{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T19:52:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "OpenClaw\u0027s macOS Dashboard flow exposed Gateway authentication material to browser-controlled surfaces.\n\nBefore the fix, the macOS app appended the shared Gateway `token` and `password` to the Dashboard URL query string when opening the Control UI in the browser. The Control UI then imported the token and persisted it into browser `localStorage` under `openclaw.control.settings.v1`.\n\nThis expanded exposure of reusable Gateway admin credentials into browser address-bar/query surfaces and persistent script-readable storage.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version verified vulnerable: `2026.3.2`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched version: `\u003e= 2026.3.7`\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to browser-controlled surfaces or persistent browser storage could recover a valid Gateway admin token and reuse it against the OpenClaw management interface.\n\nThe exposure chain was:\n\n1. macOS `Open Dashboard` constructed a URL with auth material.\n2. The browser received that credential-bearing URL.\n3. The Control UI imported the token from the URL.\n4. The Control UI persisted the token in `localStorage`.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe fix aligns the macOS Dashboard flow with the safer existing CLI/bootstrap pattern and removes persistent browser token storage:\n\n- macOS Dashboard now passes the Gateway token via URL fragment instead of query parameters.\n- macOS Dashboard no longer propagates the shared Gateway password into browser URLs.\n- Control UI keeps Gateway tokens in memory only for the current tab.\n- Control UI scrubs legacy persisted tokens from `openclaw.control.settings.v1` on load.\n- Regression tests cover fragment transport, password omission, and token-scrubbing behavior.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `10d0e3f3ca92326df0ca071fabffe463742f263c` (March 7, 2026)\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @whiter6666 for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T19:52:29Z",
  "published": "2026-03-09T19:52:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/10d0e3f3ca92326df0ca071fabffe463742f263c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s dashboard leaked gateway auth material via browser URL/query and localStorage"
}