GHSA-RFXQ-M8FC-MRW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-03 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: initialize inode mapping flags for cached inodes
[BUG] When running generic/795 with 8K block size, 4K page size, the test always fails, triggering some ASSERT()s related to folio size:
795 (241074): drop_caches: 3 assertion failed: IS_ALIGNED(start, blocksize) && IS_ALIGNED(end + 1, blocksize), in extent_io.c:1404 (blocksize=8192 root=262 ino=258 start=16826368 end=16830463 mapping min order=0) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at extent_io.c:1404! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 241105 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G OE 7.2.0-rc5-custom+ #442 PREEMPT(full) f4bfb352566f3949f29c233ce6f735050a03b245 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 RIP: 0010:assert_folio_range.cold+0x3d/0x3f [btrfs] Call Trace: btrfs_read_folio+0x9e/0x170 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3] prepare_one_folio.constprop.0+0x104/0x2a0 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3] btrfs_buffered_write+0x285/0xa50 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3] btrfs_do_write_iter+0x1aa/0x210 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3] iter_file_splice_write+0x31a/0x540 direct_splice_actor+0x53/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0xe9/0x240 do_splice_direct+0x76/0xb0 vfs_copy_file_range+0x1fd/0x630 __x64_sys_copy_file_range+0xf9/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x790 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The ASSERT() itself is added by a later patch. The crash is triggered with that new debug patch, and without this fix.
[CAUSE] In the above case, the start 16826368 is properly 8K aligned, but the end (16830463 + 1) is not 8K aligned. Furthermore the mapping's minimal folio order is 0, not the expected 1 for 8K block size with 4K page size.
So this means some inodes do not have btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() called on it.
The missing btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() call happens for cached inodes, through the following events:
-
btrfs_create_new_inode() called for inode X Which properly sets minimal folio order for the VFS inode.
-
btrfs_update_inode() called for inode X Which calls btrfs_delayed_update_inode() to create a delayed_node into root->delayed_nodes xarray.
-
Drop cache/memory pressure, evicting in-memory inode X Which evicted the inode X, but delayed_node is still in root->delayed_nodes for future reuse.
-
btrfs_iget() for inode X called again
btrfs_iget() |- btrfs_iget_locked() | |- iget5_locked_rcu() | Which creates a new vfs_inode for btrfs, whose mapping still | has the minimal order as 0. | |- btrfs_read_locked_inode() |- btrfs_fill_inode() | |- btrfs_get_delayed_node() | Which found out the previous node, and use that delayed | node to initialize the new inode. | |- filled = true; |- if (filled) goto cache_index; Which skips the btrfs_update_inode_mapping_flags() and btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() calls. So the inode still has minimal folio order set as 0, not the required 1.
Thus later page cache read will get a folio whose size is smaller than block size, as the mapping has its minimal folio order set as 0 not 1, then trigger the ASSERT().
[FIX] Move the btrfs_update_inode_mapping_flags() and btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() calls under cache_index label, so that the mapping flags and minimal folio order is always set no matter if we have a cached inode.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80734"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T13:06:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: initialize inode mapping flags for cached inodes\n\n[BUG]\nWhen running generic/795 with 8K block size, 4K page size, the test\nalways fails, triggering some ASSERT()s related to folio size:\n\n 795 (241074): drop_caches: 3\n assertion failed: IS_ALIGNED(start, blocksize) \u0026\u0026 IS_ALIGNED(end + 1, blocksize), in extent_io.c:1404 (blocksize=8192 root=262 ino=258 start=16826368 end=16830463 mapping min order=0)\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n kernel BUG at extent_io.c:1404!\n Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP\n CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 241105 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G OE 7.2.0-rc5-custom+ #442 PREEMPT(full) f4bfb352566f3949f29c233ce6f735050a03b245\n Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022\n RIP: 0010:assert_folio_range.cold+0x3d/0x3f [btrfs]\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n btrfs_read_folio+0x9e/0x170 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3]\n prepare_one_folio.constprop.0+0x104/0x2a0 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3]\n btrfs_buffered_write+0x285/0xa50 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3]\n btrfs_do_write_iter+0x1aa/0x210 [btrfs 4cd1dd93b341b8ef766643f9512f4a86259567a3]\n iter_file_splice_write+0x31a/0x540\n direct_splice_actor+0x53/0x170\n splice_direct_to_actor+0xe9/0x240\n do_splice_direct+0x76/0xb0\n vfs_copy_file_range+0x1fd/0x630\n __x64_sys_copy_file_range+0xf9/0x220\n do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x790\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nThe ASSERT() itself is added by a later patch.\nThe crash is triggered with that new debug patch, and without this fix.\n\n[CAUSE]\nIn the above case, the start 16826368 is properly 8K aligned, but the\nend (16830463 + 1) is not 8K aligned.\nFurthermore the mapping\u0027s minimal folio order is 0, not the expected 1\nfor 8K block size with 4K page size.\n\nSo this means some inodes do not have btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order()\ncalled on it.\n\nThe missing btrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() call happens for cached\ninodes, through the following events:\n\n- btrfs_create_new_inode() called for inode X\n Which properly sets minimal folio order for the VFS inode.\n\n- btrfs_update_inode() called for inode X\n Which calls btrfs_delayed_update_inode() to create a delayed_node\n into root-\u003edelayed_nodes xarray.\n\n- Drop cache/memory pressure, evicting in-memory inode X\n Which evicted the inode X, but delayed_node is still in\n root-\u003edelayed_nodes for future reuse.\n\n- btrfs_iget() for inode X called again\n\n btrfs_iget()\n |- btrfs_iget_locked()\n | |- iget5_locked_rcu()\n | Which creates a new vfs_inode for btrfs, whose mapping still\n | has the minimal order as 0.\n |\n |- btrfs_read_locked_inode()\n |- btrfs_fill_inode()\n | |- btrfs_get_delayed_node()\n | Which found out the previous node, and use that delayed\n | node to initialize the new inode.\n |\n |- filled = true;\n |- if (filled) goto cache_index;\n Which skips the btrfs_update_inode_mapping_flags() and\n\tbtrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() calls.\n\tSo the inode still has minimal folio order set as 0, not\n\tthe required 1.\n\nThus later page cache read will get a folio whose size is smaller than\nblock size, as the mapping has its minimal folio order set as 0 not 1,\nthen trigger the ASSERT().\n\n[FIX]\nMove the btrfs_update_inode_mapping_flags() and\nbtrfs_set_inode_mapping_order() calls under cache_index label,\nso that the mapping flags and minimal folio order is always set\nno matter if we have a cached inode.",
"id": "GHSA-rfxq-m8fc-mrw6",
"modified": "2026-09-03T15:32:14Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T15:32:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80734"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d26249671171ab759cb4fdce673554a690fa655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ef349734a93227b45f65fc50a3311d1cc5f03e9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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