomes a near-4-GiB value, producing an out-of-bounds kernel\nwrite that corrupts adjacent allocations and panics the kernel.\n\nReproduced on 7.0.0-rc7 with UML + KASAN via a crafted image and a\nsingle \u0027touch\u0027 inside the mounted directory; crash site resolves to\nfs/ntfs3/index.c at the memmove. Trigger requires only local mount\nof an attacker-supplied filesystem image (USB, loopback, or removable\nmedia auto-mount).\n\nReject the split whenever the chosen sp plus its declared size\nalready extends past hdr1-\u003eused. This is the minimal fix; it\npreserves the existing hdr_find_split() contract and relies on the\nsame out: cleanup path as the pre-existing error returns.\n\nA prior OOB read in the very same indx_insert_into_buffer() memmove\nwas fixed in commit b8c44949044e (\"fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in\nindx_insert_into_buffer\") by tightening hdr_find_e(), but that fix\ndoes not cover the split-point size field path addressed here: sp is\nreturned by hdr_find_split(), not hdr_find_e(), and the underflow is\ndriven by sp-\u003esize rather than hdr-\u003eused exceeding hdr-\u003etotal.",
"id": "GHSA-rw89-wm92-gvrj",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:15Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1758a564b6ebe7f4a82f23c9851d1cae15549457"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bf74e6baf810fe325f111996496c678fc6e244f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b232eb5c9fe11ec2368e9b565db69c724c35fbd2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1df9d771df47aa40de6d70949c28720ae1e430d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3624cc069195001c88df7a291af215f2133ff2c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
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