GHSA-R2JG-MCXG-628G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-24 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

s390/ap: use generic driver_override infrastructure

When the AP masks are updated via apmask_store() or aqmask_store(), ap_bus_revise_bindings() is called after ap_attr_mutex has been released.

This calls __ap_revise_reserved(), which accesses the driver_override field without holding any lock, racing against a concurrent driver_override_store() that may free the old string, resulting in a potential UAF.

Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure, which protects all accesses with an internal spinlock.

Note that unlike most other buses, the AP bus does not check driver_override in its match() callback; the override is checked in ap_device_probe() and __ap_revise_reserved() instead.

Also note that we do not enable the driver_override feature of struct bus_type, as AP - in contrast to most other buses - passes "" to sysfs_emit() when the driver_override pointer is NULL. Thus, printing "\n" instead of "(null)\n".

Additionally, AP has a custom counter that is modified in the corresponding custom driver_override_store().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53116"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:25Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ns390/ap: use generic driver_override infrastructure\n\nWhen the AP masks are updated via apmask_store() or aqmask_store(),\nap_bus_revise_bindings() is called after ap_attr_mutex has been\nreleased.\n\nThis calls __ap_revise_reserved(), which accesses the driver_override\nfield without holding any lock, racing against a concurrent\ndriver_override_store() that may free the old string, resulting in a\npotential UAF.\n\nFix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure, which\nprotects all accesses with an internal spinlock.\n\nNote that unlike most other buses, the AP bus does not check\ndriver_override in its match() callback; the override is checked in\nap_device_probe() and __ap_revise_reserved() instead.\n\nAlso note that we do not enable the driver_override feature of struct\nbus_type, as AP - in contrast to most other buses - passes \"\" to\nsysfs_emit() when the driver_override pointer is NULL. Thus, printing\n\"\\n\" instead of \"(null)\\n\".\n\nAdditionally, AP has a custom counter that is modified in the\ncorresponding custom driver_override_store().",
  "id": "GHSA-r2jg-mcxg-628g",
  "modified": "2026-06-24T18:32:47Z",
  "published": "2026-06-24T18:32:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53116"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81d6f7c3a70b10ff757ee8b5f8114a190871cf1e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f2eca0570438b94602da1297353eb7b10dcb6cb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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