GHSA-RQ5J-2985-G74R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 06:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read

The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):

if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &&
    sizeof(hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) {

hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header , so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(hdr) consistently:

if (done >= count || sizeof(*hdr) > count - done) {
...
if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) {
...
done += sizeof(*hdr);

struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.

On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur->data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur->data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.

It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width.

Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64293"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read\n\nThe bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT\npath uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):\n\n\tif (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) \u0026\u0026\n\t    sizeof(hdr) + cur-\u003edata_len \u003e count - done) {\n\nhdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr)\nevaluates to the size of the pointer.  Surrounding code uses\nsizeof(*hdr) consistently:\n\n\tif (done \u003e= count || sizeof(*hdr) \u003e count - done) {\n\t...\n\tif (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) {\n\t...\n\tdone += sizeof(*hdr);\n\nstruct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields,\nflags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two\nexpressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.\n\nOn 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by\n4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur-\u003edata_len to exceed\ncount - done while 4 + cur-\u003edata_len does not will pass the check,\nthen the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len\nbytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.\n\nIt is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct\niommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check\nshould not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer\nwidth.\n\nUse sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual\namount that will be copied.",
  "id": "GHSA-rq5j-2985-g74r",
  "modified": "2026-07-27T06:30:31Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T12:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64293"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04a177f91160ee18da98f5689482cf0f589ec869"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cdbb97a4dbd69abdd2ab998b4fbc7803d4b0b72"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be93d186ae88a92e7aa77e122d4e661fa57b1e39"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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