GHSA-R5C2-6W2M-2M2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mfd: qnap-mcu: keep the reply buffer alive past a command timeout
qnap_mcu_exec() publishes an on-stack buffer to the receive path:
unsigned char rx[QNAP_MCU_RX_BUFFER_SIZE];
...
reply->data = rx;
reply->length = length;
and qnap_mcu_receive_buf() writes into it from the serdev receive path, which runs out of flush_to_ldisc() and is not serialized against qnap_mcu_exec() at all. bus_lock cannot cover it, because qnap_mcu_exec() holds that mutex across wait_for_completion_timeout().
On a timeout qnap_mcu_exec() returns with reply->data still pointing at its own frame. A reply that arrives late, or an unsolicited message from the MCU, is then written into a stack frame that has been left, corrupting whatever runs next on that stack. The same applies when qnap_mcu_write() fails, since that path returns without touching the reply state either.
Move the receive buffer into struct qnap_mcu. It is 37 bytes and the structure is devm_kzalloc()ed, so it lives as long as the driver, and a late write lands in memory that is still valid and is reinitialized by the next command. bus_lock keeps commands from sharing it.
This deliberately does not clear reply->data or reply->length on the timeout path. Doing so races with qnap_mcu_receive_buf(), which reads both after its
if (!reply->length)
return size;
check: clearing reply->data gives a NULL dereference, and clearing reply->length alone removes the reply->received == reply->length exit condition, so the copy loop runs until the uart chunk is consumed and overruns the buffer. Leaving both set keeps the write bounded by reply->length, which qnap_mcu_exec() has already checked against sizeof(mcu->rx).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80975"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmfd: qnap-mcu: keep the reply buffer alive past a command timeout\n\nqnap_mcu_exec() publishes an on-stack buffer to the receive path:\n\n\tunsigned char rx[QNAP_MCU_RX_BUFFER_SIZE];\n\t...\n\treply-\u003edata = rx;\n\treply-\u003elength = length;\n\nand qnap_mcu_receive_buf() writes into it from the serdev receive path,\nwhich runs out of flush_to_ldisc() and is not serialized against\nqnap_mcu_exec() at all. bus_lock cannot cover it, because qnap_mcu_exec()\nholds that mutex across wait_for_completion_timeout().\n\nOn a timeout qnap_mcu_exec() returns with reply-\u003edata still pointing at\nits own frame. A reply that arrives late, or an unsolicited message from\nthe MCU, is then written into a stack frame that has been left, corrupting\nwhatever runs next on that stack. The same applies when qnap_mcu_write()\nfails, since that path returns without touching the reply state either.\n\nMove the receive buffer into struct qnap_mcu. It is 37 bytes and the\nstructure is devm_kzalloc()ed, so it lives as long as the driver, and a\nlate write lands in memory that is still valid and is reinitialized by the\nnext command. bus_lock keeps commands from sharing it.\n\nThis deliberately does not clear reply-\u003edata or reply-\u003elength on the\ntimeout path. Doing so races with qnap_mcu_receive_buf(), which reads both\nafter its\n\n\tif (!reply-\u003elength)\n\t\treturn size;\n\ncheck: clearing reply-\u003edata gives a NULL dereference, and clearing\nreply-\u003elength alone removes the reply-\u003ereceived == reply-\u003elength exit\ncondition, so the copy loop runs until the uart chunk is consumed and\noverruns the buffer. Leaving both set keeps the write bounded by\nreply-\u003elength, which qnap_mcu_exec() has already checked against\nsizeof(mcu-\u003erx).",
"id": "GHSA-r5c2-6w2m-2m2q",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b6680e306397097a97767447368221fac753809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47504742cea7878ebd1bf1491bbed923df6b90b1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8391ee06d08845a0a165b5fe679ba326915166b2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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