GHSA-RF58-PP6R-5653
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-21 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after pull from frag_list
Detect gso fraglist skbs with corrupted geometry (see below) and pass these to skb_segment instead of skb_segment_list, as the first can segment them correctly.
Valid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs - consist of two or more segments - the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size - one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment - all but the last must be gso_size
Optional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can modify these skbs, breaking these invariants.
In extreme cases they pull all data into skb linear. For UDP, this causes a NULL ptr deref in __udpv4_gso_segment_list_csum at udp_hdr(seg->next)->dest.
Detect invalid geometry due to pull, by checking head_skb size. Don't just drop, as this may blackhole a destination. Convert to be able to pass to regular skb_segment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49978"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-21T18:15:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after pull from frag_list\n\nDetect gso fraglist skbs with corrupted geometry (see below) and\npass these to skb_segment instead of skb_segment_list, as the first\ncan segment them correctly.\n\nValid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs\n- consist of two or more segments\n- the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size\n- one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment\n- all but the last must be gso_size\n\nOptional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can\nmodify these skbs, breaking these invariants.\n\nIn extreme cases they pull all data into skb linear. For UDP, this\ncauses a NULL ptr deref in __udpv4_gso_segment_list_csum at\nudp_hdr(seg-\u003enext)-\u003edest.\n\nDetect invalid geometry due to pull, by checking head_skb size.\nDon\u0027t just drop, as this may blackhole a destination. Convert to be\nable to pass to regular skb_segment.",
"id": "GHSA-rf58-pp6r-5653",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:44Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T18:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/080e6c9a3908de193a48f646c5ce1bfb15676ffc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33e28acf42ee863f332a958bfc2f1a284a3659df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3cd00d2e3655fad3bda96dc1ebf17b6495f86fea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1e40ac5b5e9077fe1f7ae0eb88034db0f9ae1ab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af3122f5fdc0d00581d6e598a668df6bf54c9daa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.