GHSA-RP9W-3FW7-7CWQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 20:01 – Updated: 2026-06-15 20:01
VLAI
Summary
DOMPurify IN_PLACE Sanitization Bypass via Attached Shadow Root Inside <template>.content
Details

If the HTML you give it contains a element, and inside that template there's an element with a shadow DOM attached to it, DOMPurify quietly skips over the shadow contents. Whatever the attacker put in there - an image with an onerror handler, a link with a javascript: URL, even a full script - survives untouched. The moment the application uses that template the way templates are meant to be used (cloning it and inserting the result into the page), the malicious payload comes along and runs as if it had never been sanitized. From there an attacker gets everything XSS normally gets them: session cookies, stored tokens, the ability to act as the user, and the ability to leave persistent payloads behind for the next person who visits.

advisory.pdf

poc.html

Severity
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dompurify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49978"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T20:01:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "If the HTML you give it contains a \u003ctemplate\u003e element, and inside that template there\u0027s an element with a shadow DOM attached to it, DOMPurify quietly skips over the shadow contents. Whatever the attacker put in there - an image with an onerror handler, a link with a javascript: URL, even a full script - survives untouched. The moment the application uses that template the way templates are meant to be used (cloning it and inserting the result into the page), the malicious payload comes along and runs as if it had never been sanitized. From there an attacker gets everything XSS normally gets them: session cookies, stored tokens, the ability to act as the user, and the ability to leave persistent payloads behind for the next person who visits.\n\n[advisory.pdf](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28275600/advisory.pdf)\n\n[poc.html](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28275708/poc.html)",
  "id": "GHSA-rp9w-3fw7-7cwq",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T20:01:45Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T20:01:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-rp9w-3fw7-7cwq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DOMPurify IN_PLACE Sanitization Bypass via Attached Shadow Root Inside \u003ctemplate\u003e.content"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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